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ABSTRACT 
DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION FOR TURKEY? 
MELİSA MENDOZA VASQUEZ 
Program of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, M.A. Thesis, June 2015 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Fuat Keyman 
Keywords: Kurdish conflict, self-determination, territorial self-governance, 
power sharing, conflict resolution. 
Territorial self-governance is an effective conflict resolution tool commonly used in 
countries where ethnic groups make self-determination demands. The success of 
territorial self-governance in resolving conflicts, however, largely relies on the way its 
institutional design is arranged. Power sharing mechanisms, at this point, emerge as 
central for the success of the design. In the light of these theoretical considerations, this 
thesis examines in detail the institutional design of Democratic Autonomy -the self-
governance model proposed by the Kurdish movement in Turkey for the resolution of 
the Kurdish conflict- and aims to evaluate the extent to which the model can contribute 
to the resolution at issue. In order to conduct the analysis, Democratic Autonomy model 
is situated in an analytical framework which can manifest an effective tailor-made 
institutional design for a territorial self-governance arrangement with essential power 
sharing mechanisms. In-depth interviews conducted with prominent Kurdish actors and 
first hand documents obtained from the mainstream Kurdish organizations make up the 
data utilized for the study. In accordance with the analysis carried out, the thesis argues 
that Democratic Autonomy is a valuable project for an alternative governance for 
Turkey. Yet, for the time being, it appears unable to offer a genuine contribution to the 
resolution of the Kurdish conflict, as its institutional design has serious inadequacies 
and ambiguities, thus making it unable to manifest an effective governance model. 
Failing to put forth a strong substantiated design, it appears to remain more rhetorical 
than concrete.  
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ÖZET 
DEMOKRATİK ÖZERKLİK: TÜRKİYE İÇİN BARIŞÇIL BİR ÇÖZÜM? 
MELİSA MENDOZA VASQUEZ 
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2015 
Danışman: Prof. Dr. E. Fuat Keyman  
Anahtar Sözcükler: Kürt sorunu, kendi kaderini tayin, topraksal öz-yönetişim, güç 
paylaşımı, çatışma çözümü 
Topraksal öz-yönetişim, etnik grupların kendi kaderini tayin talebinde bulunduğu 
ülkelerde yaygın bir şekilde kullanılan etkili bir çatışma çözümü aracıdır. Ancak, 
topraksal öz-yönetişimin çatışmaları çözmedeki başarısı büyük oranda kurumsal 
tasarımının nasıl yapıldığına bağlıdır. Bu noktada güç-paylaşımı mekanizmaları 
tasarımın başarısında temel faktör olarak ortaya çıkar. Bu teorik düşüncelerin ışığında, 
bu çalışma, Kürt sorununun çözümü için Türkiye’deki Kürt hareketi tarafından önerilen 
öz-yönetişim modeli olan Demokratik Özerklik’in kurumsal tasarımını detaylı biçimde 
incelemekte ve modelin söz konusu sorunun çözümüne ne oranda katkı 
sağlayabileceğini değerlendirmektedir. Analizi gerçekleştirmek için Demokratik 
Özerklik modeli, gerekli güç-paylaşımı mekanizmalarına sahip bir topraksal öz-
yönetişim için gerekli olan etkili ve özgün bir kurumsal tasarım ortaya koyabilen bir 
analitik çerçeveye oturtulmaktadır. Önde gelen Kürt aktörlerle yapılan derinlemesine 
röportajlar ve ana akım Kürt kuruluşlarından elde edilen birinci el kaynaklar çalışma 
için yararlanılan veriyi oluşturmaktadır. Yürütülen analize uygun olarak, tez, 
Demokrarik Özerklik’in Türkiye için değerli bir alternatif yönetişim modeli 
olabileceğini savunmaktadır. Ancak, kurumsal tasarımının ciddi yetersizlikler ve 
belirsizlikler içermesi ve bu yüzden de etkili bir yönetişim modeli oluşturamaması 
nedeniyle Kürt sorununun çözümüne şu an için gerçek bir katkı sağlayayamayacğı 
ortaya çıkmaktadır. Model güçlü bir şekilde temellendirilmiş bir tasarım ortaya 
koyamadığı için somut olmaktan çok söylem düzeyinde kalmaktadır.  
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
Aspirations and demands of the Kurdish movement in Turkey have undergone a 
major transformation over the years. The mainstream Kurdish parties currently express 
their demands along the lines of both obtaining a territorial self-rule in their historical 
homeland and building a common future within Turkey. The said demands are 
embodied in the form of Democratic Autonomy. This self-governance model gains 
increasing importance with the explicit strong demand towards its realization. However, 
it is important to note that the demand essentially comes from a good number of pro-
Kurdish organizations, 1  and thus it should not be attributed to the whole Kurdish 
society. It is necessary to make a distinction between “ethnic groups” and 
“organizations,” as it would be a major mistake to accept these entities as one group. 
Their interests may not always be compatible and, at times, may even be the very 
opposite (Tezcür 2009, 4). Democratic Autonomy is also important in that it may offer a 
remarkable contribution to the resolution of the Kurdish conflict, particularly when 
Turkey is in search for a new solution about the issue. Indeed, in Turkey “finding 
proposals to solve the conflict started to preoccupy the public debate once more” 
(Güneş 2013, 71). Within this context, Democratic Autonomy prevails as a central force 
that deserves a close look. 
In accordance with these developments, the thesis sets out acknowledging that 
Democratic Autonomy is a valuable model of resolution to be scrutinized and intends to 
evaluate its contribution to the resolution. The overall aim of the study is to look for an 
answer to the question of “To what extent Democratic Autonomy could contribute to 
                                                          
1  The organizations of Halkların Demokratik Partisi or HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party), Halkların 
Demokratik Kongresi or HDK (Peoples’ Democratic Congress) Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi or DBP 
(Democratic Regions Party)- (formerly  Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi or BDP– Peace and Democracy Party), 
Demokratik Toplum Kongresi or DTK (Democratic Society Congress), Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê or PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers’ Party), Koma Civakên Kurdistan or KCK (Group of Communities in Kurdistan) are 
within the scope of this study.  
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the resolution of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey.” In an attempt to find a convenient 
answer to the question, the thesis analyzes the main features and the institutional design 
of Democratic Autonomy within the framework of territorial self-governance literature. 
As an outcome of the analysis, the thesis puts forth the merits and limitations of its 
institutional design and evaluates the contribution it may offer to the resolution. The 
thesis argues that Democratic Autonomy is a valuable project for an alternative 
governance for Turkey. Yet, for the time being, it appears unable to offer a genuine 
contribution to the resolution of the Kurdish conflict, as its institutional design has 
serious inadequacies and ambiguities, thus making it unable to manifest an effective 
governance model. Failing to put forth a strong substantiated design, it appears to 
remain more rhetorical than concrete.   
In order to analyze the institutional design of the model, an analytical 
framework, namely complex power sharing is to be employed (Wolff 2009). The 
rationale behind choosing this particular framework derives from its potential to 
manifest an effective institutional design for territorial self-governance arrangements. 
First, the analytical framework has a strong empirical support. Complex power sharing 
has proved to be a successful conflict settlement tool in many different conflict cases in 
which territorially compact groups made self-determination claims. Second, the 
framework goes beyond “mere self-governance” and strengthens its design with other 
conflict resolution tools. It puts self-governance at its center and complements it with 
power sharing mechanisms. This aspect of the framework is significant, as it is 
commonly agreed by the scholars in the field that self-governance arrangements need to 
be accompanied by other tools to enhance its utility to resolve conflicts. Third, complex 
power sharing adds a contextual dimension to the institutional designs. The framework 
manages to develop a design for each case according to its context. This is similarly 
significant since every design needs to be tailored according to its particular context to 
be able to function effectively. Owing to its features, complex power sharing provides 
the required basis first to put forth the context of the Kurdish conflict and then to 
analyze the institutional design of Democratic Autonomy. The analysis allows for 
evaluating the effectiveness of Democratic Autonomy to address its context, revealing 
its utilities and limitations. Moreover, the data to conduct this in-depth case study are 
provided through a mixed methodology approach. First hand documents obtained from 
Kurdish actors and organizations, and the personally conducted in-depth interviews with 
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prominent actors, active in the development of Democratic Autonomy, compose the 
data.  
The significance of the thesis derives from the fact that it addresses the 
institutional design and the technical content of the self-governance model, as the 
already scarce work on Democratic Autonomy in the literature hardly touches upon this 
specific issue. The study intends to fill the apparent gap in the existing literature by 
examining a vital issue that deserves close consideration. As a matter of fact, the 
majority of works on the topic mainly attempt to explain the transformation of the 
demands put forth by the Kurdish movement and the emerging process of Democratic 
Autonomy, while some others mostly focus on a general debate about the necessity of 
either granting collective rights or equal citizenship to Kurds. There are also works 
constructed around the debate of decentralization and democratization of Turkey. None 
of these works, however, present a detailed picture of what the self-rule model actually 
proposes. Another handicap is that the area is vulnerable to political or even ideological 
debates. Actors of opposite ends are usually either too fast in acknowledging the model 
or rejecting it. This inevitably confines the debate to a political ground, and thus 
dismisses the option to discuss and evaluate the model in a factual manner with its 
possible contributions and limitations. This study, therefore, aims to provide an 
impartial view by presenting concrete facts about the model remaining committed to the 
academic self-governance literature on the topic.  
The thesis is composed of seven chapters. Following the introductory chapter, 
the second chapter starts with a literature review. It provides the main literature written 
on territorial self-governance as a conflict resolution tool for ethnic conflicts. It 
conceptualizes the term “territorial self-governance” and explains it in detail. The 
literature review, moreover, provides the main conditions and criteria the scholars have 
come up with to increase the likelihood of self-governance arrangements to function as 
effective resolution tools. Chapter Three introduces the analytical framework utilized to 
conduct the analysis of Democratic Autonomy. It explains the framework and then 
elaborates its explanatory power. Chapter Four provides the methodology of the study. 
It traces the research design, and gives a full account of the data collection and analysis 
respectively. Chapter Five provides a historical perspective on the Kurdish conflict, 
mainly discussing the process in which Democratic Autonomy has evolved. Chapter Six 
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consists of the analyses of the context of the Kurdish conflict and of the institutional 
design of Democratic Autonomy. Subsequently, the chapter manifests the outcomes of 
the analyses which serve as an answer to the research question of the thesis. The last 
chapter offers a brief discussion about the theoretical aspect of Democratic Autonomy 
and presents the conclusion of the study.   
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CHAPTER 2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter will present how “territorial self-governance” as a tool of curbing 
ethnic conflicts has been discussed in the Conflict Resolution literature. The aim of 
providing the existing literature is to present the main issues, concepts and debates 
scholars have touched upon while dealing with the topic in question. Territorial self-
governance, here, is used as a generic term that includes a wide variety of arrangements 
from decentralization to autonomy and federation. All these different arrangements are 
related to each other and are often intermingled in theory and practice. Therefore, in this 
thesis, the literature review does not focus only on a single arrangement and limit the 
theoretical background to a narrow sphere. Here, all sorts of territorial arrangements are 
relevant to the topic and the thesis touches upon various arrangements related to internal 
self-governance.  
The chapter will consist of three sections. The first section will briefly refer to the 
increasing ethnic conflicts in the world and to the growing tendency towards“territorial 
approaches” to deal with the concerning conflicts. It will mainly elaborate on the 
concept of territorial self-governance. The term will be conceptualized, its usage, logic 
and significance will be explored and world practices will be provided. The second 
section will be on the major debate taking place in the literature between “advocates” 
and “opponents” of territorial approaches. Even though this thesis approaches territorial 
governance as a conflict resolution tool, it is also necessary to display the contrary 
arguments of those who believe that territorial approaches may, on the contrary, 
promote conflicts. This debate is essential; first, not to skip a prominent discussion topic 
on the issue and second, to reveal the concerns about the harm territorial self-rule can 
bring about. Nevertheless, it is an inconclusive debate in that there is no right answer to 
the question of whether territorial approaches are conflict resolvers or stimulators, as 
there exist examples of both cases across the world. Therefore, the essential criteria and 
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designs which governance arrangements should have in order to function as conflict 
resolvers need to be analyzed. In accordance with this, the last section will present what 
has been written in the literature on the criteria of institutional designs of self-
governance arrangements to diminish ethnic tensions. This last section will also provide 
the basis for the following chapter which constitutes the analytical framework of the 
thesis. 
 
 
2.1 Territorial Self-Governance to Cure Ethnic Conflicts 
While in the previous centuries the dominant struggles in the world were to build 
nation-states, from the twentieth century onwards, most of the struggles have appeared 
to be against nation-states; mostly between minorities who are “unsuccessful aspirants 
to statehood” and majorities who have “obtained international recognition as 
constituting a new state” (Hannum 1996, 464). These struggles, generally with ethnic 
characteristics, have increased even more sharply after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. While the Iron Curtain was not able to cover them anymore, “differences 
derived from ethnicity” have become especially explicit and thus lethal (Bermeo 2002, 
96). 
However, it is surely not the ethnic differences per se that cause conflicts between 
the groups, but it is instead how these differences are treated by the state and by 
minority groups. When states mistreat the differences and, more significantly, when 
they try to eliminate them in the name of integration and unity, it paves the way for an 
atmosphere where favorable conditions appear for an ethnic conflict to emerge and 
flourish. Today, it has become obvious that the more states attempt to eliminate the 
ethnic differences, the stronger minorities ask for recognition and for their rights to self-
determination. This ongoing clash between states and ethnic groups has led to an 
increasing number of ethnic conflicts across the world, while it has also brought about a 
growing literature on how these conflicts could be resolved. As Cornell puts; “academic 
research on ethnic conflict and its resolution mushroomed” (2002, 245). In this 
“mushroomed” research there has been an increasing interest in finding a solution to 
how to balance conflicts between states and minorities or sovereignty and recognition. 
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As far as this is concerned, “territorial solutions” have increasingly become prevalent. 
Territorial solutions in Conflict Resolution literature suggest various models of 
territorial self-governance or self- rule2 arrangements in which both minority groups can 
fulfill their aspirations and states can still remain unitary.  
Arend Lijphart, a prominent scholar in the field, lists “segmental autonomy” 
among the four principles of power sharing that he claims to be the most effective tools 
while dealing with plural societies (1977, 25-44). Donald Horowitz similarly argues that 
territorial arrangements, such as regional autonomy and federalism, could be quite 
effective to resolve ethnic conflicts (2000, 596-613). Milton J. Esman (1973) considers 
territorial autonomy, federalism and legal-cultural autonomy as necessary tools for 
“balanced pluralism”. According to Saideman “segmental autonomy is an essential 
ingredient for consociationalism” (Saideman et al. 2002, 111), while Hartmann 
addresses “territorial approaches” as a “major institutional strategy of conflict 
regulation” in divided societies (2013, 123). McGarry and O’Leary use the term 
“territorial pluralism,” which is defined as a tool that “assists geographically 
concentrated national, ethnic, linguistic, or religious communities” (2010). For them, 
territorial plurality “has become particularly fashionable” for receiving significant 
“support from academics and political elite” (McGarry and O’Leary 2010). Hartman 
shares a similar view and states; “[territorial] power-sharing formulas seem to have 
become the dominant mode of ending violent conflict worldwide” (2013, 124).   
While the arguments above make up only a few examples to show the centrality 
that territorial self-governance has gained, they also point out the link that some 
scholars establish between territorial arrangements and power sharing. Indeed, many 
scholars see autonomy, federalism and consociationalism as complementary elements of 
each other. They see autonomy and the others as arrangements which allow groups to 
share power within a state. That is why territorial solutions have become particularly 
salient within the consociational theory, but definitely not merely limited to it.  
The thesis borrows the term “territorial self- governance” (TSG) from Stefan 
Wolff and Marc Weller and defines it “as the legally entrenched power of territorially 
                                                          
2 Self-governance and self-rule will be used interchangeably in the study. 
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delimited entities within the internationally recognized boundaries of existing states to 
exercise public policy functions independently of other sources of authority in this state, 
but subject to its overall legal order” (2004, 13). The term is conceptualized as a conflict 
resolution tool, which is especially significant for resolving “self-determination 
conflicts”, which are conflicts “which territorially concentrated identity groups (whose 
identity is, in part, derived from association with this territory, or homeland, in which 
they reside) demand to exercise their right to self-determination” (Wolff n.d.). In this 
context, TSG arrangements are particularly concerned with internal self-determination,3 
which allows a group to “choose its own system of government” within a state 
(Lapidoth 1997, 19). 
“Territorial self- governance” is an umbrella term that contains a wide variety of 
design options, ranging from decentralization to confederation. Wolff (2011) lists five 
“governance arrangements”; confederation, federation, autonomy, devolution, and 
decentralization. Benedikter counts seven “power sharing government arrangements”; 
associated state, condominium, confederation, reservation, federation, dependent 
territory, and territorial autonomy (2009a, 5-15). Ruth Lapidoth, in addition to 
autonomy, mentions federalism, decentralization, self- government, associate statehood 
and self-administration as “arrangements for diffusion of power” (1997, 49-58).  
As can be seen above, different scholars have different categorizations of TSG 
units. Moreover, they also have different definitions for each term. This creates a 
difficulty to study the subject. Referring to this problem, Lapidoth argues; “the 
differences and distinctions [of concepts] are not always sufficiently clear, and a certain 
term may have different meanings to different scholars and officials” (1997, 49). 
“Autonomy,” particularly is one of the most confusing terms since it is commonly used 
as a “generic” term by many scholars instead of being used for a particular arrangement. 
In many cases scholars prefer to use autonomy when they actually mean 
decentralization, devolution or other. Due to the broad meaning of autonomy and the 
                                                          
3  External self-determination, namely irredentism and secession, are also considered as viable self-
governance tools by some scholars (Hannum 1996), and they can indeed bring about a resolution to an ethnic 
conflict. This thesis, however, will deal with internal options, and thus external options are left outside the 
scope of the study.  
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fact that it is, along with federalism, one of the most commonly practiced arrangements 
the term seems to be used quite generously.  
In addition to the lack of agreement on terminology, there is also the problem of 
coherence between theory and practice. Theoretical categorizations of TSG 
arrangements are only “ideal types” and, in practice, they “shade off” into each other 
(Ghai 2000, 487). In reality, a so-called autonomy can actually be closer to a 
decentralization arrangement or vice versa, meaning that the choice of label can be 
deceptive about the actual internal design of the arrangement. The title of an 
arrangement only gives an idea about it, while what truly matters is the institutional 
design of it. 
2.1.1 TSG “re-discovered” 
The significance TSG has gained in conflict resolution is due to its potential to 
address the needs of both the state and the minority group with self-determination 
claims. For Lapidoth, when designed appropriately, it has become “beneficial for both 
the state and the population of the autonomous region,” and thus it is a valuable tool for 
easing ethnic tensions (1997, 199).  
Initially, many states were against the idea of granting self-rule to certain groups 
with the fear of damaging their territorial integrity. However, this has changed to a large 
extent, especially with the end of the Cold War, when many states encountered strong 
challenges from minority groups and faced the risk of losing their territorial integrity 
(Weller and Wolff 2004). The states that experienced the fear of losing their territorial 
unity, adopted the idea of granting self-rule to minorities. In other words, TSG that has 
once been denied with the fear of separation is now seen as a valuable option to prevent 
separation. According to Weller and Wolff, because of the fact that the “doctrine of 
territorial integrity” has been undermined, autonomy has been re-discovered as a 
possible state tool for states “that might otherwise collapse under the pressure of self- 
determination conflicts” (2004, 3). Lapidoth holds a similar opinion and contends: “the 
preference of modalities of self-determination other than independence has grown in 
10 
 
reaction to the violence perpetrated in the name of self-determination in the wake of the 
breakup of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia” (1997, 23).  
Accordingly, many states today prefer TSG arrangements for the sake of 
protecting their integrity. Thus, autonomy and other options have undergone an entire 
shift from being a “threat” to actually being a “convenient option” for state 
sustainability. Nevertheless, not all states are convinced of this. There are many states 
which are still quite skeptical about such arrangements and reject applying them. Yet, 
this does not change the fact that there is an “expanding range of polities” and 
“increased interest” in such models in recent decades (Bermeo 2002, 96).  
TSG is an appealing option for minority groups as well, since it is an option 
between full independence -an unlikely option to be realized by the state- and full 
compliance- a rejected option by the minority. TSG provides a room for groups to rule 
themselves, while also benefiting from the utilities of the state. It allows ethnic 
minorities to enjoy making their own decisions on the issues that are crucial for self- 
preserving and identity improvement, especially regarding the issues of education, 
language, culture and political representation. Moreover, not only does it pave the way 
for identity preservation but security as well. TSG is especially important for groups 
which have experienced state violence and have deep grievances of violence (Rotchild 
and Hartzell 1999). 
Self-rule has also become crucial for being a new alternative to the old methods of 
dealing with ethnic conflicts. TSG is not a tool of assimilation or integration. It does not 
aim to eliminate ethnic differences, but instead accommodate them (Hannum 1996). It 
seeks to “redress the imbalance” between a state majority and ethnic minorities settling 
compactly on their traditional territory” (Benedikter 2009a, 5). Owing to all of its 
merits, territorial governance has been a prominent institutional mechanism both states 
and minorities make use of. For Yash Ghai the significance territorial governance has 
gained is due to the facts that: (1) disadvantaged groups commonly demand it, (2) it is at 
the core of conflict negotiations, and (3) “it may be emerging as an entitlement under 
international law to groups in certain circumstances” (2000, 483). However, as argued 
by Ghai, although being at the forefront of many conflict negotiations, TSG 
arrangements lack international legal entrenchment. They “may” be legally entrenched 
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in the future, but today, self-governance arrangements in general and autonomy in 
particular are not under a definite title of international law. This is mainly due to the 
lack of a precise definition of the right to self-determination. Even though in many 
international covenants and documents the right to self-determination is emphasized, it 
lacks a definite description that all states agree upon. The way it is defined is open to 
interpretation. Not only is it unclear who or which groups can use this right, but also it 
is uncertain when and how to use it. This ambiguity serves well to the states which are 
reluctant to recognize the rights of minorities to self-determination. According to Hurst 
Hannum (1996), regardless of being a “right” or not, a responsible government should 
give serious consideration to demands for autonomy. Nevertheless, in reality, many 
states still prefer to ignore such demands. 
2.1.2 Legal Basis 
Autonomy and settlements alike have been addressed in many documents in 
international law. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Minorities, Commission on Security and 
Cooperation Copenhagen Document are some of these documents which underline the 
protection of minorities and minority rights and imply autonomy as a powerful way of 
doing so. The Convention on Indigenous Peoples and Draft United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples are documents that recognize the aspirations of 
indigenous peoples to protect their identities and run their own systems within the states 
they live. The principle of self-determination in international law as well has been a 
very commonly referred source, especially by minority groups, to establish autonomy 
and other regimes.  
Despite the fact that all these official documents have been in practice for many 
years, none of them have been successful enough to be applied widely. As mentioned 
above, the problems with a commonly accepted definition of “who, when and how” 
complicate the legal basis of self-determination and thus TSG. Let alone these 
problems, there is even no “generally accepted definition of the concept of either a 
minority or a member of a minority” (Lapidoth 1997, 10). Due to this inadequacy, states 
often do not even recognize the minority groups within their countries.  
12 
 
The inadequacy of international law to address the issues of minority and self-
determination is mainly due to the fact that the major concern of the international 
community following World War II has been the protection of individuals. While 
individual rights have been the dominant matter, collective group rights have been 
pushed back to the background. Although this has been changing in recent decades and 
minority rights have largely gained salience, many states today are still reluctant to 
address collective rights of groups and rather prefer dealing with their minority 
questions through granting individual rights (Heintze 1998, 15-17). Moreover, 
individual rights and equality of all individuals have gained such a profound basis that 
some states, and also scholars, believe that granting collective rights would violate the 
norms of individual rights. Accordingly, some believe that giving autonomy or similar 
privileges to certain groups would be acting against the “norm of equal protection” 
(Cornell 2002, 250). “Equal citizenship” versus “granting privileges” is a valuable topic 
to discuss. Nevertheless, it is also a visible fact that individual rights fall short of 
addressing group protection, identity protection and other collective matters (Benedikter 
2009a). 
2.1.3 TSG in Practice 
The ambiguity in international law about the definitions of minority, minority 
rights and self-determination and the lack of willingness of states to reach a consensus 
on such terms could make one think that there are not so many states granting self- rule 
to groups within their countries. On the contrary, there is an increasing interest in 
autonomy, federalism and other self-rule options all over the world. Philip G. Roeder 
counts Canada, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Spain, Belgium, Russia and Bosnia 
among countries with ethnofederal structures, while he lists Finland, Denmark, Italy, 
China, Sudan, France, Philippines, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, Moldova, and Papua New Guinea among those with ethnic autonomous 
regions (2009). Moreover, “Europe has been the cradle of territorial autonomy, since 
Finland created the first modern autonomy system in a democratic framework in 1921 
on the Aland Islands. Asia has become the second hub of autonomy solutions” 
(Benedikter 2009a, 8). 
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TSG arrangements also manifest themselves in peace agreements, especially in 
countries that have experienced violent conflicts. Wolff gives the examples of Annan 
Plan for Cyprus and peace initiative for South Ossetia and Sri Lanka. He claims that 
self-rule appears to be an option waiting at the negotiation tables of many self-
determination conflicts, while it has been put into practice in several (Wolff 2007). In 
their statistical work, Rotchild and Hartzell draw a similar result: 
   The fact that fully half of the cases of negotiated civil war settlements in 
our data set include provisions for territorial autonomy appears to indicate 
that contending parties to a conflict do put some stock in the utility of this 
institution for conflict management (1999, 268). 
Hartzell and Hoddie reach the same outcome after conducting an empirical analysis that 
shows the increasing number of peace agreements involving some sort of territorial self-
governance arrangement. In their study, they also present that “territorial power 
sharing[s] have a positive role to play in fostering a postwar peace” (2005, 103). 
 Nonetheless, all this support from scholars and international organizations 
should not make one attribute an excessive meaning to TSG. Territorial approaches are 
not panaceas. They surely have limits to their potential and may not be effective in all 
contexts. That is why many scholars who give strong credit to self-governance also 
draw attention to the possibility of its failure to bring about peace, especially if not 
arranged appropriately (Bermeo 2002). In other words, many think “it is the best 
inoculation against secession at present available as institutional medicine in 
plurinational places,” while they“ do not suggest that territorial pluralism guarantees 
stability or unity” (McGarry and O’Leary 2010, 262).  
Undoubtedly, not all scholars are of the same opinion about it. Furthermore, some 
scholars even believe that the limitations and demerits of self-governance overweigh its 
merits, and it may cause more conflicts instead (Stewart 2001). Those who hold this 
opinion underline the risks that self-rule can bring about. For them, granting territorial 
rule to certain groups can pave the way for new conflicts such as disunity and 
polarization within the country and most importantly separation. 
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2.2 Resolving or Stimulating Conflict? 
The debate over whether granting self-rule to ethnic minorities is to resolve or 
escalate conflicts has been intense, yet useful. It has been intense because both sides, 
advocates and opponents of territorial solutions, have developed strong arguments and 
counter-arguments to reinforce their stance. It has been, at the same time, useful 
because it has provided a sphere where both the potential pros and cons of self-
governance arrangements are discussed. This has allowed the advocates of self-
governance to develop certain criteria to minimize the possible liabilities of territorial 
approaches and increase the likeliness of them to function as effective conflict 
resolution mechanisms. 
The scholars who are critical and skeptical about TSG, especially about autonomy 
and federalism, give the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia 
as their point of reference. For them, one of the biggest reasons why these systems have 
come to an end is their ethno-federal structures (Hale 2000, Cornell 2002, Roeder 
2009). These scholars, in fact, are not necessarily against mere TSG arrangements, but 
particularly critical about their being based on certain ethnic features.   
Henry Hale, for instance, believes that federalism could actually be a “viable 
alternative” to avoid conflict as long as it lacks “core ethnic region”. For the author 
ethno-federalism, i.e.,“a federal state in which at least one constituent territorial 
governance unit is intentionally associated with specific ethnic category”, is prone to 
bring separatism (Hale 2004, 167). According to Hale, the concentration of the ethnic 
group in a specific region can make the group members be involved in “collective 
action” against the state (2004). Thus, he contends that ethnically arranged governance 
units may cause threat to the state unity. Philip Roeder, like his colleague,believes that 
the concentration of ethnic groups in one region may lead to “alternative nation-state 
projects” (2009, 204).  
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To be able to tackle this problem, Hale suggests dividing the region where the 
ethnic group concentrates “into a number of distinct federal regions” and thus creating 
an “institutional disunity”of the group (2004, 167). However, the idea to divide the 
historical homeland or territorial demarcations of an ethnic group does not seem to fit 
into the primary intention of territorial solutions. The idea here is to recognize the 
collective rights of a group derived from being a “group.” Dividing a compact-settled 
group into distinct regions would harm the group identity, especially if the group 
identity is majorly shaped from sharing the same territory. This would only serve the 
very opposite of what territorial arrangements intend.    
The fear of damaging territorial unity and sovereignty is a commonly projected 
argument of those who are quite skeptical about TSG. For Svante Cornell, for example, 
“the institution of an autonomous region nonetheless implies that the state itself is no 
longer completely sovereign” (2002, 252). Hurst Hannum, on the other hand, finds 
these arguments quite irrelevant. He questions the “rationale for equating territorial 
integrity with a centralized form government” (1996, 463). He argues; “However, it 
cannot seriously be doubted that federal or consociational states, or those in which 
substantial powers have been devolved to local governments, are any less sovereign or 
stable than unitary states; in fact the reverse may be true” (1990, 464).  
Adding to the fear of losing sovereignty and integrity, objections to grant 
territorial tools derive from fears of  “demands for greater autonomy” (Nordlinger 
1972), ethnic group mobilization, gaining excessive political control (Hale 2004, 
Roeder 2009), isolation and alienation of different groups, “minimiz[ing] the common 
shared ground” (Heintze 1998), difficult dialogue between groups (Cornell 2002), 
segregation and strengthening ethnic differences (Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999). Given all 
these factors, TSG will not cure the existing conflict, but instead may even cause new 
conflicts in the society, as the scholars above claim. 
Many state leaders in the current international climate have similar concerns about 
those of the scholars mentioned above. Hence, they are highly reluctant to pursue this 
method of conflict resolution. Ferrazzi (2000), in a humorous way, writes about how the 
President of Indonesia had difficulties even uttering the word “federalism” for his 
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country. For many state leaders even “using the ‘F’ word” arouses anxiety, let alone 
putting it into practice.  
While this contention between opponents and supporters of territorial solutions in 
ethnic conflict resolution occupies a great place in the literature, there has been a new 
dimension added to it. Graham Brown explains the new dimension as follows: 
   Increasingly, however, there is a realization that the term ‘federalism’ 
covers a broad spectrum of institutional arrangements, and that the influence 
of federal structures is likely to interact with other sociological or economic 
influences so that it is implausible to assert that ‘federalism’ in general 
increases or decreases the risk of secessionism (2009, 2). 
What Brown explains through federalism is surely valid for all TSG arrangements. 
Accordingly, there is no definite answer to whether territorial self-governance 
arrangements resolve or escalate conflicts. Seeking a precise answer to this would lead 
to an everlasting debate, since there are both success and failure examples of them in 
various cases. Every self-governance arrangement is a unique case with its distinct 
context and institutional design. Thus, the success or failure of each self-governance 
arrangement depends on its own context and design. This shows that the questions of 
“Do territorial self-governance arrangements solve ethnic conflicts or do they 
exacerbate them?” have become out-dated and there is a need for asking a more proper 
question: “In which conditions and institutional designs do these arrangements function 
as conflict resolution tools, not leading to further conflict?” 
2.3 Asking the Proper Question: 
Many scholars studying the conflict resolution theory have lately preferred to ask 
a more contextual question; “What kind of institutional design increases the likeliness 
of TSG arrangements to curb ethnic conflicts and does not lead to new conflicts?” or “in 
what conditions is TSG most likely to succeed?” In order to answer these questions, 
various scholars have come up with certain criteria. The idea behind listing such 
conditions is not to create an optimal standard for self-rule. The best institutional design 
is the one tailored for the specific ethnic conflict (Lapidoth 1997, 29-36). The objective 
is rather to draw a general framework that offers certain precautions that could prevent 
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the territorial entity from giving birth to new disputes both at the central and local 
levels. 
Ruth Lapidoth lists sixteen “factors that may increase the prospects for success” 
(1997, 199-203). Yash Ghai, under the title of “propositions about actions that can 
increase the likelihood that an autonomy arrangement will succeed” mentions five 
criteria (2000, 504-512). John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary (2010) suggest both 
demographic and historical conditions together with power sharing mechanisms for 
effective “pluri-national” entities. Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff contend that the TSG 
needs to be combined with other conflict resolution tools such as power sharing 
mechanisms (2004). Thomas Benedikter puts forward a comprehensive list of eighteen 
elements to be taken into account while structuring territorial autonomies (2009b, 246-
247).  
 Among the wide variety of criteria and conditions, there are six which are 
considered to be vital by the majority of scholars: 
Democracy: For Lapidoth, if both central and local governments are democratic 
regimes, “the prospects for success are greater” (1997, 200). Kjell-Ake Nordquist 
reaches the same conclusion after conducting a qualitative research into the relationship 
between democracy and durability of autonomy. According to his work,“autonomies 
within democratic states are more likely to be durable than other autonomies” (1998, 
73). Yash Ghai gives credit to liberal societies for hosting the most successful autonomy 
examples thanks to their democratic traditions (2000). For Benedikter, pluralist 
democracy is a “conditio sine quo non for genuine ‘modern’ territorial autonomy” 
(2009b, 10). If it is not built upon a democratic environment, it is destined to cause new 
conflicts.  
Nevertheless, territorial solutions can be applied to all countries regardless of their 
regimes. Indeed, there are examples of which territorial power sharing mechanisms are 
applied in non-democratic or authoritarian regimes. This was the case in the former 
Yugoslavian and Soviet Union states, both having ethno-federal structures. However, 
some scholars believe that the very reason why these states collapsed is their anti-
democratic structures (Bermeo 2002, Heintze 1998). As a response to the scholars who 
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blame the ethno-federal structure for the collapse of the Soviets and the others, they 
claim that it was not the federal structure itself but the lack of democratic institutions 
what led to their dissolution. This argument seems to have some truth in it, given the 
strong link established between democracy and TSG by several scholars.  
Division of power: Building an effective territorial self-rule entity requires a well-
arranged and clear distribution of powers and competences between central and local 
units. Wolff argues;  
   One of the key questions to ask of any self-governance regime is where 
powers rest; i.e., how different competences are allocated to different layers 
of authority and whether they are their exclusive domain or have to be 
shared between different layers of authority (n.d., 3)  
Dividing powers such as education, security, taxation, natural resources and foreign 
affairs between central and local entities varies from case to case depending on the 
nature of the conflict. Although there is no best way of separation of powers between 
entities, the criterion about the division of power emphasizes the need to constitute a 
clear list of competences. Misunderstandings and conflicts are likely to be avoided 
when there is no ambiguity about who holds the power on what. It is important to 
properly clarify each party’s duties, responsibilities and authority. A clear division of 
competences would also decrease the risk of power exceeding.  
Dispute resolution and coordination mechanisms: TSG settlements are inherently 
complex institutional arrangements since there are multiple governments and layers 
within one state. To structure and practice such a governance system is surely not an 
easy task at all. It is almost inevitable not to encounter difficulties emerging from 
different interpretations of policies of central and local units or one of them exceeding 
its power or acting against the settled rules. Thus, establishing a common organ for the 
units to meet and discuss vital issues, concerns and disputes is a substantial criterion for 
the success of territorial arrangements.  
In order to address this criterion, territorial entities can establish a joint 
commission consisting of an equal number of representatives from each unit. This 
dispute resolution and policy coordination mechanism can serve useful. Ghai believes 
“systems that provide consultation and mechanisms for renegotiation are more likely to 
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succeed” and gives the Switzerland case as an ideal example, arguing “Switzerland’s 
success is often attributed to habits of consultations and negotiations” (2000, 513).  
Entrenchment: The legal basis of a TSG agreement is a significant matter for its 
effectiveness and success. It is possible to grant status to a TSG arrangement through 
international treaty, constitution, statute, specific laws, and custom (Lapidoth 1997; 
Benedikter 2009b). The idea behind entrenchment is to make sure that none of the 
parties can make arbitrary changes in the settled arrangement. In some cases the 
stronger party, usually the central state, can resort to unilateral changes about the 
governance structure without obtaining the consent of local entity. To prevent such 
cases, stronger entrenchments, preferably constitutional, are required.   
Local power sharing: The issue of local power sharing is one of the most crucial 
criteria for a territorial self-rule to function as a conflict resolution tool. It is about 
establishing necessary power sharing mechanisms within the distinct territorial unit. It is 
especially significant in cases where the territorial unit is demographically 
heterogeneous, meaning that it consists of different ethnic or religious groups.  
Susan Stewart, in her work, accuses both power sharing and autonomy literatures 
of neglecting “the fact that when territorial autonomy is granted to an ethnic or 
linguistic group, problems can arise concerning the position of minorities (titular or 
otherwise) within the territory in question” (2001, 113). Her statement, however, is not 
entirely accurate since the majority of work on autonomy as a tool of conflict resolution 
in divided societies touches upon and, in fact, makes great emphasis on the importance 
of local power sharing arrangements to prevent new conflicts from emerging in the local 
entity. 
Once the minorities with self-determination claims reach their aspirations and 
start ruling the lands where they are concentrated, they usually become the majority of 
the new territory. “The former minority gains power over other groups, which entails 
the danger that these ‘new’ minorities are suppressed” (Heintze 1998, 19). Disunity and 
discontent among the local groups could trigger a series of conflicts both within and 
with the center. To deal with this potential conflict, “new” minorities also need to be 
granted some rights and privileges. Depending on the context, cultural autonomy (non-
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territorial autonomy), veto right, grand coalition, guarantees for minority protection, 
sanctions against discrimination, representation in legislation and executive could be 
among tools to prevent an inner dispute.  
Central-level power sharing: “Historically, when central leaders grant increased 
autonomy to disaffected regions, they are usually rewarded with peace rather than 
instability” (Bermeo 2002, 105) and the risk of instability falls when the autonomous 
entity joins state institutions and central decision making. The idea behind establishing 
power sharing mechanisms between the central and local units is to create a “sense of 
partnership” (Elazar cited in Bermeo 2002, 107). This cooperation is crucial to get the 
local entity to have a stake in the whole territorial integrity and not desire secession. In 
order to meet this requirement, groups should join the institutions at the center and 
preferably be active in legislation and execution.  
O’Leary, McGarry and Salih (2005), in their book, The Future of Kurdistan in 
Iraq,underline the need for constructing center-level power sharing mechanisms to 
make the local unit interested in sustaining shared governance with the center. For the 
authors, a “shared government” would “tie[s] self-governing entities to the center 
without encroaching on their powers” (Cited in Wolff 2007, 385).These arguments are 
surely not specific to Iraq, but valid for all self-rule arrangements. However, it is now 
more prominent for Iraq than ever. Kurdistan and the Iraqi state need to further develop 
their cooperation not to have a separate future. Kurdistan Regional Government, 
currently, is raising demands for independent statehood. Recent unpleasant 
developments taking place in Iraq with the attack of the brutal armed organization, the 
Islamic State, have showed that the central government is neither eager nor capable to 
protect the Kurdistan region from violent attacks. Situations of this kind may worsen the 
connection between the territorial and central governments, creating divergence and 
triggering ideas of separate futures.  
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2.4 Conclusion: 
Territorial self-governance has become a convenient and feasible option in the 
resolution of conflicts where groups ask for identity recognition and self-determination 
and where states ask for the continuation of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The 
merit of territorial solutions come from its ability to meet the demands of both majority 
and minority groups.  
Self-government has a great potential to accommodate ethnic differences and curb 
ethnic conflicts that would otherwise lead to state collapse. Yet, neither is it a 
prescription that can cure all conflicts, nor it is sufficient alone. Territorial self-
governance arrangements need to be accompanied by other conflict resolution tools and 
power sharing mechanisms. In other words, there needs to be a “delicate balancing act 
to be performed when creating and implementing autonomy arrangements, in which the 
relationships among the center, the regional authorities and the ethnic groups involved 
must be carefully considered” (Stewart 2001, 138). In order to achieve a good balance,a 
TSG arrangement needs to have a well-arranged institutional design that can address the 
context it emerges within.  
Stefan Wolff (2009), in his attempt to suggest a model for creating successful 
TSG structures, has developed an analytical framework of what he names as complex 
power sharing. In this model, he combines TSG with other criteria, local and central 
power sharing tools, which are among the most significant criteria that majority of 
scholars have pointed out as crucial for success. This is the way to create “not fake” but 
“true” self-rule designs (Heintze 1998, 30; Ghai 2000, 522). 
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CHAPTER 3  ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter will introduce the analytical framework of the study which the 
analysis of the case will be conducted through. First, the analytical framework -complex 
power sharing- will be described and then, how it is utilized in the research design will 
be explained. Subsequently, its explanatory power will be discussed.  
3.1 Describing Complex Power Sharing 
Stefan Wolff, like many other authors mentioned above, has asserted the inability 
of territorial self-governance to cure self-determination conflicts on its own. According 
to Wolff, an effective self-governance regime is only possible through combining it 
with other conflict resolution tools. In this respect, he has established an analytical 
framework, namely complex power sharing and conceptualized it in the following way; 
   Complex power sharing, in the way I define it,refers to a practice of 
conflict settlement that has a form of self-governance regime at its heart, but 
whose overall institutional design includes a range of further mechanisms 
for the accommodation of ethnic diversity in divided societies (Wolff 2007, 
29). 
In his analytical model, Wolff specifies three main features of complex power 
sharing arrangements. In other words, “Wolff’s concern is to identify the principal 
features of ‘complex power sharing’ arrangements that have proved relatively effective 
in resolving such [ethnic] conflict” (Brown 2009, 2). These features are; (1) the form of 
territorial self-government, (2) local power sharing tools within the self-governing unit, 
and (3) central power sharing tools within the overall state. These three main features 
are prominent for being common to many conflict settlements and for having proved to 
be successful in various cases.  
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However, Wolff contends that these features need to be applied in the cases where 
the context of the conflict necessitates them. In other words, he believes that it is 
important to analyze the context of each conflict to determine “which of these features 
are most apposite” to that conflict case (Brown 2009, 2). Wolff suggests that complex 
power sharing need to be tailored according to the context of the conflict. In order to 
find the convenient arrangement, he suggests asking for each case the following 
questions: (1) Is there a compact regional settlement of the group within the state, (2) Is 
the local territorial unit heterogeneous, and (3) Is the local unit significant to the overall 
state? The answers to these questions will be helpful to arrange the appropriate 
institutional design of the self-governance arrangement. The figure below tabulates the 
design of complex power sharing: 
Table 1: Context4 and institutional design for conflict settlement 
 
Source: Wolff 2009, 32. 
                                                          
4 Definitions of compact regional settlement, heterogeneity and significance of the territorial entity will be 
provided in the data analysis chapter.  
Examples
Institutional design 
features
Significance of the 
territorial entity?
Heterogeneity?
Compact regional 
settlement?
Yes
Yes
High
1)territorial 
self-
government
2)local 
power 
sharing
3)central 
power 
sharing
Kurdistan 
Regional 
Government
Low
1)territorial 
self-
government
2)local 
power 
sharing
District of 
Brčko
No
High
1)territorial 
self-
government
2)central 
power 
sharing
Flemish 
Region
Low
1)territorial 
self-
government
Scotland
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As visible in the figure, the institutional design is set upon the context of the case. 
This contextual approach is vital because it allows for context-specific-solutions to 
conflicts. Accordingly, the compact settlement of the group with self-determination 
claims, the heterogeneity of the local territory and its overall significance are the main 
issues before settling an arrangement. If, for example, a territorial region were highly 
heterogeneous in itself, it would definitely need local power sharing tools. If, on the 
contrary, it were homogenous, then local power sharing tools might not be as vital. A 
territorial unit could be very significant for the overall state, or it could be territorially 
separated from the center such as Greenland, and thus may not need central level power 
sharing mechanisms. 
Remaining committed to this analytical model, this thesis will ask; (1) Is there a 
compact regional settlement of Kurdish population in Turkey, (2) Is the Kurdish region 
heterogeneous, and (3) Is the region significant to the rest of the country? The answers 
to these contextual questions will be the guide to evaluate a suitable complex power 
sharing model for the resolution of the Kurdish conflict.  
After finding answers to these questions and thus analyzing the context of the 
Kurdish case, it will be determined which of the three features would be most suitable 
for the case. Accordingly, the study will seek to analyze; (1) the form of arrangement 
Democratic Autonomy stands for and its main characteristics, (2) the nature of local 
power sharing arrangements of Democratic Autonomy, if necessary (3) the nature of 
central power sharing arrangements of Democratic Autonomy, if necessary. 
The analyses all together will show whether Democratic Autonomy has a suitable 
institutional design that can address the requirements of its context. The outcome of the 
analyses will allow the writer of the thesis to put forward the merits and demerits of 
Democratic Autonomy. This way, it will be possible to evaluate whether or not 
Democratic Autonomy is a promising model for the resolution of the Kurdish conflict in 
Turkey, and to what extent it can contribute to the resolution with its current design. 
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3.2 Explanatory Power of Complex Power Sharing: 
Stefan Wolff’s complex power sharing is a prominent analytical framework which 
offers a valuable design for self-governance. It has a great explanatory power for several 
reasons. First, this model is a synthesis of prominent conflict resolution theories. It is a 
combination of the conflict resolution tools suggested by power sharing, power dividing 
and integration. It has a TSG arrangement at its center, but not limited to it. It also 
involves various other tools to strengthen its institutional design. In the words of Stefan 
Wolff; 
   The essence of complex power sharing is that such institutional 
frameworks go significantly beyond one-dimensional arrangements offering 
“just” autonomy, or power sharing, or minority rights bills, or improved 
economic development, etc., but combine a range of different mechanisms 
to address the concerns of all relevant parties (2009, 41). 
Combining various mechanisms makes complex power sharing a flexible design which 
does not dictate certain ways of dealing with ethnic conflicts, but instead does allow 
realizing diverse arrangements as long as they serve the cause, the resolution of ethnic 
tensions. 
Second, the analytical framework involves the main criteria to increase the 
likeliness of territorial self-governance arrangements to resolve self- determination 
conflicts. The centrality of local and central power sharing tools in the success of TSG 
arrangements was emphasized in the previous section. While Wolff is well aware of the 
importance of other criteria, such as democracy, legal entrenchment, dispute solving 
mechanisms and others, he does not restrict the model to a strict format involving a set 
of multiple criteria. Limiting the model to extensive conditions could limit the chances 
of success as well. Instead of “develop[ing] full-fledged theory of complex power 
sharing” he attempts to develop a systematic framework which involves the main 
features of many conflict settlements (2009, 28). 
Moreover, different from the other scholars in the area, Wolff adds a contextual 
approach to his model. Although many authors emphasize the uniqueness of every 
single case and underline the importance of a contextual understanding, it is this very 
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model which directly addresses “the need for a more contextual understanding” in the 
literature (Brown 2009, 3). Wolff argues that the context of the case-compact 
settlement, heterogeneity of the local unit and its significance to the state- is crucial to 
find the appropriate design for resolution.  
Lastly and most significantly, Wolff provides empirical support for his analytical 
framework. He makes an empirical analysis of eighteen individual cases to illustrate the 
practice of complex power sharing. The author examines the cases of; Brussel Capital 
Region (Belgium), Flemish Region (Belgium), Walloon Region (Belgium), Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Republika Srpska (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), District of Brčko (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Nanggröe Aceh Darussalam 
(Indonesia), Kurdistan Region (Iraq), Province of South Tyrol/Region of Trentino-
Südtirol (Italy), Districts of the Mitrovica Region (Kosova), Local districts in western 
Macedonia (Macedonia), Territorial Autonomous Unit of Gagauzia (Moldova), 
Province of Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), Autonomous Region of Muslim 
Mindanao (Philippines), South Sudan (Sudan), Crimea (Ukraine), Northern Ireland 
(United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), and Scotland (United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). The common characteristic of all these 
cases in thirteen different countries is the existence of territorially compact groups 
making self-determination claims. In all the cases, with the mere exception of Crimea, 
there are central power sharing mechanisms, if the region is significant to the rest of the 
country. In the majority of cases, where the region is highly heterogenous, there are 
local power sharing tools. Three cases, Nanggröe Aceh Darussalam, Gagauzia and 
Crimea, lack local power sharing tools despite having very high levels of local 
heterogeneity. All in all, despite there is a wide range of different contextual dynamics 
and institutional arrangements, the overall analysis of these cases shows that “there is a 
clear trend of conflict resolution practice that points in the direction of complex power 
sharing settlements” (Wolff 2009, 38). The assumption that conflict settlement in 
divided states requires a self-governance design with necessary local and central  power 
sharing tools is confirmed to a large extent by the author.   
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CHAPTER 4  METHODOLOGY 
The aim of this chapter is to trace the methodology that is utilized in the thesis. In 
doing so, first, the thesis will be situated in an in-depth case study format and then the 
research design will be presented. Subsequently, the process of data collection and 
analysis will be explained. Lastly, there will be brief remarks on the terminology used 
in the study.  
4.1 In-Depth Case Study and Research Design 
Qualitative studies have been dominant in studying territorial approaches in 
conflict resolution. Quantitative studies, on the other hand, remain relatively few in 
number. Yet, their contributions to the field are well appreciated. Quantitative studies 
are mostly visible in the debate carried out between advocates and opponents of 
territorial solutions, since both groups attempt to support their own arguments with 
numerical data. Moreover, quantitative studies have served useful in, for instance, 
investigating the impact of democracy on the success of self-rule deals.  
On the other hand, the majority of qualitative work is concerned with adding a 
theoretical perspective to the topic and analyzing in-depth case studies. Many of the 
case studies focus on federalism in post-communist regimes. There are also studies that 
concentrate on grasping the European models of regional and local governance. While 
these studies fall short of making larger generalizations about the topic, they still shed 
light on various cases. In-depth case studies reveal various different institutional 
designs, and thus are valuable to grasp different self-governance arrangements. The case 
study approach is a vital method, since only a meticulous study would allow making a 
real judgment on the merits and demerits of a particular self-government design.   
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Upon this understanding, the analysis of Democratic Autonomy will be performed 
through a single case study research design. The case study design will allow for 
drawing a comprehensive picture about the model in question and reach an outcome 
about its utility. Democratic Autonomy has been debated extensively in the media by 
experts, politicians and journalists. It has been subject to intense public discussions. 
Yet, there exists a major lack of scholarly research especially focusing on the internal 
arrangement of the model. An in-depth study of the case will kill two birds with one 
stone, both to fill the gap in the literature of scientific research, and explore and evaluate 
a case which is significant in itself as a valuable model that could bring about peace in 
Turkey.  
The growing acknowledgement of merits of territorial solutions to resolve ethnic 
disputes also paves the way for Democratic Autonomy to be considered as a useful tool 
in the resolution of the Kurdish conflict. In the light of prominent scholarship on 
territorial self-governance, this thesis seeks to answer, “To what extent does Democratic 
Autonomy contribute to the resolution of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey?” Answering 
this question requires a certain order to follow. First, territorial self-governance will be 
conceptualized and explained as a conflict resolution tool. Then, some necessary 
conditions and criteria will be added to it in order to increase its prospect of success. 
Subsequently, an analytical framework, which is complex power sharing, will be 
introduced and explained as a model containing both territorial self-governance and 
necessary principal criteria. This model has proved to be successful in the resolution of 
many conflicts, and hence will be treated as a measurement tool in this thesis to 
measure the potential success of Democratic Autonomy.  
Data analysis will follow the structure of the analytical framework. First, the 
context of the Kurdish conflict will be revealed through contextual questions of 
complex power sharing. Then, the institutional design corresponding to that context will 
be traced. This will lead to answer the question; Does Democratic Autonomy have a 
qualified institutional design with effective local and central power sharing tools that 
would satisfy the conflict context it exists in? Provided that it fulfills the necessary 
institutional design that its context requires, it will be considered as a beneficial and 
even necessary tool Turkey needs to take into consideration. However, if it does not; 
that is, if the institutional design falls short of satisfying the needs of its contextual 
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setting, then Democratic Autonomy will be considered to be ineffective, and thus 
unable to bring peace to the country at this point. The overall research process will lead 
to evaluate the contribution of Democratic Autonomy to the resolution of the Kurdish 
conflict in Turkey.  
Given the fact that Democratic Autonomy has long been advocated by all the 
mainstream pro-Kurdish actors, given its importance in shaping politics in Turkey and 
its significance as a possible solution to the long-lasting Kurdish conflict, this thesis 
acknowledges Democratic Autonomy as a valuable project that necessitates an in-depth 
analysis. While acknowledging its great potential for the resolution, the thesis holds a 
questioning approach towards it, thus seeking a systematic evaluation of the model. In 
this respect, assuming that there is a compact settlement of Kurdish population in its 
historical homeland, which is both heterogeneous and significant to the rest of the 
country, the institutional design of Democratic Autonomy should require very effective 
local and central power sharing arrangements. Accordingly, the thesis hypothesizes that 
Democratic Autonomy could only serve its purpose if it is a well-defined territorial 
arrangement with remarkable power sharing tools both within and with the center, and 
if so, its contribution to the resolution of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey would be 
valuable and worthwhile as a robust solution.  
4.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
The data to test the validity of the given hypothesis have been collected through a 
mixed methodology approach. One way of gathering the data has been through in-depth 
interviews. The writer of the thesishas conducted eight interviews with the members of 
the DBP, DTK and HDP. Meetings with the DBP members have taken place in the 
Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey, since the party currently holds mayorship 
of ten-plus-one cities in the region; Tunceli, Ağrı, Iğdır, Van, Hakkari, Şırnak, Bitlis, 
Siirt, Batman, Diyarbakır and plus Mardin.5 For the interviews, the writer has focused 
on the cities of Van, Diyarbakır and Mardin -all of which have metropolitan 
                                                          
5 The mayor of Mardin was an independent candidate in the local elections of 2014 due to his political ban. 
He is a prominent face of the Kurdish movement.  
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municipalities, and thus are presumably active agents in developing and constructing 
Democratic Autonomy at the local- and on the cities of Hakkari and Yüksekova, “where 
the secular Kurdish nationalist movement is the dominant actor” (Tezcür). In all the 
selected cities pro-Kurdish parties have a strong basis and gain considerable support 
from the constituency of the region. Among the cities mentioned, Diyarbakır is “long 
considered the unofficial capital of the Kurdish areas in Turkey” (Gunter 2011, 4). 
Holding the power of municipalities is very important for Kurdish actors, since it 
stands as a powerful means to develop and implement policies of autonomy in the 
region. The local government, in Turkey, that is municipalities, are the closest level to 
the society. In this respect, the success of the DBP to get hold of several municipalities 
does not only grant the party important resources to develop certain self-rule practices 
but also ensures a close connection with the local people. This makes the DBP 
municipalities crucial agencies and the DBP mayors vital actors in the development and 
realization of Democratic Autonomy. Therefore, the in-depth interviews have mostly 
been focused on local government actors, who are also the members of the DTK.  
All the interviews conducted with the co-mayors of the DBP and the two-
weeklong visit to the region have made a great contribution to the preparation of the 
thesis. Nevertheless, given the importance of holding the power of municipalities, it was 
expected that the contacted mayors would be more enthusiastic about providing more 
information. Many times the interview questions were either answered inadequately or 
irrelevantly. Another major limitation to the interviews was to receive politically and 
ideologically oriented answers instead of more concrete and tangible facts on the 
institutional design of Democratic Autonomy. In some conversations political discourse 
overrode factual information.   
However, even though not arranged in advance, the co-president of the DTK was 
quite enthusiastic to devote more than an hour to answer the interview questions on the 
topic. The information provided by the DTK co-president was definitely beneficial. The 
DTK, although not officially recognized as a civil society organization, is the main 
establishment to carry out the works concerning local governance and autonomy. The 
organization was founded in 2007, with the call of Abdullah Öcalan and with the 
purpose of working primarily on Democratic Autonomy. More significantly, the 
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organization is accepted as the “Parliament of Kurdistan” by the Kurdish movement. In 
addition to the interview, the Press Officer of the DTK provided many documents, 
including informative texts about Democratic Autonomy, workshop reports, annual 
reports, texts of speeches and most importantly the DTK Contract, which is said to act 
as the Constitution of the “DTK Parliament.” 
Lastly, interviews with two HDP deputies have served very useful to receive 
substantive data. Both deputies are among those who are directly involved in the 
matters of local governance in their own party.  
All the interviews were semi-structured ones consisting of open-ended questions. 
The majority of the questions focused on the institutional design of the proposed model. 
The same questions were asked in all the meetings; yet, more questions were raised 
during the conversations according to the given answers. Further details and 
elaborations were requested whenever the answers were found vague or off the topic. 
Besides the personally conducted interviews, the thesis has also used the interviews of 
Kurdish actors in the media, BDP’s proposal on draft Constitution, DTK documents and 
extensive writings of Abdullah Öcalan and of the Kurdish movement.  
This study has made use of the data obtained from Kurdish political actors. Yet, 
the talks with the Presidents of Bar associations in Van and Diyarbakır, the long and 
very fruitful talk with the President of Human’s Rights Association in Diyarbakır and 
the talks with local youth, especially in Mardin Kızıltepe, have allowed the writer of the 
thesis to get more familiar of the local dynamics and hear several different opinions 
about the topic.  
The analysis of the institutional design of Democratic Autonomy relies on a 
systematic reading of first-hand data. In this respect, documents released by the DTK 
are of considerable value. The DTK Contract, the draft of the Democratic Autonomous 
Kurdistan Model (Demokratik Özerk Kürdistan Modeli Taslağı) from the DTK 
Congress held on 18-19 December, 2010, and especially the book prepared following 
the Democratic Autonomy Workshop, (Demokratik Özerklik Çalıştayı) which took 
place on 12-13 May, 2012 serve as significant sources to grasp the legal design of 
Democratic Autonomy. Other useful first-hand sources for the analysis are the writings 
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of Abdullah Öcalan and the books published by the academy in his name. However, the 
most beneficial sources are surely the personally conducted interviews. These personal 
conversations are significant to focus on specific concerns, such as the local and central 
power sharing tools, which are the two main issues to shed light on this thesis. 
Conducted in-depth interviews allow for making comparisons among the answers given 
by different actors to the same questions. Through a systematic reading, the interviews 
reveal commonalities and contradictions in the answers, and thus lead to a 
comprehensive analysis to assess the contribution of Democratic Autonomy. A good 
number of interviews conducted with members of Kurdish politics by several journalists 
are also remarkably useful. Using multiple sources from different organizations and 
people for the analysis have constructed the validity of the study. 
4.3 Terminology 
The terminology used while studying the Kurdish conflict is a sensitive matter, as 
the words chosen may reflect the political and ideological position of the writer. In this 
work, no term is used with the purpose of reflecting a certain political stance. The usage 
of the term Kurdistan in the thesis merely refers to the geographical region in 
Turkey,where Kurds have been historically concentrated. It is interchangeably used 
with the terms of Kurdish region and the eastern and southeastern Turkey.  
The words, Kurdish people and Kurds, on the other hand, are used in loose way 
disregarding the sub-diversions within the Kurdish identity. Throughout the thesis, the 
term “Kurdish people” is used very cautiously to avoid major generalizations, and rather 
the terms “Kurdish political movement” and “Kurdish political actors” are preferred. In 
fact, making a distinction between the Kurdish movement and Kurdish society is 
crucial, since Democratic Autonomy is considered to be a demand posed by the 
movement, and it would not be correct to present it as a demand referring to the whole 
Kurdish society.  
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CHAPTER 5  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE KURDISH CONFLICT 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a historical and conceptual background for 
the discussion of the Kurdish question, where the nature and ideological transformation 
of the mainstream Kurdish political movement are debated. In doing so, the chapter will 
touch upon several issues, events and concepts on the Kurdish question, which are 
considered to be significant. These will be situated in a historical context from 1923 to 
1999 -from the establishment of the Turkish Republic until the capture of Öcalan- and 
from 1999 onwards, during which the Kurdish national movement has undergone a 
major shift in its ideology in which it has abandoned the goal of a separate statehood 
and embraced a “living together formula”. The period at issue is also significant for the 
“Resolution Process” that has started between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
governments and Kurdish political parties. 
A historical perspective on the Kurdish conflict is essential in order to make a full 
sense of the process around which the Democratic Autonomy model has evolved on the 
political agenda and the current context in which it is being debated. In this chapter, it 
will be argued that the form of the Kurdish struggle has shifted drastically throughout 
the decades influenced by both state policies and the conjuncture it has found voice in. 
Moreover, Kurdish identity politics, mainly developed by ethnic entrepreneurs in the 
late 1970’s, has also shifted in the way it exhibits its political project.  
5.1 The “New” Middle East 
 “The Middle East is not likely to be the same again.” The quotation belongs to 
Graham E. Fuller, who more than a decade ago believed that Kurdish politics with its 
increasing momentum would have a major role in re-shaping the politics in the Middle 
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East, as Kurds had firmly been “banging on the door of national recognition and self-
determination” (1993, 108). In fact, the Middle East, has never been the same again 
since the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, which led to the division of the Kurdish-
populated Ottoman territory, and thus to ever growing Kurdish and Kurdistan problems. 
Nevertheless, what is “new” about the region Fuller refers to is that issues such as 
human and minority rights, democracy, autonomy, federation and even new states are at 
the forefront and are less likely to fade away without effective responses from Turkey, 
Iraq, Syria and Iran.   
The establishment of the Kurdish Regional Government within a federal Iraqi 
state, the most recent developments taking place in Northern Syria, or Rojava (Western 
Kurdistan) and serious attempts in Turkey towards a resolution all indicate that the 
Kurdish issue has increasingly been on the top agenda of regional and international 
politics. According to Gunter, “If the Arab-Israeli dispute slowly winds down, the 
Kurdish issue will bid to replace it as the leading factor of instability in the 
geostrategically important Middle East” (Gunter 2011,1). The Kurdish conflict, 
however, would not only be a source of instability in the region but a great source of 
stability as well, if handled appropriately. The Kurdish factor by its nature has the 
potential to push the governments forward for more democracy and human rights. This 
is now the case in the Turkish context in which the state has had to reconsider its 
repressive policies towards its Kurdish citizens and political actors. The Turkish state 
that once denied even the existence of Kurds and Kurdish language has now had to take 
accommodative steps towards their recognition. The state, moreover, has acknowledged 
the fact that security policies could never bring peace to Turkey, since terror is a 
“symptom rather than a cause of the conflict” (Özkırımlı 2014, 1067), which needs a 
profound social, sociological, political and economic treatment. Concisely, the Kurdish 
political movement has forced the reluctant state to question issues such as human 
rights, linguistic and cultural rights, identity, recognition and decentralization. Özkırımlı 
skillfully outlines the issue as such; 
   It is no longer possible to turn a blind eye to Kurdish demands for 
recognition at a time when millions of people, including the Kurds in 
neighbouring countries, are galvanized into action for more freedom and 
democracy across the broader Middle East. They compel us to rethink the 
question of how to accommodate difference, both at the level of state-
community and inter-community relations, and to consider the different 
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ways of achieving peaceful coexistence in societies characterized by cultural 
diversity (2014, 1056). 
Having said this, it is now up to the Turkish state and Kurdish political actors to 
whether converge and turn the conflict into an opportunity for further democratization 
and stability or diverge and cause instability and even bloodshed in the country.  
5.2 Defining the “Kurdish” Conflict 
Defining and naming the Kurdish question in Turkey has never been an easy task, 
in particular due to the difficulty to pinpoint its embedded underlying causes. 
Discriminatory state policies and strong centralization,  denial of the Kurdish identity, 
culture and language, definition of Turkish citizenship, imposed supra-identity, political 
suppression, social and economic poverty can be listed among the several factors 
frequently expressed by the mainstream scholarship to refer to the roots of the conflict. 
However, there is no common agreement on which of these factors have contributed 
most to the emergence and rise of the dispute, thus turning it into a long-lasting brutal 
war. Even the few quantitative studies into the underlying causes fall short to present a 
complete picture of the case. While a recent study finds a strong link between socio-
economic status -level of education and income- and Kurdish nationalism (Sarıgil 
2010), another study firmly dismisses these findings and claims that it is instead “the 
effect of political dissatisfaction” that has triggered nationalist sentiments among Kurds 
(Ekmekçi 2011, 1614). 
Political actors as well as scholars encounter the same problem while seeking to 
define and explain the conflict. Various actors in Turkey tend to describe the issue in 
very different and even opposing manners. Actually, even today, in the process of an 
ongoing resolution between Turkish governments and Kurdish national actors, there still 
exists a lack of consensus about the definition of the conflict. In fact, there is still little 
attempt to arrive at such a definition, and the process has been underway for years 
without being able to reach a common understanding on the causes and dynamics of the 
dispute. It would not be surprising, if this, in the long run, would cause a serious setback 
for the peace process, since defining a conflict means determining the attitudes, goals, 
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intentions of its actors and, most importantly, the possible resolutions to it (Keyman 
2008, 128-129). Without agreeing on a definition and using a language in common, it 
would hardly be possible to find a genuine solution to the issue, if not impossible.  
Throughout history, the Turkish state and Kurdish political actors have used 
contradictory terminology to describe the issue. While Kurdish nationalists have 
preferred terms such as “internal exploitation”, “assimilation”, “forced Turkification”, 
“occupation” and even “genocide”,  state actors have seen the issue mainly as “regional 
economic underdevelopment”, “regional backwardness, “tribal tensions”, and “terror 
and security” (Keyman 2013, 130-133). What is significant is that, Kurdishness, 
meaning the ethnic identity aspect of the conflict, used to be absent from the definition 
for so many years. This substantial remark presents two major clues about both sides of 
the conflict. For the Turkish state, it was natural not to acknowledge or, at times, even 
conceal the “ethnic identity dimension” of the issue, as it was extremely reluctant to 
recognize the existence of a separate Kurdish nation. Accepting Kurdishness of the 
conflict, 
   would mean directly acknowledging the existence of a very big minority 
population, and coming to terms with the possibility that the unifying 
policies that were part of the Republic’s founding ideology—policies of a 
single nation, single language, and centralized power—were perhaps neither 
well-founded nor realistic (Aydınlı and Özcan 2011, 441). 
While the approach of the state to the issue was less surprising, the picture was far more 
complex on the side of Kurdish actors, as they were not to put Kurdishness at the heart 
of the issue before the late 1970’s. In the first two decades of the Republic and in the 
1960’s and partly 1970’s, Kurdish politics represented itself in various other forms. In 
fact, the Kurdish issue, as an ethnic identity and recognition struggle, came to emerge in 
the late 1970’s, speeded up in the 1980’s and reached its peak in the 1990’s. In other 
words, Kurdish ethnic identity politics is a relatively recent phenomenon. “That is not to 
say that, in the past, no Kurdish ‘national’ awareness existed” (Bruinessen 1992, 267). 
What is claimed is that this “awareness” was not used as a defining cause of Kurdish 
conflict and was hence not instrumentalized as a collective force for demanding 
recognition of the Kurdish identity.  
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5.3 Discontent Overlapping with Identity 
In the late Ottoman period, particularly as of the 19th century, increasing 
centralization policies aroused discontent among Kurds, whose “local affairs had been 
largely beyond the reach of the state” (Belge 2011, 99). Kurdish discontent showed 
itself mainly in the form of tribal tensions caused by the fact that landlords had to hand 
over their privileges to the new centralized state. With the end of World War I and the 
heavy loss of the Ottomans, a territorial dimension to this discontent was added. The 
Kurdish-populated areas, which were previously separated between the Ottoman and 
Persian Empires, were divided into four newly-established countries, namely Turkey, 
Iran, Syria and Iraq. This Kurdistan conflict left Kurds with a divided homeland and as 
“the largest nation in the world without its own independent state”6 (Gunter 2011,1). 
Kurds in Turkey, in fact, had an opportunity to have an independent state with the 
Treaty of Sevres signed in 1920 between the Sultan’s Istanbul government and allied 
forces. Not only did Article 62 of the Treaty designate a “local autonomy for the 
predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates” but, more significantly, 
Article 64 paved the way for an independent Kurdistan if “majority of the population of 
these areas desires independence… and if… these peoples are capable of such 
independence” (WWI Document Archive). The leaders of Turkish national 
independence “turned that treaty into a dead letter” (Fuller 1993, 109) and the Treaty 
was never implemented. As a matter of fact, few Kurds at the time wanted a Kurdish 
state or an autonomous Kurdistan (Kirişçi and Winrow 2011, 93-99). There were 
Kurdish nationalists, but definitely lacked mass support, since the majority of Kurds 
fought together with the rest of the country for a united independence against the 
“infidel” (McDowall 2000, 184). Moreover, the already weak Kurdish national 
aspirations were totally dismissed with the Lausanne Treaty signed in 1923, which 
implicitly refused both a Kurdish state and a possible minority or otherwise status.   
                                                          
6 Mehrard R. Izady suggests that it is a frequently made mistake to claim that Kurds constitute the biggest 
nation or ethnic group without a state. Kurds, he contends, are the largest ethnic group in the world that has 
constantly fought against their particular states, but surely not the largest without a state, since India alone 
hosts couple of ethnic groups that outnumber Kurds (2004, 321). 
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According to Kirisçi and Winrow, Kurds, between 1920 and 1923, were 
recognized more by the “others” than recognized by the “self” (2011, 102). That is why 
it was relatively an easy task for the founders of the Republic to receive the support of 
Kurds during the struggle for nation-state building. However, great challenges to the 
Republic started when the Caliphate was abolished and the main common bond between 
Turks and Kurds was removed. Religion became a great source of discontent among 
Kurds. The new secularism that had dismissed the centuries-old Islamic common 
ground irritated many religious leaders in the Eastern and Southeastern regions, which 
also gave rise to mass revolts. The Sheikh Said rebellion broke out in 1925 as the 
biggest uprising to the newly founded Republic. Among many others it was followed by 
major 1930 Ağrı and 1937 Dersim uprisings, especially the latter of which has become 
notorious due to excessive brutality imposed by the state.  
Many of the said uprisings involved both religious and tribal characteristics 
(Gürbey 2000, 59) and reflected the major difficulties Kurds had while welcoming the 
new state. However, despite a growing discontent among some Kurdish groups, Kurds 
were unable to present a common unified stance against the Turkish state. They were 
“divided by borders, dialects, tribal loyalties, and blood feuds”, and thus for the state “it 
was easy to dismiss their uprisings” (Marcus 2007, 77). When heavy state responses 
were added to this lack of Kurdish unity, it became impossible for Kurds to “mount a 
challenge against increasingly monodimensional Turkish nationalism” (Olson 1998, 
19), and from 1938 to the 1960’s Kurds were “stopped manifesting in the public sphere” 
(Natali 2005, 84).  
By the 1960’s a large portion of Kurds had actually been assimilated into the new 
Turkish identity (Cornell 2001; Keyman 2009). However, those opposed to integrating 
into the new Turkish state and identity were never to be assimilated. In the 1960’s, the 
Kurdish struggle, which had been silenced previously, gained voice in the relatively 
liberal atmosphere provided by the 1961 Constitution. Kurdish voice found basis in the 
rising socialist parties7, which also had the Kurdish question on their agendas. Workers 
                                                          
7 Interestingly, the Kurdish struggle which was embodied in Turkish socialism in the previous decades, today 
constitutes the biggest party in Turkey with socialist reference. The Peoples’ Democratic Congress or the 
HDK -the congress wing of the HDP- incorporates thirty-four different groups from different segments of 
society, while the HDP, as a party, aims to unite all peoples who are exploited, othered, discriminated and 
ignored, as stated at the party’s bylaw.  
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Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TİP) was, for instance, the first legal party to 
recognize the Kurdish reality (Kirişçi and Winrow 2011, 129), and named it as “the 
‘eastern question,’ that is, inequality, exploitation, poverty, and feudal backwardness” 
(Natali 2005, 99). At the time, Kurdish and Turkish socialists were hand-in-hand in 
Marxist Leninist ideology groups, which were all against imperial powers rapidly 
leaking into Turkey.  
Towards the end of the 1960’s and mainly after the 1971 Memorandum, there 
appeared a surge in the Kurdish national groups. In this period, organizations such as 
Kurdistan Democratic Party in Turkey (Tükiye’de Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi, T-KDP), 
Revolutionary Eastern Culture Associations (Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları, DDKO), 
Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan (Türkiye Kürdistanı Demokrat Partisi, TKDP) 
and Kurdistan Workers Party (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi, PKK) started operating.8 All of 
these formations, with the exception of TKDP, were against the traditional elements of 
the Kurdistan society -aghas, beys, tribal and religious leaders and their structures- 
accusing them of being the enemies of the revolution and the reason for regional 
backwardness (Gündoğan 2012). In the said period, the Kurdish movement defined 
itself mainly through the adoption of socialism and refusal of traditionalism.  
Previously having more or less similar discourses and agendas to Turkish 
socialists, Kurdish groups by the mid 1970’s had undergone a “realization” of their 
distinct Kurdish identity (Natali 2005, 112) and slowly broke apart from Turkish 
socialist groups. Pro-Kurdish groups drew a separate path in which Kurdishness would 
be instrumentalized as the main source of ideology (Gündoğan 2012).  
In the late 1970’s, the PKK particularly had a vital role in mobilizing Kurdish 
society around identity and recognition politics. Among many pro-Kurdish groups, the 
PKK was outstanding not only for being the only one to actualize armed struggle but 
also for its “distinctive theory” that strongly accused its own Kurdish people of 
                                                          
8 What is interesting is that the leaders of these groups, or those who spread the seeds of Kurdish nationalism, 
“emerged among those who were most integrated in Turkish culture” (Bruinessen 1998, 41). Many received 
modern Turkish education in Western Turkey. According to Gündoğan, the Western educated Kurdish 
students recognized the socio-economic backwardness of their regions compared to the cities in the West. 
This awareness contributed to their Kurdish ethnic consciousness to a great extent (2012). In other words, 
“the overlap between the regional economic disparity and particular ethnic (Kurdish) identity is translated 
into Kurdish nationalism” (Yavuz 2001, 2).  
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“imitating oppressors and being limitlessly brave and cruel in fighting against each 
other” (Özcan 2005, 404). According to the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, Kurds as 
“debased people” (düşürülmüş halk) were also short of “a base of ethnic nationalism” 
(Özcan 2005, 391). The PKK would gradually alter this through the use of violence and 
a strong rhetoric as well. Millions of Kurds would be attracted by the PKK’s call for 
“emancipation” and became greatly politicized. Nevertheless, it is important to point out 
that, Öcalan’s PKK could have never been so persuasive if the violent atmosphere in 
Turkey of the 1980’s had not taken place. The 1980 military coup d'etat, its following 
order that removed almost all channels of legal politics and the Diyarbakır Prison in 
particular are major milestones towards the PKK’s violent armed activities, which 
thousands of people were voluntarily involved in.9 
The PKK and the Turkish state started to fight a “low intensity war” as of August 
1984. By the end of the 1990’s, over 30.000 people lost their lives in this war, while 
thousands got either lost or murdered through extrajudicial killings, which are still 
waiting to be enlightened by the state. Nonetheless, despite “the highly ethnicized and 
militarized political space” of the 1990’s, (Natali 2005, 109), the Kurdish movement 
was able to form political parties that carried the Kurdish agenda to the Parliament. 
Even though these parties had very limited means and were exposed to systematic party 
closures, they opened up a legal political space for the Kurdish struggle. At the same 
time, leading politicians of the time, Tansu Çiller and especially Turgut Özal, started 
speaking about a Kurdish reality and even coming up with some recommendations for 
the solution, mainly about the Kurdish language (Kirişçi and Winrow 2011, 160-166). 
Nevertheless, in an atmosphere where the Turkish Armed Forces had the upper-hand 
and concentrated on security policies mainly, it was hardly possible to speak about a 
major attempt towards any resolution.  
The tense and dark atmosphere of the 1980’s and 1990’s diminished with the 
capture of the PKK leader in Kenya by an operation led by the American intelligence, 
which the Kurdish movement would later call “Great Gladio Conspiracy.” With 
                                                          
9Remnants of the 12 September 1980 Coup are still major obstacles in reaching peace, not only because it has 
formed traumatic collective memories in people’s minds but also because of the definition of citizenship of 
the 1982 Turkish Constitution that has openly stated that “Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the 
bond of citizenship is a Turk” (Article 66, Turkish Constitution). One of the principal demands of the Kurdish 
movement is a change of the definition of citizenship into one which makes no reference to being a Turk. b 
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Öcalan’s capture many people assumed a victory of the Turkish Armed Forces over the 
PKK. They were surely unaware that the PKK would carry on functioning and thus 
violence from both sides would continue. As a matter of fact, in the 2000’s Kurdish 
conflict would not disappear and, on the contrary, would even find a stronger basis both 
due to the PKK’s reinterpretation of the struggle and a new era starting with the EU 
candidacy and AKP initiatives.  
5.4 Shifting Ideologies and New Aspirations 
Captured on 15 February 1999 and brought to court to present his defence, Öcalan 
surprised almost everyone with his statements regarding the Turkish state and the army, 
in which he presented his “appreciation” to the latter (Öcalan 1999, 59). He said; “I 
really love Turkey and the Turkish people. Sincerely, I will do all I can to be of service” 
(Cited in Gunter 2000, 852). What was even more striking and decisive for Turkish 
politics was Öcalan’s defence statement, in response to the chief prosecutors of the 
State, which was published as the Declaration on the Democratic Solution of the 
Kurdish Question (Kürt Sorununa Demokratik Çözüm Manifestosu Savunmalar I-II-III) 
in November 1999. In his defence, he rejected the main goal and ideology of the PKK, 
for which thousands of people had lost their lives. Öcalan claimed that the idea of 
separate statehood was totally unrealistic and unachievable since it lacked all the 
necessary basis to survive as a separate state. He argued (Öcalan 1999, 66);  
   The option of an independent Kurdistan state for the Kurds cannot go 
beyond merely a discourse in this sense. It is also mentioned in the PKK’s 
program ideologically; however, it is the togetherness reality that is seen in 
practice and revealed in history so far.10 
Öcalan was also quite against concepts such as federation and autonomy since, for him, 
they would only strengthen the “feudal-tribal remnants” in the region. He was of the 
opinion that (Öcalan 1999, 67); 
                                                          
10 All the translations of Abdullah Öcalan and actors of the Kurdish movement are done by the writer of the 
thesis. 
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   Factors such as circumstances in regions where Kurds and Turks are 
embedded, differences in dialects and Kurdish population being at least the 
same number in the western part of the country already show the 
unavailability of the concrete basis of the autonomy thesis. Federation 
cannot be implemented on millions of Kurds in cities like İstanbul, İzmir 
and Adana. Besides, it would be possible to gain many more democratic 
benefits from the development of local governance structures than those 
expected from autonomy. 
Totally abandoning the options of an independent state and autonomy for the resolution 
of the Kurdish conflict, Öcalan was confidently claiming a third option of what he 
called “Democratic Republic,” “in which Kurds and Turks would be unified in the way 
that Turkey’s founder, Ataturk, had imagined so” (Marcus 2007, 79). He thus, “referred 
to the transformation of the PKK… into a movement that aims at a democratic society 
as a rebirth” (Jongerden and Akkaya 2013, 178). 
The PKK leader, furthermore, almost condemned the previous methods and 
tactics of the PKK. He stated; “It is so explicit that democracy cannot proceed with 
violence and that a peaceful solution to all the problems leading to violence can only be 
achieved through democracy” (Öcalan 1999, 58). Accordingly, soon after his capture, 
Abdullah Öcalan ordered ceasefire and the PKK forces to withdraw from Turkey and 
even some to surrender to the Turkish state. While Öcalan was trying to show the good 
intentions and “sincerity” of the PKK, the orders were shocking to the guerrilla forces. 
Following Öcalan’s statements, Rozerin, a PKK rebel, said; “There was almost nobody, 
from the highest level to the lowest, who thought this was the right thing to do… But it 
was impossible to go against the order without being accused of disloyalty… According 
to me the king was naked but we couldn’t say this” (Cited in Marcus 2007, 78). 
Nonetheless, despite Rozerin’s statements, the PKK promptly accepted Öcalan’s 
statements as its official position. It abandoned the goal of separate statehood and 
embraced the idea of radical democracy in the Seventh Extraordinary Congress, held in 
January 2000. The PKK Presidency Council Member, Cemil Bayık uttered the 
following words at the opening speech of the congress; 
   We are not giving up our philosophy, hopes, ideals and ideology… What we are 
giving up is outdated aspects that will not anymore serve the future, that will not 
develop and take us to victory. We only want to get rid of these. This has to be 
understood correctly (Serxwebûn 2000, 3). 
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Apart from some internal conflicts emerged within the PKK, the organization was 
able to sustain its united position and commitment to its leader. Nevertheless, it was 
indeed quite puzzling to see that the main goal of the Kurdish struggle was not a viable 
option anymore. In the PKK’s Manifesto of Establishment in 1978,  The Path of 
Kurdistan Revolution (Manifesto) (Kürdistan Devriminin Yolu), “Independent, United 
and Democratic Kurdistan” was clearly stated as the main aim (1978, 127). An 
independent state was seen as the “only right interpretation” of the right of nations to 
self-determination (Öcalan 1978, 128). Moreover, options of “regional autonomy,” 
“federal unity” and “language and cultural autonomy” were strictly refused, for they 
were seen as “reactionary” (Öcalan 1978, 128). In 1999, however, not only the demand 
of an independent state was abandoned but even autonomous and federal options were 
dismissed, this time not for being “reactionary” but instead for being unnecessary. In the 
mid 2000’s this would also change and Öcalan would this time call for the recognition 
of “Democratic Autonomy” project, by which the Kurdish movement would again re-
position itself.  
At this point it is crucial to ask; How was it then possible for Öcalan to suddenly 
abandon the ideology of the PKK and develop a whole set of a new ideology? The 
answer to this lies within the writings of Öcalan. Towards the 1990’s, he slowly 
“avoided employing the term ‘independent-united Kurdistan’ but was rather obsessed 
with the idea of ‘Free Kurdistan’ (Özcan 2006, 104). The idea of “Free Kurdistan” was 
mainly about “universal and philosophical concepts such as ‘humanization’, 
‘socialization’, ‘human emancipation’, ‘analyzing the Self’, ‘freed personality’, ‘pure 
human being’…” (Özcan 2006, 109). Öcalan gradually diverged from the concepts of 
Marxist Leninist thinking and focused on these abstract ideas. Öcalan would eventually 
believe that Kurds do not actually need a separate nation-state to be able to put all the 
ideas mentioned above into practice. In fact, statehood would even pose a limitation to 
internalize them. Later, in one of his numerous writings, Öcalan would explain his 
internal conflict and thoughts in the process of diverging from the idea of an 
independent state as such; 
   The fact that I thought I lost the concept of nation-state that actually never 
existed was the result of the blinding effect of nationalism on my mind and 
feelings. I would later realize that it was fortunate for me to get rid of it. 
What I experienced was the discharge of a mind and feelings stuck in 
statism in general and nation-statism in particular. It was a disease that 
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maddened Lenin and killed Stalin. It was a disease that could not find a cure 
even in Mao’s Cultural Revolution (2013, 392).  
 The transformation that Öcalan and thus the PKK has undergone has been the 
subject of many works regarding the Kurdish issue. Öcalan’s conversion from ‘national 
liberation’ in the form of statehood  has been dealt with extensively in the literature. 
However, most works “do not provide a convincing account of the reasons behind such 
comprehensive changes” (Güneş 2009, 262). Was Öcalan’s move a long-term plan or a 
strategic save-the-day attempt? Was he sincere about the new political project or was he 
hiding the real agenda? These questions are yet to be answered. According to Michael 
Gunter, Öcalan’s statement was not that surprising since “as early as 1991 Öcalan was 
arguing that independence was an inappropriate solution to the Kurdish problem in 
Turkey” (2000, 857). For Gunter, “in part he had mellowed in the face of the hard 
realities imposed by the Turkish military and the outside world, hostile to any 
independent Kurdish state which might destabilize the volatile but geostrategically 
important Middle East” (2000, 853).   
It is quite hard to be sure of the real intentions of the PKK leader. Nevertheless, 
reading through his extensive writings, it appears that the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union has had a major impact on this transformation. Öcalan, who once aimed to set up 
a “new branch of a socialist tribe” started criticizing the socialist experiment severely 
after its collapse. He even claimed that what he once thought was socialism was in fact 
capitalism itself (Öcalan 2013, 320; Akademi 2009, 48)  
The main criticism of Öcalan about the Soviet Union was its approach towards the 
state. For him, the Soviets captured the state with the intention of providing a better 
system, yet they only continued to serve it. This was mainly due to the absence of an 
alternative political tool that could replace the state. According to Öcalan, “The reason 
behind socialism adopting a statist approach is that it was unable to establish its own 
political tool” (Akademi 2009, 48). However, for him, it was not possible for socialism 
to survive hand-in-hand with the state. For that very reason, socialism had to create an 
antithesis for the thesis (the state) and use it as its new political tool. To fulfill that, 
Öcalan created a new antithesis of what he called “radical democracy.” In the dialectical 
approach of Öcalan, unlike the Marxist dialectic understanding, the antithesis would not 
destroy the thesis, but rather go beyond it. In other words, radical democracy would not 
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destroy the state, and instead surpass it and make it eventually useless (Akademi 2009, 
44-53).  
In the light of these critical thoughts, influenced greatly by the American theorist 
Murray Bookchin in many respects, in the mid 2000’s Öcalan’s radical democracy “was 
developed in three intertwined projects: democratic republic, democratic autonomy and 
democratic confederalism. These three political projects function as a ‘strategic 
dispositif’: ideas and means through which Kurdish political demands are (re)defined 
and (re)organized” (Jongerden and Akkaya 2012, 6).  
In brief, Democratic Republic is the project of a truly democratic Turkey, in 
which the state would hand over not only cultural and individual rights but also political 
rights of Kurds (and of all other peoples) and recognize the political organization of 
Kurdish people, which embodies itself in Democratic Autonomy, or more specifically, 
Democratic Autonomous Independent Kurdistan. Democratic Confederalism, on the 
other hand, means the union of all autonomous regions in Iran, Syria, Turkey and Iraq. 
It represents the organization of all Kurds; but not based on any certain ethnicity, 
religion or territory. It does not aim to challenge territorial integrities of the particular 
states. It actually goes beyond all of the concepts attributed to nation-states. Democratic 
Confederalism aims to carry out its relationship with the Turkish State through 
Democratic Autonomy. In other words, autonomy fundamentally acts as a legal bridge 
between the state and the democratic society. For Abdullah Öcalan, in the formula of 
“state+democracy”; state refers to Turkey, (+) refers to autonomy and democracy to 
confederalism (Akademi 2009, 87). In order to accomplish a union of which all Kurds 
could unite, it is first necessary to pursue the realization of Democratic Autonomy.  
Even though all this conceptual terminology and package of political projects may 
sound extremely confusing, the PKK has accepted all of them as its official position, 
and particularly after 2005, Kurdish politics re-organized itself according to this new 
agenda. Many new organizations were established within the Kurdish movement in 
order to support the new aspirations. The KCK (Association of Communities in 
Kurdistan or Koma Civakên Kurdistan) was founded as an umbrella organization 
composed of several Kurdish groups across Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Democratic 
Society Congress (DTK), which emerged in 2007, gathered many civil society 
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associations, political parties, academics, journalists and members of municipalities for 
the main purpose of introducing, improving and exercising Democratic Autonomy. In 
July 2011, the co-presidents of the Congress, Aysel Tuğluk and Ahmet Türk, announced 
the establishment of Democratic Autonomy in a meeting hundreds had attended. The 
DTK, moreover, has been accepted by Kurdish actors as the de-facto parliament of the 
“future Kurdistan autonomous region”. Another major actor to set up and exercise 
Democratic Autonomy is the legal political party that holds the municipalities in eastern 
and southeastern Turkey, DBP, formerly named as Peace and Democracy Party or BDP. 
“The municipalities under the control of pro-Kurdish party since 1999 have formed a 
kind of selfruling regional body” and they have been crucial in “expanding the Kurdish 
identity politics based on the concept of democratic confederalism and democratic 
autonomy” (Jongerden and Akkaya 2012, 10). While all these organizations at issue 
mainly function at the local level, it is the Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların 
Demokratik Partisi, HDP) that has been more visible at the national level. As the co-
president of the HDP, Selahattin Demirtaş puts it, “today, from its least significant 
organization to its most centralist one, in every arena it enters, the HDP will organize 
radical democracy” (2015, 33). In this sense, the party can be said to function as a 
strong legal force to pursue the political goals of the Kurdish movement throughout 
Turkey.  
5.5 AKP’s Kurdish Opening 
During the same years through which the PKK has undergone transformation, 
Turkey has similarly entered a new political phase, in which Kurdish reality and conflict 
can be openly debated. This has largely developed owing to the policies of the AKP 
governments that have opened the path towards the resolution of the conflict. Reactions 
to the Kurdish policy of the AKP can be evaluated as both supportive and critical. 
Support is due to the party’s “boldest effort ever made by a Turkish government to find 
a peaceful political resolution to the long-festering Kurdish question” (Somer and Liaras 
2010, 152). The AKP has been praised primarily for breaking the taboos and 
acknowledging the existence of a separate Kurdish identity (Aydınlı and Özcan 2011). 
Moreover, Aydınlı and Özcan believe that the AKP, with its Kurdish initiatives, has 
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displayed a desire to shift from a counter-terrorism approach towards a conflict 
resolution position. For Yıldız, the AKP has abandoned the Turkish state’s “classic 
approach” in dealing with the Kurdish question, that is military intervention, killings 
and human right abuses (2012). Criticisms, on the other hand, have been due to the 
government’s inconsistency in approaching the issue and reluctance about taking target 
steps to further progress. Those criticizing the government’s approach question the real 
intentions and sincerity of the government, as they underline the still ongoing military 
and political attacks targeted at the Kurdish movement. In sum, the AKP has gained 
support for its Kurdish opening, but has been condemned for “openings that turned into 
closures” (Jongerden and Akkaya 2013, 164).  
In 2002, when the AKP’s first term started, there was a relatively positive 
atmosphere in Turkey due to the acquired EU candidacy status with the 1999 Helsinki 
Summit and the ongoing ceasefire of the PKK. With regard to the EU process, the AKP 
government passed eight harmonization packages, making both legislative and 
constitutional amendments. These included the lifting of the state of emergency, ‘policy 
of zero tolerance to torture’, abolishment of capital punishment, and limited education 
and free broadcast in languages and dialects other than Turkish. Even though all were 
significant steps towards democratization, they were not framed around the Kurdish 
conflict, and certainly inadequate towards its resolution (Çelik 2009). The AKP, 
however, was able to achieve salience among Kurdish constituency. Both in March 
2004 local elections and 2007 general elections, the Party “captured the Kurdish vote” 
and “explicitly and repeatedly challenged the PKK’s claim of being the real 
representative of the Kurds of Turkey” (Tezcür 2010, 783). In 2004, the PKK violated 
its decision of ceasefire, most likely because of the competition over the Kurdish 
support.  
In 2009, the AKP addressed the Kurdish issue in a more direct manner when Beşir 
Atalay, the former Interior Minister of Turkey, announced the “National Unity Plan” or 
the “Kurdish Opening” as the public preferred to call. Quite vague in its content, the 
Unity Plan, on one hand, gave partial amnesties to the PKK members to return from the 
mountain and rhetorically called for peace, and, on the other hand, witnessed the closure 
of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP) and 
arrests of hundreds of Kurdish politicians under the name of KCK operations. These 
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waves of KCK arrests continued in the following years, which looked “less like a “war 
on terror” than a “war on dissent” (Gunter 2013, 444). What was most significant in this 
period was the Oslo Meetings of Turkish Intelligence Service members and 
representatives of the government with prominent Kurdish actors, in contact with 
Abdullah Öcalan. Despite the fact that the “Oslo Process” was short of producing some 
fruitful outcomes, it was yet significant for both parties to specify their positions and 
goals. Due to the deadlock in reaching an agreement and a few undesirable events, the 
Oslo Process had to be suspended and dialogues slowed down in 2011 as a 
consequence.  
The stagnant peace process gained speed again with major developments as of the 
end of 2012, when a group of Kurdish parliamentarians were allowed to visit Öcalan on 
İmralı Island. This was followed by Öcalan’s 2013 Newroz letter, by means of which he 
announced; “A doorway opens from the process of armed struggle to a process of 
democratic policy” (Bianet 2013). This statement gave start to the Peace Process 
consisting of three major stages; “withdrawal of the PKK”, “directing the process” and 
“normalization”, respectively. The first phase aimed at PKK ceasefire and a secure 
withdrawal of the armed forces from Turkey to Northern Iraq. In return, the AKP was 
expected to make some legal amendments primarily regarding Kurdish prisoners and 
guerrillas, education in Kurdish language and election threshold (Aras and Duman 
2014, 5-7). The process, however, reached a deadlock at its first stage due to mutual 
accusations; the government blaming the PKK for not completing its withdrawal and 
Kurdish actors believing that the government has not taken any of the essential steps it 
has committed. 
In July 2014, however, the AKP government took a major step to secure the 
incomplete and vulnerable Peace Process. The Party passed a “Law on Ending Terror 
and Strengthening Social Integration,” which turned the Resolution Process into a state 
policy rather than a mere government initiative. With this initiative, all the matters 
regarding the conflict, including “political foundations, political actors, legal 
regulations, human rights, social, economic and cultural programs, security and 
disarmament, returning home and civil society” were entrenched under the Law 
No.6551 (Official Gazette 2014).  
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The entrenchment of the negotiations was meaningful, as the peace process had 
been extremely fragile and vulnerable to events happening inside and outside of Turkey 
since the very beginning. A very recent setback to the process was due to the 
widespread street protests against the President’s and the AKP’s attitude towards 
Kobane, a city of symbolic significance for Kurds in Rojava, occupied by a radical 
armed organization, the Islamic State. The overall tension was due to the Turkish 
government’s strong restlessness about the de-facto Kurdish settlement in Syria, which 
had declared its own Democratic Autonomy. “The resulting Syrian Kurdish Autonomy 
caused great apprehension in Turkey because suddenly PKK flags were flying just 
across its southern border with Syria” and “Ankara feared that this newly won Kurdish 
Syrian position would serve as an unwanted model for Turkey’s own disaffected Kurds” 
(Gunter 2013, 453). In the past, the Turkish state was similarly skeptical about the 
Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, with which it has now strong economic 
cooperation and good relations. The same type of relations could be achieved with 
Rojava and “Ankara could use its strong economic potential to woo” the new settlement 
(Larrabee 2013, 140). This would be a very instrumental step since dynamics in Turkey 
and Rojava mutually affect each other and both are primary stake-holders in the 
resolution of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey.  
5.6 Conclusion 
The Kurdish discontent in Turkey has so far expressed itself in various forms. For 
more than three decades it has showed itself in the form of ethnic identity and struggle 
for recognition. The PKK, the outlawed interlocutor of the Kurdish conflict, has been 
the main actor of making ethnic boundaries, shaping and reshaping the Kurdish identity 
and politics according to its dialectical relationship with Turkish nationalism (Tezcür 
2009). The position of the Kurdish movement has been vibrant and at times difficult to 
make a reading off. Sharp conversions and shifts on the Kurdish agenda have been 
puzzling. Autonomy which was dismissed as an option in Öcalan’s 1999 Defences, is 
now on the main agenda. Today; 
   Kurds want to be included in the political body with their identity based 
on their inscribed ‘political geography,’ which requires a constitutional 
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recognition of the Kurdish identity in Turkey. This  al recognition, including 
the notion of autonomy, would also mean a radical change in the existing 
political regime of Turkey (Jongerden and Akkaya 2012, 12). 
“Is the Turkish state, which has been committed to its centralist tradition, ready to 
undergo such a radical state restructure” is a crucial question waiting to be answered. 
The course of the Resolution Process will most likely provide an answer to this in the 
future. It seems that discussions on decentralization and autonomy will hold great 
importance in Turkish politics in general and Kurdish politics in particular in the 
following years. Whether Democratic Autonomy is the formula of the resolution of the 
Kurdish conflict should yet be the main question to ask at this point. In order to be able 
to come up with a sound answer to this, it is first necessary to draw the institutional 
design of the model.  
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CHAPTER 6  DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter seeks to provide an analysis of the context of the Kurdish conflict in 
Turkey and of the institutional design of Democratic Autonomy, respectively. The 
context of the conflict will be revealed through the complex power sharing framework. 
Accordingly, settlement patterns of the Kurdish population, the heterogeneity of the 
Kurdish region where self-determination claims are addressed and the significance of 
this region to the overall country will be explored.  
Subsequently, the design of Democratic Autonomy will be sought. First, the most 
significant characteristics of Democratic Autonomy as a model of territorial self-
governance arrangement will be analyzed. In doing so, the motivations of Kurdish 
political actors for proposing such a model will be discussed. Later, major topics that 
are crucial for all self-governance designs -scale of regions, entrenchment, distribution 
of duties and powers, principal values and principles, and issues such as transitional 
links, citizenship and language- will be analyzed in the context of Democratic 
Autonomy. Secondly, local power sharing arrangements and local institutions of the 
model will be presented. Lastly, the center-level power sharing tools of the design will 
be explored.  
This analysis will put forward the merits of Democratic Autonomy as well as its 
limitations. Thereby, the effectiveness and possible contribution of Democratic 
Autonomy to the resolution of the Kurdish conflict will be evaluated.  
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6.1 Context Of The Kurdish Conflict 
The context of a conflict is vital for determining the necessary design for its 
resolution. It is by no means possible to speak of a best-model or a perfect design of 
solution that can address all conflict cases. Every single territorial arrangement needs to 
be shaped in accordance with the context it is embodied in. A territorial structure which 
does not address the conditions of its conflict environment would fall short of 
presenting a real solution and would even create new conflicts. This would only worsen 
the conflict, make it longer and aggravate its resolution. As this is totally undesired, a 
strong consistency and harmony between the context and design is required to increase 
the possibility of territorial self-governance to be a genuine tool for conflict resolution.  
The context of a conflict case, according to the framework of complex power 
sharing, refers to the geographical settlement of the group that makes self-determination 
claims, the heterogeneity of the territory that the claim is referred to, and the 
significance of the territory to the whole country. Accepting these as vital matters for 
forming a territorial structure, the context of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey will be 
analyzed accordingly. Thus, this will allow the writer to reach a judgement of whether 
the institutional arrangement of Democratic Autonomy can fully address the contextual 
conditions of Turkey or fall short of doing so. Before providing Turkey’s Kurdish 
context, internal and external dynamics of the Kurdish self-determination claims will be 
briefly visited. This will lead to a better understanding of the conflict case to be 
discussed.  
6.1.1 Self-Determination Claims 
Kurds in Turkey constitute a good example of a national group striving for their 
right to self-determination for several decades. Although the form of their self-rule 
demands has displayed a drastic change throughout the years, Kurdish politics has long 
been mobilized around the demands of self-rule, carrying out its agenda with the aim of 
creating a self-rule in its historic homeland (Kara 2013, 152). Recently, Kurdish 
political parties have contended that the recognition of the Kurdish national identity 
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passes through the realization of Democratic Autonomy. In this respect, they believe 
that the recognition of their political project would directly mean granting “status” to 
the Kurdish nation, which has lacked it since the establishment of the Republic.   
There have been different self-determination claims of the Kurdish parties in the 
past decades. Previously the Kurdish movement aimed at separation from Turkey for 
the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. In the words of the Kurdish 
movement, “Virtually all the organizations forming the Kurdish movement, and mainly 
the PKK, have interpreted the right of nations to the self-determination principle as the 
right of building a state” (Akademi 2013, 97). Today, however, this goal is totally 
abandoned and replaced by the current autonomy project. Now the political movement 
interprets the right to self-determination as building a radical democracy in Turkey, 
where Kurds can rule themselves in their homeland. Thus, Kurdish politics has 
dismissed the option of external self-determination, which would inevitably challenge 
the territorial integrity of the Turkish State, and instead has embraced a solution of 
internal self-determination. It is believed that both internal and external factors have 
been effective in this drastic shift  
One of the main reasons behind the PKK’s decision to give up “statehood” could 
be due to its inability to achieve any real progress towards a territorial gain. The 
organization has achieved no real advancement towards reaching this aim. Moreover, 
the PKK lost military power towards the end of the 1999’s, and it was hardly possible 
for it to gain momentum especially after Öcalan’s expel from Syria and, more 
significantly, capture in Kenya and imprisonment in Turkey. Due to the conditions 
regarding its militaristic capabilities and organizational limitations, the PKK was 
heavily losing blood. While these factors may have had a role in the PKK’s 
transformation, it is believed that the “leadership” factor or, more specifically, the 
Öcalan-factor has been the main determining factor. As explained in the previous 
chapter in detail, Öcalan has gradually moved away from the idea of state-building and 
established this new political project. It would not be inconvenient to claim that, if it 
were not for Öcalan, it would arguably be not likely for the PKK to abandon its 
statehood desire and agree on an internal arrangement.  
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 Even though Öcalan appears to be the decisive factor, several external dynamics 
may also have been influential in today’s self-rule claims. First, the Kurdish movement 
has greatly been influenced by the political atmosphere of the Cold War. The presence 
of the Soviet Union and its socialist bloc inspired the PKK to establish its own socialist 
state and embrace the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric to justify its cause. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union had a considerable effect on the PKK and pushed it to “realize” that state 
building was not the real solution for national independence. Secondly, in the 2000’s the 
European Union might have been influential on the Kurdish movement to stick to a 
living together formula for the resolution of the conflict. Since 1999, especially between 
2000 and 2006, the EU impact on Turkish politics has been quite visible. It has paved 
the way for further democratization in Turkey and decentralization as well. The Union 
has also had a great role in the decision to lift the death warrant on Öcalan. Since then, 
Kurdish actors have frequently referred to the EU, addressing both the way it 
approaches minority rights and promotes decentralization. The global trend towards 
decentralization in general and the EU’s support to Turkey towards increasing local 
governance may have had a substantial impact on the Kurdish movement decision to go 
for a strong self-governance arrangement.  
 While the dissolution of the Soviet bloc stands as a historical factor and the EU 
impact as a long-term ongoing element, there are obviously other regional factors that 
directly influence the Kurdish movement in Turkey. These are the developments taking 
place in the neighboring Kurdish areas, Northern Iraq and Northern Syria respectively. 
Firstly, the establishment of an Iraqi Kurdish government in the 2000’s with American 
support revealed that a Kurdish self-rule would not be impossible, and in fact quite 
achievable with international support. Secondly and, more recently, the developments 
taking place in Syria, and more specifically, the establishment of the de-facto Kurdish 
settlement in Northern Syria, referred to as Rojava, have strengthened self-
determination claims of the Kurdish political movement in Turkey. Syrian Kurds were 
able to use the political opportunities caused by the authority gap due to the Syrian civil 
war and structured a canton system to rule themselves. Their canton system shows great 
similarities to the system Kurds in Turkey want to construct, and hence inspire Kurdish 
political parties to achieve a similar arrangement.   
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The Kurdish movement, today, wants to use its right to self-determination in an 
arrangement where it can rule itself within Turkey. This demand is principally aimed to 
be realized in the historical homeland of Kurds, the Eastern and Southeastern regions of 
Turkey, or Kurdistan as Kurdish actors refer to. A deeper look into the region is 
required, evaluating its patterns of Kurdish settlement, heterogeneity and significance 
for the whole state.  
6.1.2 Compact Regional Settlement 
“Compact regional settlement” of an ethnic minority group is central to 
determining the institutional form of a territorial self-governance arrangement. While 
the existence of a compact regional settlement of an ethnic group can easily allow for 
forming a self-rule model based on a certain territory, the absence of it may lead to seek 
a more suitable alternative, such as cultural autonomy. The conceptualization of 
“compact regional settlement” within the complex power sharing framework is as 
follows (Wolff 2009, 33):  
   Communities of people who share a sense of identity that is distinct from 
other communities in the same state, who are neither dominant nor a 
numerical majority, and who live predominantly in their historic homeland 
or an otherwise delineated territory. 
In accordance with the definition above, if a certain group with a sense of 
common identity shares a common settlement, it presents a suitable context for regional 
governance. Kurds in Turkey in fact meet this criteria as the second largest group in the 
country living predominantly in the Eastern and Southeastern regions. This statement, 
however, has its own problems, as it is not possible to know the precise number of 
Kurds living in the region. “Accurate information about the demography... of the 
Kurdish population in Turkey is scarce” (Sirkeci 2000, 149). The national censuses in 
Turkey have lifted the ethnicity question due to political and security concerns (Sirkeci 
2000, 152) and thus there are no official numbers of Kurds living in Turkey since 1965. 
Manifesting accurate numbers of Kurdish population is also difficult due to the 
limitations of defining a Kurd. Lack of a final definition of the Kurdish ethnic identity 
limits one to giving accurate numbers of their population in the country and the region 
as well.  
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Nonetheless, many scholars agree that the most distinctive and strongest 
characteristic of Kurds, both in the etic and emic senses, is the Kurdish language 
(Bruinessen 2002; Yalçın-Heckmann 2002; Mutlu 1996). The Turkish state, 
accordingly, regards the Kurdish language as the defining characteristic of Kurdish 
people. According to Andrews, the strict prohibition of the state on the use of Kurdish 
language indicates that the state has perceived the Kurdish ethnic identity mainly on 
linguistic basis (Andrews 2002, 113). Moreover, for Kurds as well, language has been a 
principal indicator of difference. Servet Mutlu contends that, “the Kurdish language has 
almost always been a rallying point and an inseparable part of the emic definition of 
Kurdishness for the leaders of the Kurdish movements in the 20th century as well as for 
ordinary Kurds” (Mutlu 1996, 518). For Sirkeci, “mother tongue data is the only 
potential indicator for ethnicity in the absence of any other alternative information” 
(2000, 152). However, defining ethnic identity merely based upon language is also 
problematic, as the picture in terms of the language appears quite complex in the region. 
Not everybody speaking Kurdish is a Kurd, while not all Kurds can speak Kurdish. Yet, 
the criterion of language could still allow one to make estimates both about the number 
of Kurds living in Turkey and their distribution across the regions.    
There are numerous different estimates about the Kurdish population residing in 
Turkey. Vast differences in their numbers are mainly due to political factors aiming 
either to reduce or increase the number of Kurds. “Obviously, the host state may 
attempt to deny the presence of Kurds or other ethnic or religious minorities within their 
borders” while “the Kurds themselves will of course try to expand the number of those 
regarded as Kurds, to increase their credibility” (O’Shea 2012, 42-43). For Gunter, a 
“reasonable estimate” would be that there are between 12 to 15 million Kurds in Turkey 
(2011, 3). According to a more recent study, in 1998 14.4% of people in Turkey had 
Kurdish as their mother tongue (Erkan 2005, 66). It is no doubt that these numbers 
would vary as much as the tellers. Although no accurate numbers are available, an 
estimated populace of Kurds, based on the language criterion, gives the picture of how 
Kurds have concentrated in the Eastern regions of Turkey. According to Ekmekçi 
(2012), if the Kurdish population in Turkey is considered to be 13.5 million, 7,2 million 
(53%) of this still reside in the nineteen eastern provinces. If the provinces of Ardahan, 
Erzincan, Iğdır and Kars are also to be included in the statistics, the Kurdish population 
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in eastern Turkey reaches 60%. İbrahim Sirkeci, in his study, where he utilizes the data 
of Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) contends that: 
   Kurdish people may still be identifiable with a region as they are amassed in the 
south-east part of the country as it was in the past. This is evident in the findings 
of this study and in the detailed estimations of Mutlu (1996). According to 
Mutlu’s estimations, which are supported by the analysis of TDHS data, the 
majority of Kurds live in the Eastern and South-eastern parts of the country. Their 
proportion in provincial populations ranges from 25 per cent to 90 per cent in the 
region and according to TDHS, 70 per cent of Kurds living in the East (2000, 
156).   
 
Table 2: Estimated Kurdish population in Turkey by regions 
  1965 1990 
Region 
Number of 
Population 
(thousand) 
% Total 
Population 
Number of 
Population 
(thousand) 
% Total 
Population 
Southeastern11 1,192.73 64.24 2,365.04 64.98 
Eastern12 1,369.65 38.87 2,230.29 41.96 
Mediterranean13 190.22 4.98 726.55   8.95 
Marmara14 72.65 1.24 810.13   6.09 
Central Anatolia15 262.64 4.13 579.38   5.53 
Aegean16 15.77 0.36 296.99   3.93 
Black Sea17 28.72 0.51 37.88   0.50 
Total 3,132.39 9.98        7,046.25 12.60 
Source: Servet Mutlu 1996, 533. 
                                                          
11Adıyaman, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Siirt, Şanlıurfa. 
12 Ağrı, Bingöl, Bitlis, Elazığ, Erzincan, Erzurum, Hakkari, Kars, Malatya, Muş, Tunceli, Van.  
13 Adana, Antalya, Burdur, Gaziantep, Hatay, Isparta, İçel, Kahramanmaraş. 
14Balıkesir, Bilecik, Bursa, Çanakkale, Edirne, İstanbul, Kırklareli, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Tekirdağ.  
15 Ankara, Çankırı, Çorum, Eskişehir, Kayseri, Kırşehir, Konya, Nevşehir, Niğde, Sivas, Yozgat.  
16 Afyonkarahisar, Aydın, Denizli, İzmir, Kütahya, Manisa, Muğla, Uşak.  
17Amasya, Artvin, Bolu, Giresun, Gümüşhane, Kastamonu, Ordu, Rize, Samsun, Sinop, Tokat, Trabzon, 
Zonguldak.  
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For Andrews, “both the etic and the majority emic view strongly identify the 
Kurds with eastern Anatolia, ignoring the dispersion in the west” (Andrews 2002, 114). 
Indeed, eastern Turkey has been associated with Kurds despite the fact that millions 
have moved to Western parts of Turkey. Mass immigrations of Kurds have taken place 
throughout the years mainly due to socio-economic conditions and unpleasant war 
conditions between the state and the PKK. Today, Istanbul is regarded as the largest 
Kurdish city in the country, accommodating more than 8% Kurdish population (Mutlu 
1996, 526). Moreover, Kurds have also moved from villages to big cities within their 
own regions. The provinces of Diyarbakır and Van, for instance, have received big 
population surges due to the immigrations. In brief, “events of the last one hundred 
years have further driven many Kurds both forcibly and voluntarily to seek safety or 
employment in the larger cities of the region” (Dahlman 2002, 274).  
Changing settlements of Kurds within their own region and, most significantly 
mass immigrations from the east to the west may have had a negative impact on their 
sense of territorial belonging. Although most Kurds still continue to live in their 
historical homelands, they have arguably “become less of a territorially defined social 
entity” (Bruinessen 1998, 48) or, in other words, have become “deterritorialized.” 
According to Bruinessen (1998, 48),  
   Kurdistan remains central to the Kurdish awareness as the historical 
territory of their people, but the percentage of the Kurds actually living there 
has significantly decreased over the past few decades. Because of the high 
birth rates, the population of the region has kept growing in absolute 
numbers, but it may now constitute only around two thirds of all Kurds, or 
even less. 
Even though there may be some truth in Bruinessen’s argument that some degree of 
“deterritorialization” may be valid for the Kurdish society in general, it surely has not 
affected the Kurdish political movement. For the movement, Kurdistan is a major 
element of the Kurdish identity as well as of its collective history, values and culture. 
As stated by the Kurdish movement (Akademi 2009, 95):    
   The Kurdistan concept holds a significant place in the emergence of 
Democratic Autonomy. Kurdistan is the homeland of Kurdish people. They 
have dwelled on this land ever since they existed as a community. A people 
may not have a state. This does not mean that they do not exist, and that 
their homeland does not have a name. Kurds may not have state as a people, 
but they do have a homeland where they live. And this land used to be 
called Kurdistan until a century ago. From now on it is also going to be 
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called Kurdistan. Each of the four states having sovereignty over Kurdistan 
has to accept this fact.   
Kurdish political actors have firmly and persistently emphasize the word 
“Kurdistan.” The deputies of the Kurdish parties are strongly against the denial of using 
the term “Kurdistan” and frequently utter it in the Parliament, trying to convince the 
other party’s deputies that no one can deny its existence. The other parties, on the other 
hand, are still far from even using the term. For Donald McDowall, until the early 
twentieth century, it was not important how “generously” the term Kurdistan was used 
and “no one cared very much about the boundaries of Kurdistan, or the numbers of 
people who lived there” (2000, 7). Needless to say, the situation has become the 
opposite with the establishment of the Turkish nation-state. Today, many believe that 
Kurdistan poses a challenge on the sovereignty of the state as it represents an authority 
separate from the Turkish authority. In other words, accepting the existence of 
Kurdistan in Turkey is associated with the notion of accepting dual authority within one 
state. 
In conclusion, despite the dispersion of Kurds in western Turkey, Kurds still have 
a major concentration in the eastern part of the country. While this fact allows for a 
possible territorial institutional arrangement in the region, it raises the question about 
the status of Kurds living outside the region (Güneş 2013, 81) and their relationship 
with the local government in Kurdistan.  
6.1.3 Heterogeneity of the Region 
Heterogeneity of a certain region where self-determination claims are made is a 
crucial factor in the institutional design of the local government. Depending on the 
heterogenous character of the region, strong local power sharing mechanisms may be 
necessary. This is crucial to guarantee the representation and participation of all groups 
within the system. In the case where there are no sufficient power sharing tools in a 
heterogenous territory, the dominant group may hold the power, and this may lead to a 
new conflict in the local unit,which would not only serve the very opposite purpose of 
self-governance, but also worsen the conflict and complicate its resolution. 
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In the model of complex power sharing, the heterogeneity of a region is calculated 
by looking at “the ratio between the largest group and the total of all other groups” 
(Wolff 2009, 44). The theoretical framework suggests that the ratio between different 
groups needs to be at least 5% to be able to speak about the necessity of local power 
sharing tools. If it is less than minimum 5% of difference, then constructing power 
sharing mechanisms may not be necessary.  
Within the Turkish context, it is neither possible nor necessary to provide the 
number of different ethnic groups and calculate the ratio between them. Instead, there 
are a few important points to make to be able to draw a clear picture about the 
demographic composition of southeastern and eastern Anatolia. First, Turkish and 
Kurdish people constitute the majority of the population in the region, that is, there are 
two dominant groups present there (Nestmann 2002; Aslan 2015, 176). This fact alone 
necessitates the construction of power sharing structures. Second, there are many ethnic 
and religious identity groups other than the two major ones, which certainly needs to be 
taken into account in the system. Last but not least, “Kurds themselves are notoriously 
divided geographically, politically, linguistically, and tribally” (Gunter 2011, 4), and 
thus this contributes greatly to the heterogeneity of the region. All in all, the Eastern 
region of Turkey has a very rich inter-ethnic, inter-religious and intra-ethnic 
composition.  
 The concentration of the Kurdish population in the East was given in the 
previous section through Servet Mutlu’s population estimates. Even though the numbers 
in Mutlu’s work may have changed due to the war conditions mainly in the 1990’s, it 
still indicates that, there is a large concentration of Kurds in the region, but this does not 
necessarily make them the majority there. They share the lands with other large groups, 
particularly with Turkish people. Due to the lack of recent data about the distribution of 
ethnic groups in the region, an old but credible source -the records of the Village 
Inventory- will serve useful to show that the region is majorly dominated by people who 
have Kurdish and Turkish as their mother-tongues (Nestmann 2002, 179-199). A recent 
report on the distribution of mother-tongues across Turkey, indicates the same results 
that two groups constitute the majority in the region (Aslan et al. 2015, 176). However, 
they undoubtedly share these lands with many other identity groups.  
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 The comprehensive study of Peter Alford Andrews, Ethnic Groups in the 
Republic of Turkey, provides a list of ethnic groups in Turkey in which ethnic and 
religious character of eastern Turkey becomes evident (1989, 239-429). According to 
this valuable data, apart from Turkish and Kurdish people, who belong to different 
religions, there are also approximately forty different identity groups, both ethnic and 
religious, in the region. Some of the major groups existing in the region are as follows: 
Turkmens (Sunni, Sunni:Avşar, Alevi, Alevi:Barak, Alevi:Çepni, Alevi:Tahtacı) 
mainly concentrated in Gaziantep and Kars; Azerbaijani Turks (Shii, Karabağ:Sunni, 
Karapapah) mainly in Kars,Erzurum and Ağrı and partly in Muş and Van; Turkistanis 
(Uygur, Kırgız, Kazak, Özbek, Özbek-Tatar) in Van; Sunni Arabs in Gaziantep, 
Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, Siirt, Mardin, Bitlis and Muş; Chaldeans in Diyarbakır, Siirt, 
Mardin, Hakkari; Circassians in Adıyaman, Şanlıurfa, Mardin, Bitlis, Bingöl, Kars; 
Chechen and Ingush in Mardin, Kars, Muş; Georgians in Kars and Muş  Tatars 
(Crimean, Noğay, Kazan) and Bashkir in Gaziantep; Muslim immigrants from 
Balkan countries in Diyarbakır and Elazığ; Muslim immigrants from Daghistan 
(Avar, Dargwa, Kumuk, Lak/Gazikumuk, Lezgi) in Kars and Muş; Estonians in Kars; 
Ossetes in Siirt, Bitlis, Erzurum, Kars, Muş; Christian Armenians in Diyarbakır, Siirt, 
Mardin, Bitlis, Bingöl, Elazığ; Muslims of Armenian origin in Siirt, Elazığ, Erzurum, 
Kars, Tunceli, Van; Slavs (Kuban-Cossack, Molokan, Polish) in Kars; Romani (Poşa) 
around Ağrı, Bitlis, Van, Erzurum and Kars. 
 The demographic variety of the region is even coupled by the heterogeneity of 
Kurds within themselves. Kurds have serious linguistic, religious, tribal, geographical 
and ideological differences among themselves. Hakan Yavuz approaches the matter as 
follows (2001, 3): 
   Although Kurdish 'ethnic entrepreneurs' tend to identify Turks as their 
'other' in the construction of Kurdish nationalism, there are major tribal, 
linguistic, religious, alphabetical, and regional fissures within Kurdish 
identity itself. The sources of these divisions are socio-historical, and they 
prevent the emergence of a full-fledged Kurdish identity.  
Adding to these varieties among Kurds, there also exist serious ideological and political 
rivalries among them, which largely contributes to the lack of Kurdish unity. This can 
be seen even by only looking at the results of the recent local elections held in 2009 and 
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2014. The constituent of the Eastern region is virtually divided into two voting groups, 
the pro-Kurdish HDP and DBP, and the incumbent AKP.  
6.1.4 Significance of the Region 
Territories have certain values in and by themselves both for the states and 
minority groups living there. The significance of Kurdistan for the Kurdish identity and 
thus the Kurdish political movement was presented in the previous sections. However, 
the significance of the region to the overall country and state also needs to be evaluated. 
What kind of value and importance does the state attribute to eastern Anatolia? To what 
extent is it significant to the whole country? Answers to these questions would have a 
great role in determining the central-level power sharing mechanisms between the 
central state and local governance. The higher the significance is, the more important it 
becomes to build up effective tools that could enable the participation and 
representation of the local unit in the center. It becomes crucial that the local be 
included in the national decision-making and implementation procedures.    
In order to seek an answer to the question whether the Kurdish region is 
significant to Turkey or not, first it becomes necessary to define “significance.” The 
significance of a region derives from both tangible and intangible factors. While the 
former involves natural resources, goods and services, trade, industry, military 
capabilities and geographic advantage of the given territory, the latter is more about 
sentimental attachment, historical and cultural importance attributed to it. In accordance 
with the complex power sharing framework, size and population of the territory, 
existence and availability of natural resources, strategic location and cultural importance 
emerge as the main determinants to decide whether or not a certain land holds 
significance. The framework defines significance as “high” in the case where three or 
more of these factors are present. It is of “medium” significance if two, and “low” if one 
or none of these factors is present (Wolff 2009, 5).   
The Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey constitute a large portion of 
Turkey’s lands. Eastern Anatolia is made up of fourteen provinces -Ağrı, Adıyaman, 
Bitlis, Bingöl, Elazığ, Erzincan, Erzurum, Hakkari, Iğdır, Kars, Malatya, Muş, Tunceli 
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and Van. According to Turkey’s 2013 Statistical Yearbook, these cities all together 
constitute approximately 150,210 square kilometers -about 19% of the country’s total 
territory and host virtually 6 million people (the exact population in 2013 was 
5,906,564). Southeastern Anatolia, on the other hand, consists of nine provinces -
Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Batman, Şırnak and Siirt- 
resting on 76,938 square kilometers. It makes up around 10% of the total land of Turkey 
with the populace of over 8 million (8,096,352 in 2013), which is again nearly 10% of 
the overall country population (76,667,864 in 2013). These two regions, in total, 
constitute a vast portion of Turkey, both in terms of population and territory. The sum 
of the two regions where Kurdish national claims are addressed, makes up about 19% of 
the total land and over 14 million citizens (Turkish Statistical Institute 2013, 5, 46-48).  
In terms of natural resources, the Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey host 
several mineral resources including copper, asphaltite, phosphates and oil, the last two 
of which constitute a considerable percentage of the overall Turkish production (Mutlu 
2001, 119) and lignite, iron and chrome (O’Shae 2012, 58). Apart from them, the most 
significant natural resource in the region is water. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers 
together make up 28% of Turkey’s water potential (Mutlu 2001, 121). These two rivers 
rise in Turkey’s Kurdish populated region and flow to the southern neighbors, Iraq and 
Syria. While the rivers are valuable by themselves as great natural resources, their value 
has increased considerably for the Turkish State since most of the Middle East 
countries, particularly the southern neighbors, experience serious difficulties to meet 
their water demands (Gruen 2000). Because Syria and Iraq heavily rely on the water 
coming from the Tigris and the Euphrates, they naturally become dependent on 
Turkey’s water regulations.  
Turkey, well aware of its water potential, has effectively used this potential and 
turned it into an advantage. First, it has realized the GAP Project (Southeastern Anatolia 
Project), “one of the largest construction project[s] in the world” (O’Shae 2012, 56), 
and secondly has used it as a political weapon to increase its strategic power in the 
region. In other words, the water in southern Turkey serves the country in several ways; 
as a natural resource, as a tool for energy production and as a political weapon.  
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The GAP project is a major project that comprises nine provinces in the region, 
aiming to construct 22 dams, 19 hydroelectric power plants for the “irrigation of 1.7 
million hectares of land and the generation of 27 billion kilowatt-hours of electrical 
energy” (Mutlu 2001, 115). With these, the GAP project makes a great contribution to 
the overall energy production of Turkey and thus is vital for the country. For Gruen, the 
GAP is more than a project to produce energy and food; it is a plan of “sustainable 
economic development” that would increase Turkey’s power both inside and outside 
(2000, 565). For the latter, the author contends that Turkey has used water as a tool “to 
promote regional peace,” where the country has some sort of interest.  
The Turkish state has indeed used its water potential also as a foreign policy 
weapon to advance its regional interests. The most striking example of this is probably 
the bilateral deal between Turkey and Syria in 1987 in which Turkey guaranteed to 
supply a certain amount of water from the Euphrates River to Syria in exchange for a 
guarantee from Syria to halt all the PKK activities in its territories (Jongerden 2010, 
189). This deal led to the process in which the PKK leader had to leave Syria and 
eventually got caught. As mentioned above, the vulnerability of Syria and other 
neighbors to the water from the north has allowed Turkey to pursue effective water 
policies in the region. In this respect, not only the presence of water is significant for 
Turkey, but also its location is strategically meaningful.  
For many scholars, water is becoming increasingly important in international 
affairs. According to Gunter, the increasing importance of water will make Kurdistan an 
important region both economically and politically (2011). For McDowall, due to the 
increasing population, energy demand and need for irrigation, “water is rapidly 
becoming more important than oil,” and he adds: “Neither government will willingly 
surrender control of this water to the Kurds” (2000, 7). The Turkish State would 
naturally want to maintain its control over the resources and would never be willing to 
surrender its interests gained by water, which is valuable both in terms of energy 
production and its strategic location that carries Turkey to a prominent position in the 
region.  
In addition to water, other energy resources, most prominently gas, increases the 
geopolitical importance of the Eastern region. Although Turkey itself is insignificant in 
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terms of energy production, it is “encircled by the world's largest energy-wealthy 
regions,” most outstandingly Caspian Region, Central Asia and the Middle East 
(Öztürk, Yüksel, and Özek 2011). Proximity to these regions gives the advantage to 
Turkey to supply its own gas demand in relatively easy terms and to become “East-
West gas transportation corridor” (Winrow 2004). Turkey’s importance to become a 
bridge between European energy market and Asia and Middle East would not only 
benefit Turkey in terms of its foreign policy but also for its domestic development.  
As for cultural importance, Turks and Kurds share a long common history. The 
Kurdish movement, often makes reference to this historical togetherness. Abdullah 
Öcalan himself very frequently underlines the historical solidarity of Kurds and Turks 
starting with the 1071 Malazgirt War and reaching its most prominent achievement with 
the 1919 Independence War of Turkey. Öcalan contends that Turks and Kurds are “two 
essential elements” of “national revolution,” referring to the Independence War. He also 
adds that two peoples are “strong partners” who have nested histories and culture 
(Öcalan 2013, 380).  
Undoubtedly, for the Turkish State, the Eastern and Southeastern regions, like all  
the other regions, have a cultural significance since they symbolize national sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Turkey. McDowall however claims that Turkey attributes a 
special meaning to its eastern frontiers. This, he believes, is due to the emotional and 
ideological meaning given to the national borders of modern Turkey, which was to a 
great extent shaped by the National Pact of 1919. He argues that the territorial integrity 
of the country has a “mystical quality” for its people and “the loss of Kurdistan…would 
be perceived as a grievous blow to the spatial identity of Turkey” (2000, 7).   
6.1.5 Conclusion 
Despite the dispersion of Kurds to the western parts of Turkey, they still majorly 
concentrate in their historical homeland. For that, it is possible to speak of a compact 
regional settlement of Kurds and thus, of the possibility of granting them a form of TSG 
arrangement. Kurds, however, are not the only group living in the region. They share 
the region with various other groups including Turkish people and other minorities. 
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Moreover, Kurds themselves are divided within various identity lines including political 
rivalries. Taking all these factors into consideration, it would arguably be valid to claim 
that there might be a high risk of creating new disputes within local governance 
provided that local power sharing mechanisms do not function properly. It is certainly 
obvious that the institutional design of Democratic Autonomy necessitates powerful 
participatory tools to incorporate all groups into the local system in order to contribute 
to the resolution of the Kurdish conflict. 
In his study regarding secessionist movements and their possible successes, 
Donald Horowitz contends that “the strength of a secessionist movement and the 
heterogeneity of its region are inversely related” (2000, 267). Horowitz suggests that it 
be a very difficult task to get the consent of all groups in the region to form a local 
governance and that major conflicts can erupt between the rival groups. In this respect, 
the Kurdish movement has a hard task ahead to deal with. Not to pave the way for 
heavy clashes between opposing groups, the Kurdish movement needs to convince all 
groups in the region that Democratic Autonomy would serve useful.  
As for the significance of the region to the overall country and the State, it seems 
that the region is important for Turkey in all matters. In terms of size and population it 
constitutes a large portion of the country; in terms of natural resource and strategic 
location it serves the interests of Turkey, and as of culture it symbolizes sovereignty and 
unity of the country. This shows that it is important for the institutional design of 
Democratic Autonomy to include strong power sharing options that could allow the 
inhabitants of eastern Turkey to have a significant role in joining the power structures at 
the center. Democratic Autonomy necessitates having effective mechanisms to be 
included in the parliament of the center and preferably also in the government. The 
participation of the local government in both legislative and executive branches of the 
center would not only ensure strong policy coordination and joint decision-making 
devices, but also help to increase the feeling of togetherness. This arises as a crucial 
issue for the future since it could provide a common ground for all groups and decrease 
the possibility of separation. 
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6.2 Institutional Design of Democratic Autonomy 
Having examined Abdullah Öcalan’s and the DTK’s writings, and interviews both 
conducted personally and gathered via media as reliable data, there emerge several 
themes that are quite significant to understand the notion Democratic Autonomy. These 
themes allow one to grasp the motives behind why such a political project is demanded 
by the Kurdish movement for the resolution of the Kurdish issue and why it is regarded 
necessary. More importantly, the data introduce themes and topics to explore the 
institutional design of the model in question. In this chapter, by using the data as the 
point of reference, the shared motivations of Kurdish actors and a detailed legal design 
of the model will be presented respectively.  
6.2.1 Common Motives 
One outstanding theme that arises in almost all the writings and interviews 
regarding Democratic Autonomy is the criticism posed for the “centralist nation-state”. 
With this, all the states with centralist approaches are severely criticized, while Turkey 
is placed at the heart of the criticisms. The data show that there is a strong discontent 
about the nature of the Turkish State, which is based both upon the notion of nation-
state and centralism. Regarding the former, most interviewees accuse the state of 
overlooking the differences derived from identity and of imposing policies of 
uniformity. As for centralism, the heavy tutelage of the center on municipalities is 
criticized. Moreover, a shared perception is that Ankara is largely unable to understand 
the local dynamics and demands, and thus is incapable of addressing the needs of the 
society. Within this context, one respondent, in a personal conversation, has also stated 
that the city governors, appointed by the center, are short of local knowledge and are 
only the representatives of the system regulated by the center. In brief, the inadequacy 
of centralism and nation-state to bring about effective governance emerges as a 
common perception among Kurdish actors. It is also argued that the global trend is 
evolving towards decentralization. One interviewee has stated that “[the nation-state] 
has already been outdated in the 21st century. The mindset, especially in the unitary 
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structure, is not able to meet social needs anymore” (Yüksekova, 10 September 2014).18 
Another has claimed, “States have now reached a point where new governance relations 
based upon decentralization and upon the principles of subsidiarity and localization are 
preferred to rigid authoritarian central structures. This overlaps with what we defend” 
(Ankara, 13 June 2014)19. By many Kurdish actors, decentralization is seen as a sine 
qua non in the new globalized political system. In association with this view, the EU is 
given as a point of reference in several of the interviews. Many respondents believe that 
the EU presents a sound example of local governance and autonomy as well.  
Another main theme in the data is the issue of “rights”. The word is indeed used 
most frequently both in the DTK documents and interviews. Equal rights to all national 
and religious components of Turkey are requested. More specifically, equality among 
Turks and Kurds seems to be the most emphasized demand for the realization of 
Democratic Autonomy. Equality, for Kurdish actors, however, cannot be achieved only 
through granting cultural rights to Kurds. Political rights are also required to be able to 
speak of true equality. As Demirtaş puts it, “Kurds, as a people, must be equal to Turks 
in their rights of language, culture, life, education, governance and expression. They 
must have the right to live as a Kurd in Turkey, not as a Turk” (BDP Blog, 2013). As 
his remarks indicate, cultural rights such as use of language and expression of culture 
are demanded together with political demands such as participation in governance. In 
brief, according to the Kurdish movement: 
   Acceptance of only cultural rights means ‘live your culture but do not be 
involved in politics, do not govern yourselves, we will govern you.’ 
Therefore, political rights are as indispensable as cultural rights. A nation 
establishing its own institutions and organizations, determining its own 
politics, implementing it –in other words- governing itself is a 
‘must’(Akademi 2009, 92).20 
                                                          
18 “21. yüzyılda bu model zaten zamanını bitirdi. Özellikle üniter yapıdaki merkezi zihniyet artık toplumsal 
ihtiyaçları karşılamıyor.” 
 
19 “Devletler artık katı otoriter merkezi yapılardan âdemi merkeziyetçiliğe dayanan, yerinden ve yerellik 
ilkesine dayanan yeni yönetim ilişkilerini önemseyen bir noktaya geldi. Bu bizim savunduğumuzla 
örtüşüyor.” 
 
20 “Sadece kültürel hakların kabulü, kültürünü yaşa ama siyaset yapma, kendi kendini yönetme, biz seni yöne-
telim demektir. Onun için kültürel haklar kadar siyasal haklar da vazgeçilmez-dir. Halkın kendi kurumlarını, 
kendi örgütlerini oluşturması, kendi siyasetini kendisinin belirlemesi, hayata geçirmesi, özce kendini 
yönetmesi olmazsa olmaz koşullardır.” 
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For Kurdish actors, Democratic Autonomy presents an ideal model in which Kurds 
could achieve their cultural and political rights alike. This way, they would be equal 
citizens in Turkey. Moreover, the acknowledgement of these rights would also mean 
that the state eventually agrees to hand over the collective rights of Kurds, which have 
been long denied. According to one interviewee, the state approach towards trying to 
solve the Kurdish problem only through individual rights has brought the opposite, 
“solutionlessness”. “Kurds do not accept individual rights but demand collective rights” 
(Van, 9 September 2014).21 
“Identity politics” is another dominant motive for the Kurdish movement to 
demand Democratic Autonomy. In the data, there appears an explicit demand to 
conduct politics and participate in governance with Kurdish ethnic identity. An example 
of this is that: 
   Until recently a Kurd was able to have a say in Turkey provided he quit 
his identity. We do not accept this anymore. I want to go to the parliament 
on behalf of Kurds, I want to run for Presidency in the name of Kurds 
(Yüksekova, 10 September 2014).22  
While these remarks reflect the strong emphasis made on the Kurdish identity 
specifically, Kurdish actors are of the opinion that all the other groups in Kurdistan 
could and should participate in governance with their own identities. Thus, there is a 
strong focus on the “recognition of differences” and “conducting politics through 
differences”.  
Furthermore, relatedly, Democratic Autonomy, is seen as the formal and legal 
recognition of the Kurdish identity, and thus is equated to the “status” of Kurds. While 
the issue of “status” will be elaborated more in the following sections, it is necessary to 
state here that it is one of the main issues related to the reasons why Democratic 
Autonomy is vital for the resolution.  
                                                          
21 “Kürtler bireysel haklara razı değil, kolektif haklarını istiyorlar.”  
22“Şimdiye kadar bir Kürt ancak kimliğini terk ettiği takdirde Türkiye’de söz sahibi olabiliyordu. Bundan 
sonra bunu kabul etmiyoruz. Kürtler adına ben meclise gitmek istiyorum, Kürtler adına cumhurbaşkanı adayı 
olmak istiyorum.” 
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Along with the prevalent themes of “limitations of the centralist nation-state”, 
“the issue of rights” and “politics through identity,” Democratic Autonomy is described 
as “the ultimate solution” to the Kurdish conflict. All the other options are described as 
inadequate and unsatisfactory. Moreover, in several interviews, it has been stated that 
the demand of self-rule posed by the Kurdish movement would be a great opportunity 
also for Turkey, since it does not aim to challenge the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the state. However, it has also been claimed by some respondents that Kurds 
will not advocate this project forever. If the state insisted on disregarding it, new 
alternatives, possibly more radical ones, would be sought. Gültan Kışanak, in an 
interview available in the media, asserts that “Obviously, Kurds have chose to live 
together. This should be welcomed as quick as possible. Otherwise, nobody could 
ensure that this choice will always remain so” (Akşam, 2012). Selahattin Demirtaş, 
similarly claims that if the Resolution Process between the government and the Kurdish 
movement turned out to be inconclusive, partition would eventually come along (Taraf 
2012b).  
In addition to the said issues, the concepts of democratization, democratic 
representation, participation, direct democracy (as an alternative to representative 
democracy), territorial integrity, living together and common future within the borders 
of Turkey have been commonly expressed in the data by Kurdish actors. Further 
elaboration on these concepts will take place while analyzing the legal design of the 
model. 
6.2.2 Fundamental Design 
6.2.2.1 Scale of Self-Government 
The data utilized suggest that Democratic Autonomy is a project not only 
designed for Kurdistan but for the whole country (Bianet 2011). Accordingly, the 
project proposes establishing 20-25 regional units throughout Turkey or across the 
“common-land,” as the Kurdish movement refers to. As Öcalan explains:   
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   The democratic autonomy we mention is not merely related to Kurdistan, 
but also to the Aegean, Black Sea and Middle Anatolian regions. We do not 
restrict the democratic autonomy project to ourselves only. We do not base 
it upon solely Kurdish ethnicity. Kurds today may pioneer this; however, 
this understanding of democratic autonomy is a project covering all Turkey 
(Komünar 2010, 10). 
Selahattin Demirtaş, in one of his interviews in the media, says:  
   We want autonomous regions for all Turkey. For instance, there may exist 
three or four autonomous regions in the location defined as Kurdistan. You 
can take a big city as center. You can put around it the other cities in 
cooperation with it in terms of transport, culture, economy and social 
matters and call that place as region (Taraf 2012b). 
As revealed by the given quotations, a system of regions is proposed for Turkey. This, 
in fact, is surprising when looking at the name of the model, which seems like 
proposing a single unit of autonomous region instead of a model formed by regions 
across the country. Nevertheless, the project is intended to design a model where 
Turkey, as a whole, is divided into regional governments consisting of neighbouring 
provinces that are culturally, economically, historically and ecologically in close 
relation with one another. According to the report of the Democratic Society Party 
(DTP), a former pro-Kurdish party that was closed in 2009, each of these regions would 
be named with the unique name of that specific region or would take the name of the 
biggest city within that region (Akademi 2009, 112). 
The formation of regional governments across Turkey stands as a controversial 
issue considering the fact that there is no expressed demand from the western regions 
towards a decentralized structure. When this argument was posed to the interviewees, 
several replied that, when the merits of strong decentralization were perceived, people 
would be convinced of its vitality. One contended that when people in the other regions 
saw the advantages which Kurds would be enjoying with Democratic Autonomy, they 
would eventually demand similar practices as well. Another stated that the project of 
Democratic Autonomy would most make sense if it encompassed whole Turkey, 
because this project was about the democratization of Turkey. However, he added, “In 
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terms of the intensity of the Kurdish conflict, our priority is Kurdistan and Kurdish 
people –the direct addressee of the issue” (Ankara, 13 June 2014).23 
Regarding the issue of the scale of governance, all the respondents have also 
claimed that Democratic Autonomy, by its very nature, is not based on and limited to 
any certain geographical demarcations. All the respondents are of the same opinion that 
the model goes beyond any territorial lines, limitations and ethnic bases as well. It has 
no claims to change either the unitary state structure or the territorial boundaries of 
Turkey. The same arguments are visible in almost all the documents and writings of the 
Kurdish movement regarding Democratic Autonomy.  
Following these discussions, the more specific question of precise territorial 
boundaries of Kurdistan has been brought up in the interviews. How would the region 
of Kurdistan be determined? To this, one respondent has said, “Kurdistan’s borders are 
the provincial borders in the historical roots of Kurds” (Diyarbakır, 12 September 
2014).24 Another has replied: “Kurdistan is not a place to be determined again with 
upcoming negotiations. It is a location with a historical heritage of thousands of years. 
The discussion where Kurdistan’s borders start and end would overshadow a thesis 
from the onset” (Hakkari, 11 September 2014).25 Instead of giving precise territorial 
demarcations, the respondents have tended to refer to the historical boundaries of 
Kurds.  
Several respondents have claimed that the Kurdistan region alone would not make 
up one self-governance unit; instead, it would be divided into distinct regions. While 
this statement has been made by several of the respondents, only one of them has made 
the issue explicit. The respondent explained how Kurdistan would be divided within 
five specific regions consisting of five provinces: Botan Region: Hakkari, Van, Şırnak, 
Mardin ve Siirt; Amed Region, which is also the hub of the whole Kurdistan region: 
                                                          
23 “Kürt sorunun yoğunluğu açısından birebir muhatabı olan Kürt halkı ve Kürdistan önceliğimiz.” 
24 “Kürdistan’ın sınırları Kürtlerin tarihsel köklerindeki eyalet sınırlarıdır.” 
25 “Kürdistan bölgesi yeniden bir tartışma yürütülerek belirlenecek bir bölge değildir. Binlerce yıllık tarihsel 
mirasa sahip bir coğrafyadır. Kürdistan’ın sınırlarının nereden başlayıp nerede bittiğini tartışma konusu 
yapmak, bir tez çalışmasına başından gölge düşürür.” 
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Batman, Diyarbakır, Muş, Bitlis ve Bingöl; Serhat Region: Erzurum, Kars, Ardahan, 
Iğdır, Ağrı; Fırat Region: Urfa, Antep, Adıyaman, Maraş ve Kilis and Dersim Region: 
Sivas, Malatya, Erzincan, Elazığ ve Tunceli (Diyarbakır, 14 September 2014).  
In some of these provinces, the Kurdish political movement has a very strong 
basis and receives high numbers of votes. Provinces such as Hakkari, Şırnak and 
Diyarbakır accommodate large numbers of constituents supporting pro-Kurdish parties.  
In these places, the realization of Democratic Autonomy could be relatively easier. 
However, for example, in Sivas, Erzincan and Malatya, where the Kurdish parties are 
considerably weak, there could be a high risk of strong opposition towards autonomy. 
How would then, the autonomous regions be constructed in those provinces and how 
would Kurdistan incorporate them into its autonomous region? When such concerns 
were raised, the respondent above said that the effectiveness of Democratic Autonomy 
naturally would not be equal in all the places involved. In other words, while the model 
can be implemented more successfully in some provinces, it may work less effectively 
in some others. It should be the duty of the Kurdish political movement to spread it 
throughout the regions of Kurdistan and Turkey, as the respondent claimed (Diyarbakır, 
14 September 2014).  
6.2.2.2 Legal Entrenchment: 
The Kurdish movement places great importance on the conception that the 
intended new Constitution of Turkey should structure the state according to 
decentralization. For that, the BDP submitted a draft text to the Parliamentary 
Constitution Committee in 2013 in which it suggested a decentralization design for 
Turkey. This submitted draft text states: “The administrative structure of the state is 
designed by the principle of decentralization. The state’s territorial integrity is immune” 
(TBMM Başkanlığı 2014). Referring to this particular text, one respondent, in the 
personal interviews, has stated that the Kurdish movement has already officially 
proposed Democratic Autonomy as a state structure. The respondent has also added that 
it is essential Democratic Autonomy find its representation in the Constitution 
(Diyarbakır, 12 September 2014).  
74 
 
Similarly, in all the interviews carried out personally, it has been stated that 
constitutional guarantee is the precondition of Democratic Autonomy. One of the 
interviewees has stated that the Kurdish parties would by no means be satisfied unless 
the project was guaranteed by the new Constitution. In addition, all the respondents 
have emphasized the essential bond between constitutional entrenchment of the model 
and constitutional “status” to Kurds. Granting status to Kurds is equated to granting 
self-rule to them.  
However, would it not be possible to grant status to Kurds without necessarily 
structuring a full-fledged autonomy? Would it not be satisfactory for them if Turkey, for 
example, lifted the reservations it had made on many articles of the European Charter of 
Local Self-Government and fully implemented the Charter? Would this not bring about 
a solution to the Kurdish conflict since it also allows for a strong decentralization 
without necessarily granting full autonomy to the regions? A shared answer to these 
questions by the interviewees was that the European Charter of Self-Government would 
be a good start, but definitely insufficient to fulfill the demands of the Kurdish 
movement and would not stand as a “status”. One said:  
   Turkey’s removing its reservations on the Charter is the basic demand of 
the BDP and the HDP. However, even if these reservations are cast aside, it 
does not allow for a sphere of facilities equivalent to the representation of 
Democratic Autonomy. It only paves the path for the municipalities or local 
structures to obtain administrative financial autonomy (Ankara, 13 June 
2014)26.  
Another added:  
   You will be mistaken if you believe that you can solve the problems at a 
geography making up one third of Turkey’s territory by only omitting the 
articles of the European Charter without granting any status. Kurds, along 
Turks, are equal citizens of this country, but they have rights due to their 
identity. These rights are to be under constitutional warranty (Mardin, 15 
September 2014).27 
                                                          
26 “Türkiye’nin Şart üzerindeki çekincelerini kaldırması BDP ve Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP)’nin 
temel arzusudur. Fakat bu çekinceler kaldırılsa bile Demokratik Özerklik’in temsiliyetine denk düşen bir 
olanak alanı vermiyor. Sadece belediyelerin veya yerel yönetimlerin idari mali özerkliğe kavuşmasının 
yolunu açıyor.” 
27  “Türkiye’nin coğrafyasının 3’de 1’i olan bir yerde hiçbir statü elde etmeden Avrupa şartnamesinin 
maddelerinin kaldırılmasıyla sorunların çözüleceğini düşünüyorsanız yanılırsınız. Evet, Kürtler Türkiye 
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Yet, another claimed:  
   Only administrative autonomy would lead to drawbacks and problems in 
terms of Kurdish people using their rights resulting from being a ‘people.’ 
Thus, Democratic Autonomy is the most applicable resolution model 
harboring both political and administrative autonomy, not making the 
borders a problematic issue” (Hakkari, 11 September 2014).28 
One interviewee raised a new debate to the issue by saying that settling at a looser 
arrangement than Democratic Autonomy would definitely not be satisfactory for those 
fighting for this “ideal” for thirty five years, referring to the guerrillas of the PKK 
(Yüksekova, 10 September 2014). In fact, a similar comment was stated by another 
respondent when the success of the Resolution Process between the government and the 
Kurdish movement was asked. The respondent also said that first the actors who had 
been practically fighting for the resolution needed to be convinced for a true peace bid 
to take place (Mardin, 15 September 2014). 
When in one of the interviews conducted with Gültan Kışanak in the media, she 
was similarly asked whether it would be possible to resolve the Kurdish issue without 
granting autonomy, she answered: “Ultimate resolution is not possible. We do not have 
a chance to resolve the issue without establishing a mechanism where Kurds will have 
the right to participate in governance. The real concern of Kurds is to join the 
governance” (Taraf 2012a). 
All these answers clearly show that Democratic Autonomy goes far beyond a 
mere administrative and financial autonomy. It is designed as a full-fledged political 
autonomy reinforced by the powers of decision-making and execution. In the light of 
the data, it appears that it would not be easy at all for the Turkish State to convince the 
Kurdish movement to agree on a looser bid.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Cumhuriyeti ile birlikte bu ülkenin eşit yurttaşıdır ama kimliğinden doğan hakları vardır. Bu hakların 
anayasal güvence altına alınması gerekir.” 
28 “Salt idari özerklik Kürt halkının halk olmaktan doğan haklarını kullanması açısından eksiklikler, sorunlar 
doğuracaktır. Dolayısıyla hem siyasal hem idari özerkliği içinde barındıran, sınırları sorun etmeyen çözüm 
modeli olan Demokratik Özerklik en uygulanabilir modeldir.” 
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6.2.2.3 Power and Competences: 
The model of Democratic Autonomy claims to entail all the three branches of 
government; legislative, executive and judicial. The BDP, in the submitted draft text of 
the Constitution, has proposed that the power of legislation belong to the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey and Regional Parliaments. The executive power must be 
granted to the President, Council of Ministers and Regional Presidencies within the 
framework of the constitution and laws. Thirdly, the judiciary will be conducted 
through independent and impartial courts (TBMM Başkanlığı 2014). 
As part of these powers, there would be a division of competences between the 
central and local units. While some responsibilities would exclusively be in the hands of 
the central government or local governments, some would be shared between. 
According to the document of the DTP, regional parliaments would be responsible for 
the areas such as education, health, social services, culture, agriculture, marine, 
industry, town planning, environment, tourism, telecommunication, social security, 
women, youth and sports. The center, on the other hand, would be responsible for the 
duties of external affairs, national finance and national defence. Security and law would 
share duties that the central and local governments would carry out in cooperation 
(Akademi 2009).  
When the distribution of duties and powers between the central government and 
local governments was asked to the interviewees, all the answers were consistent with 
the description above. Concisely, the duties of the central government would mainly be 
limited to certain areas of foreign policy and diplomacy, national economic regulations, 
finance and national defence. Other services, especially those related to local education 
and health, local police force, public works and local planning would be exclusive to 
local governments. The regulation of national days and important local events as well as 
the use of national symbols and flags would also be in the hands of local authority. 
6.2.2.4 Principal Values of Self-Governance: 
The values and principles that Democratic Autonomy is designed upon naturally 
reflect the ideology and political approach of the Kurdish movement and, particularly of 
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Abdullah Öcalan. First of all, the project totally rejects all kinds of uniformism in 
identity and is based upon a pluralist principle seeking multi-lingualism, multi-
culturalism and multi- religiosity (Orgun 2012, 157). Hence, all religious, ethnic and 
linguistic groups can freely express their own identities and pursue politics with their 
identities. Relatedly, the participation of the society in governance and decision-making 
processes are seen vital. The intended arrangement has the claim to be fully inclusive 
and supportive of a highly politicized society.  
Democratic Autonomy also rejects representative democracy, which equals to 
going to the polls only at electoral times, as described by Kurdish actors. Alternatively, 
it embraces “radical democracy,” which is defined as direct democracy (Çelik 2012, 
108, 111-113). Radical democracy structures itself via a strong parliamentary system in 
which peoples’ councils at villages, neighborhoods, districts, provinces and regions 
function effectively. Through these councils, people could participate in the decision-
making processes and directly rule themselves.  
The Kurdish movement, furthermore, places special importance on the role of 
women in the society. It promotes women to be active and visible in the public sphere, 
including politics. Accordingly, all of the Kurdish organizations today have accepted 
the principle of co-presidency. This is a practice in which a woman and a man jointly 
run the presidency at all levels of organizational units. Moreover, Kurdish actors 
frequently emphasize that they support positive discrimination towards women, when 
necessary. In an interview carried out with a DTK member, it was stated that the DTK 
wanted half of its delegates to be women in the recent elections conducted in September 
2014; “We wanted to have half of the delegates, i.e. 250, as women within the DTK. 
Yet, the woman’s movement was able to form only 168 despite all efforts. The rest of 
the delegates were men” (Diyarbakır, 14 September 2014).29 This approach towards 
women makes up a significant and distinctive characteristic of Democratic Autonomy.  
Lastly, the Kurdish movement, in the light of Öcalan’s thoughts, has developed a 
strong criticism against the notion of nation-state and its embedded economic 
characteristics, which are claimed to aim at maximum profit and heavy industrialism. 
                                                          
29 “DTK içinde istedik ki delege sayısının yarısı yani 250'si kadın olsun. Fakat bütün uğraşlara rağmen kadın 
hareketi ancak 168 delege oluşturabildi. Geriye kalan delegeler erkek oldu”.  
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For the movement, the nation-state and its economic perspective is defined as “capitalist 
modernity.” This term is frequently used by Kurdish political actors, especially by 
Öcalan, and thus has become an effective tool of criticizing both nation-states and their 
heavy capitalistic economic policies. The movement claims to construct a so-called 
“democratic modernity” in Kurdistan to replace capitalism. This means forming a 
democratic nation (equal citizens of Turkey), a non-profit social market economy (a 
system heavily based on communal market) and ecologic industry (environment 
friendly industry) (Öcalan 2013). The last element is especially important for Kurdish 
actors, since it seeks to develop an economic system harmless to nature and ecological 
balance. Agriculture appears to be a significant means of production in the design of 
Democratic Autonomy (Bilen 2012; Baluken 2012). Öcalan contends that returning to 
agriculture is the “most valuable revolutionary act” (2013, 436).  
6.2.2.5 Transnational Links 
Democratic Autonomy is not only seen as a political project that allows Kurds in 
Turkey to gain status and self-rule, but also as a way of establishing strong 
communication and relationship with the Kurds living in the neighbouring countries of 
Turkey, namely Iraq, Syria and Iran. Kurdish actors often refer to this as the “national 
unity” project or Democratic Confederalism (Bianet 2011). 
In accordance with this, there is a strong emphasis to create “unity” among all 
Kurds, as the data suggest. Moreover, in the interviews conducted, several respondents 
emphasized that Democratic Autonomy would not take into account the boundaries 
dividing Kurds. Kurdish actors support a new system where Kurds could freely 
establish coordination among themselves regardless of the borders. Several respondents, 
in this respect, referred to the EU as a model where territorial borders of sovereign 
states are protected although the boundaries have lost their meaning. “Europe both has 
borders and not” contended one interviewee in a personal conversation (Van, 9 
September 2014).30 In one of his interviews in the media Ahmet Türk says, “A free 
Kurdish geography would be possible without changing the borders... Does a border 
                                                          
30 “Avrupa’da hem sınırlar var hem de yok.” 
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dispute exist in Europe among Italy, Germany and France?” (Milliyet 2012). Similarly, 
one respondent in the personal interviews has claimed:  
   Today if you started off driving from Bulgaria to the Netherlands, you 
would have no trouble at all. Let the border between four parts stay but be 
more flexible. Let the political borders remain but become permeable. Let’s 
learn lessons from the EU regarding this issue, but let’s create even a more 
developed form in the Middle East (Diyarbakır, 14 September).31 
Having said this, establishing transnational links stands as a crucial issue for 
Democratic Autonomy,since the Kurdish movement claims to create a unity among 
separate states while respecting the existing territorial boundaries.  
In addition, Democratic Autonomy suggests developing a common ground where 
all Kurds could discuss issues and develop common policies. For that matter, 
Democratic Autonomy seeks to set up a national congress which would be responsible 
to carry out all the national and international diplomacy of Kurds. The targeted 
Democratic National Congress aims to create an institutionalized Kurdish diplomacy 
which is to develop unitary policies. Moreover, the Congress suggests that the self-
defence forces of all Kurds in the region unite under the Peshmerga forces (Öcalan 
2013, 384-386).   
6.2.2.6 Citizenship 
The legal design of Democratic Autonomy suggests that every individual be 
linked to the Turkish State by means of constitutional citizenship. To achieve this, 
the Constitution is not to refer to any ethnic identity regarding citizenship, and thus 
be impartial towards ethnicities. This requires an adjustment of Article 66 of the 
current Constitution of Turkey, replacing the term “Turk” (Türk) with “the one 
belonging to the Turkish Republic” (Türkiyeli). This way, the supra-identity would 
not take the name of only one single identity but the name of the country. This 
would mean a cut of the ties between the law and ethnicity (Kara 2013).  
                                                          
31 “Bugün Bulgaristan'dan başlayıp Hollanda'ya kadar arabayla gitseniz hiç bir sorun olmaz... Dört parça 
arasındaki sınırlar da dursun ama esnek hale getirilsin. Siyasi sınırlar kalsın ama geçirgen hale gelsin. Avrupa 
Birliği'nden bu konuda dersler çıkaralım ama Orta Doğu'da daha da gelişmişini yapalım”.  
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The Kurdish movement has long been seeking a redefinition of citizenship in 
Turkey. This is one of the most crucial debates evolving around the resolution of the 
conflict. The movement firmly insists on an inclusive and impartial citizenship 
description, which would also serve the design of Democratic Autonomy. In the 
document personally received by the DTK, 32  it states that: “Every Kurdish 
individual will accept constitutional citizenship of Kurdish Republic on the 
condition that Democratic Autonomy status is recognized.”33Moreover, as Öcalan 
asserts, “ ‘Belonging to Turkey’ will be the supra-identity. For example, I am a Kurd 
and a citizen of the nation of Turkey at the same time. The identity of ‘belonging to 
Turkey’ is the supra-national identity” (Akademi 2009, 83).  
6.2.2.7 Language 
The issue of language occupies a significant place in Kurdish politics. Heavy 
restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language in the public and in education have been 
major concerns of the Kurdish movement. The use of mother tongue in all aspects of 
life is a priority for Kurdish politics,which cannot even be restricted any more, let alone 
be banned. Concerning that, the BDP, expresses its demand in the draft text of the new 
Constitution. Firstly, it suggests that the official language of the state be Turkish and all 
citizens have the right and duty to learn the said language. All the other languages used 
by the members of society could be the second languages with the decisions of the 
regional parliaments. Secondly, it suggests that all individuals have the right to use their 
own mother tongue both in personal and public spheres. Thirdly, the state would be 
obliged to respect and protect all the languages in the country and ensure that they are 
used and developed (TBMM Başkanlığı 2014).  
The intended language policy of Democratic Autonomy is similar to the proposal 
of the BDP. According to the DTK document,34 the official languages of the Kurdistan 
                                                          
32 This document was provided to the writer of the thesis by a DTK employee responsible for the media at the 
DTK office in Diyarbakır on 15 September 2015. The title of the document is “Demokratik Özerk Özgür 
Kürdistan Projesi” (The Project of Democratic Autonomous Independent Kurdistan).  
33  “Her Kürt bireyi, demokratik özerklik statüsünün tanınması halinde Türkiye Cumhuriyeti anayasal 
vatandaşlığını kabul eder.”   
34 See Note 33.  
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autonomous region would be Kurdish and Turkish. Both languages would be used in 
public spheres and in education. Kurdish would be used as a language of education 
starting from kindergarten through university. Moreover, all settlements and 
geographical places would regain their original Kurdish names. The document also 
states that all languages used in Kurdistan could be used freely in all aspects of life.  
Despite the information in the DTK document that names two official languages 
in the region (Turkish/Kurdish), all the respondents in the personal interviews 
confirmed that all the languages used in Kurdistan would be regarded as official 
languages. In one of the interviews, the respondent said that refusal of any language was 
out of question in Democratic Autonomy. In other words, not a bilingual but a 
multilingual system is targeted. Another interviewee said:  
   There could be no hierarchy according to the populations among the 
nations. Even if their population is ten, each and every group is a ‘people,’ 
and should be able to take advantage of every single right. Then, there 
would be no clashes between peoples. If only Turkish and Kurdish were 
official languages, then Kurds would be doing the same things as Turkey 
has done to us for years (Diyarbakır, 14 September 2014).35 
The data apparently manifest a contradiction about the issue of official languages of the 
autonomous region. It does not clarify whether only Kurdish and Turkish, or all the 
languages spoken in the location would be granted official status. Yet, it appears that a 
multilingual policy is desired, which would also suit the principal values of Democratic 
Autonomy.  
 
 
 
                                                          
35  “Halklar arası nüfuslara göre hiyerarşi olmaz. 10 kişi de olsa her grup bir halktır ve her haktan 
yararlanmalıdır. Zaten böyle bir şey olursa halklar arası çatışma olmaz. Eğer sadece Türkçe ve Kürtçe resmi 
dil olursa o zaman Türkiye'nin yıllarca bize yaptığını bu sefer Kürtler yapmış olur.” 
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6.3 Local Power Sharing Tools in Democratic Autonomy 
Democratic Autonomy is supposed to be different from all other autonomy 
practices in the world, as Kurdish actors claim. Current autonomy models are mere 
representations of states with the exception that they function at the local level. They are 
highly bureaucratic and hierarchical. They are “small states at the local.” As Demir 
Çelik, a prominent member of the HDP interprets, today’s autonomy models are only 
examples of “the state changing hands,” and they still continue to serve the statist 
approach36 (Radikal 2014). For Kurdish politics, autonomy practices in the world are 
merely “micro-states” (Akademi 2009, 88). A respondent, during one of the personal 
interviews, has claimed that Democratic Autonomy is a “synthesis” of many autonomy 
practices, while it “surpasses” them as a “full-fledged democracy project” (Van, 9 
September 2014). 
What makes Democratic Autonomy so different from other autonomous structures 
then? What does the model propose as an alternative to the state? When these questions 
were raised in the personal interviews, the respondents claimed that Democratic 
Autonomy’s uniqueness is due to its firm opposition to and even rejection of the state. 
Unlike the state, Democratic Autonomy claims to be fully egalitarian, totally inclusive 
and participatory, pluralist and transparent. It seeks ecological production, a communal 
and non-profit market, which are all absent in today’s economic systems. Some 
interviewees have stated that the rejection of the statist approach in self-governance and 
adoption of these values are totally new dimensions added to the existing autonomy 
theories by Abdullah Öcalan.  
In the personally conducted interviews, it is often argued that Democratic 
Autonomy is not a mere autonomy, but instead a “democratic” autonomy which is 
based on and carried out through a system of peoples’ councils. These councils would 
provide direct democracy by functioning at all levels of local governments starting from 
village and street communes to the regional assembly (Çelik 2012). As stated: 
                                                          
36 This criticism posed against today’s practices of autonomy is very similar to that of Abdullah Öcalan’s 
towards the Soviet experience, in which he blames the socialists for not being able to develop a new political 
tool and for ending up embracing the state again. As an alternative political tool, Öcalan is a strong advocate 
of the construction of Democratic Autonomy, as he regards it as the ideal way to surpass the statist approach. 
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   Democratic Autonomy is opposed to the state in terms of its way of 
organization. It is organized from the bottom. Village and neighborhood 
councils are placed at the very bottom, then come city and province councils 
and at the top are peoples’ councils. There is not only one parliament as in 
the states. It is a system of councils formed for people to be able to govern 
themselves more easily. Inter-council relations take place from the bottom 
to the top (Akademi 2009, 71).37  
The system mentioned would give the opportunity to all individuals to participate in the 
local councils present in their own local settlements. It promotes active citizens, who are 
both concerned about and aware of the environment they live in (Çelik 2012). This 
would lead to politicization of the society, and hence serve one of the principal values 
of Democratic Autonomy.  
6.3.1 Peoples’ Councils as Local Power Sharing Tools 
Village-street communes and neighborhood councils:They are the smallest units of 
the council system. They are formed by the delegates residing in the concerning local 
unit. The members of the municipal council, provincial assembly or village council 
become natural members of these councils if they reside in the neighborhood, village or 
street. This way, coordination between different institutions of governance can be 
achieved. Institutions such as the provincial administration or village structures would 
be maintained while they are be freed from state intervention and become institutions of 
Democratic Autonomy (Çelik 2012, 108; Akademi 2009, 112). In addition, the principle 
of co-presidency is applied in all of the councils.  
Communes and neighborhood councils are autonomous units that have both the 
right and responsibility to make decisions about any matter directly related to the people 
of that site, such as collecting wastes, opening a village school, or organizing a sports 
activity. Every commune and council has also an executive branch in which the 
members are chosen from within the council by means of secret ballot system. The 
members of the executive committee are responsible to make sure the decisions are 
                                                          
37 “Örgütlenme biçimi itibariyle de devlete zıttır. Tabandan örgütlenir. En altta köy ve mahalle meclisleri, 
daha sonrasında il ve eyalet meclisleri ve en sonda da halk meclisi bulunmaktadır…Dev-letlerde olduğu gibi 
tek meclis değildir. Halkın kendini daha rahat yönetebil-mesi için oluşturulmuş bir meclisler sistemidir. 
Meclislerarası ilişki tabandan yukarı doğru olur.” 
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implemented. However, if the taken decision requires a larger budget or authorization, 
the council can ask the support of the higher council or more likely that of the 
municipality. The municipality, provided that it has adequate resources, is obliged to 
enact the decision taken by the council. One of the interviewees has described the 
process as: 
   Let’s suppose there will be an arrangement in the neighborhood about 
sports. The neighborhood needs a commission to be in charge of only sports 
or cultural pursuits. The duty of the municipality is to help only if there 
occurs a problem about these activities. In the cases where they cannot do 
so, eg. in the case of an infrastructure problem, the council will detect it on 
the spot, and the municipality will implement it (Hakkari, 10 September 
2014).38 
In this system, the peoples’ councils are decision-makers and implementers, while the 
municipalities are supportive service providers, as another interviewee has explained. 
District and City Councils: The structure of district and city councils is not much 
different from the ones in villages, streets and neighborhoods as far as the data suggest. 
They are similarly granted decision-making and implementation powers. They are 
autonomous and responsible for all the issues concerning the district and the city.   
District and city councils are composed of delegates elected from sub-councils 
(neighborhood and district councils), co-mayors, members of municipal councils and 
representatives of civil society organizations. The co-mayors and members of other 
institutions are natural members of the councils. As the co-president of the executive 
committee of Yüksekova Council has put:  
   Delegation is distributed from all the civil society organizations, 
municipality and all the institutions regarding the civilian community. 
Delegates coming from the institutions make up 40% of the council. There 
is also a 60% delegation from the people. All these form a council 
(Yüksekova, 10 September 2014).39 
                                                          
38 “Diyelim mahallede spor ile ilgili bir düzenleme  yapılacak. Bu mahallenin kendi içinde sadece spordan 
veya kültürden sorumlu komisyonu olması gerekiyor.  Belediyeye düşen görev bu aktivitelerde sıkıntı 
yaşanırsa yardımcı olacak. Yapamadıkları durumlarda, örneğin alt yapı sorunu var, meclis orada onnu tespit 
edecek, belediye uygulayıcısı olacak”. 
39 “Yüksekova’da bulunan tüm sivil toplum örgütleri, belediye, sivil toplumu ilgilendiren tüm kurumlardan 
delegasyon aktarılıyor. Kurumlardan gelen delegeler %40’ını oluşturuyor meclisin. Bir de halktan gelen 
%60’lık delege var. Bunlar bir meclis oluşturuyor.” 
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60% of the delegates come from sub-councils through being elected within their 
own councils. In order to explain this system, the Yüksekova (Gewer) Council, a de 
facto district council established in July 2014, would serve useful. As the co-president 
of the Gewer Council has explained, each neighborhood connected to that district is 
asked to send delegates to join the district council and is given a different quota 
depending on its population. The co-president has stated that: 
   Every neighborhood council was granted a certain quota to be able to send 
delegates to the city council40 depending on its population. For instance, the 
Güngör Neighborhood has a council of 80 persons and has sent 20 members 
to the city council. To give an example, Yenimahalle has sent 25 and Dize 
16 delegates. All these delegates have formed the 301 person Yüksekova 
Council. Afterwards, a few did not show up and the total became 285 
(Yüksekova, 10 September 2014).41 
As the interviews show, the formation of district and city councils is both based on 
council elections and the participation of various actors who are either engaged in local 
governance or civil society activities. Moreover, each council also forms its own 
executive committee from within its own members through elections.   
 In addition, the Gewer Council also claims to have a judiciary branch 
responsible for mainly trade and civil law cases. For example, those wanting to divorce 
or solve their trade disputes consult the council and get support. This, however, surely 
has no official validity. Nevertheless, the members of the council seem to be very 
confident that the decisions made by local courts would gain official acknowledgement 
in the future. One interviewee has added: “This is not to be misunderstood. Throughout 
our history, the elderly (Aksakallılar) and those who have a say in issues have brought 
together, listened to and mediated fairly between two persons having a dispute” 
(Yüksekova, 10 September 2014).42 The region’s traditions and customs seem to play a 
role in its legal system.  
                                                          
40 Here the respondent refers to Yüksekova as a city rather than a district. 
41 “Her mahalle meclisine nüfusuna göre kent meclisine delege göndermesi için kota verildi. Mesela Güngör 
Mahallesi’nin mahalle meclisi 80 kişiliktir ve 20 kişiyi kent meclisini vermiş. Örnek olarak veriyorum, 
Yenimahalle 25, Dize 16 delege göndermiş olsun. Tüm bu delegeler 301 kişilik Yüksekova Kent Meclisi’ni 
oluşturdu. Sonra birkaç kişi gelmedi 285 kişi oldu.” 
42 “Bunun yanlış anlaşılmaması gerekiyor. Bizim tarihimiz boyunca Aksakallılar, sözü geçerli olanlar iki kişi 
arasında bir anlaşmazlık olduğunda bu kişileri bir araya getirmişler, dinlemişlerve hakkaniyeti göz önünde 
bulundurarak aralarını bulmuşlardır.” 
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Regional Parliament - Democratic Society Congress (DTK): The DTK is considered 
to be the upper parliament of the Kurdistan autonomous region by Kurdish actors. It 
incorporates all city councils and other organizations, and thus is also called as the 
“umbrella organization of all Kurds.” İdris Baluken, a HDP member, after the 
seventeenth meeting with Öcalan on the island of Imrali, quoted the words of Öcalan as: 
“DTK is prototype-parliament, and in the upcoming term the resolution will be 
conducted through this local parliament” (Kurdistan 24). At this point, it would not be 
too strong to claim that the DTK is currently the most significant institution regarding 
Democratic Autonomy. This significance is not only due to its activities to develop the 
project, but also for the symbolic meaning attributed to it as the de facto regional 
parliament.  
The Congress, with the call of Öcalan, was established in 2005 with the very 
purpose of serving autonomy by developing its internal design, spreading it across the 
region and making it functioning. Since its establishment it has been working through 
various commissions in different areas, prominently on politics, economics, ecology, 
law and diplomacy. Following its latest meeting in September 2014, it has increased its 
number of commissions up to fourteen to be able to conduct more comprehensive work 
and respond to the needs of the society, as a DTK employee has explained.43 
The DTK is composed of delegates coming from various local levels and 
institutions. Similar to the district and city councils, forty percent of the regional 
parliament is composed of representatives of civil society organizations, members of 
women and youth organizations, prominent politicians, scholars, journalists, members 
of municipal councils and mayors, while the remaining sixty percent is formed by 
public delegates. When the interviewees were asked how the public delegates were 
elected, it was stated that the DTK sets up a quota for each city and expects the 
delegates from city councils to join the DTK (Van, September 2014). For instances it 
asks for ten delegates from Van, five from Şırnak and six from Hakkari according to the 
population of the provinces. Hence, each city council holds elections and elects the 
members to join the upper parliament (Yüksekova, 10 September 2014). While the 
                                                          
43 The commissions: Status and Law, Youth, Rights and Faith, Diplomacy, Language Education, Social 
Reconciliation and Dialogue, Culture Art, Ecology and Local Governance, Economy, Political, Social 
Policies, Human Rights, Science, and Woman.   
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answers received point out a system where 60% of the DTK is formed by the city 
councils, the DTK Contract, which is regarded as the regional Constitution, says that the 
parliament would be organized through five regions within Kurdistan, all of which have 
their separate regional councils (DTK n.d.).44 According to the Contract, the public 
delegates would not be elected from within the city councils, but from the regional 
councils instead. In fact, this statement confirms the claim of the interviewee who has 
stated that the whole region would be divided into and governed through five separate 
regions; Botan, Amed, Serhat, Fırat and Dersim. Regarding the issue, two different 
statements of the data cause a confusion about a clear design of the organizational 
structure of the DTK.  
 
6.3.2 Heterogeneity and Local Power Sharing 
Local power sharing tools which are based on peoples’ councils appear to be 
effective and powerful tools that provide the participation of society in decision-making 
processes at all levels. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the representation 
and participation of ethnic, religious or other minority groups in the system are 
guaranteed. There may occur a risk of Kurdish hegemony at the councils and in their 
executive branches. That is why the design also requires some sort of power sharing 
between different identity groups. As the context of the Kurdish case explicitly shows, 
the Kurdistan region is highly heterogeneous. Not only are there two large groups of 
Turkish and Kurdish people that need to share the power in governance, but also there 
are different ethnic and religious groups that need to be included. Besides, Kurds 
themselves are highly diverse in terms of mainly religion, language and political 
orientation. Given all these facts, the institutional design of the project necessitates 
building strong mechanisms.  
All the data on Democratic Autonomy, including the writings of Öcalan and the 
DTK, and the interviews suggest that all peoples in Kurdistan -Kurdistani peoples- must 
                                                          
44 It is precisely stated in the Contract: “The Congress works based on the council and is organized through 
five regions in North Kurdistan. In each region, regional councils are formed.” 
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have the right to express themselves in politics and governance irrespective of their 
number of population in the region. According to Article No. 3 of the DTK Contract, 
the DTK provides the representation of all different groups in “Northern Kurdistan” and 
applies positive discrimination to the groups in need. It promotes the “free identity” of 
all Kurdistani peoples (DTK n.d.). 
While this approach constitutes the main understanding of the Kurdish movement, 
it is not visible in the same writings how these groups would represent themselves in the 
local institutions. What are the local power sharing mechanisms that would guarantee 
the representation of these various groups in the local governance system? What 
guarantees that the minorities would be delegates in the councils and in the DTK 
parliament? And how would these groups take place in the decision making processes?  
The answers to the raised questions are neither available in Öcalan’s writings nor 
in the DTK documents. As a result of this absence of information, in all of the 
interviews conducted personally, the respondents were strongly encouraged to provide 
concrete answers to them. A shared thought was that it was the natural principle of 
Democratic Autonomy and also an automatic necessity of being a “democratic nation” 
to make sure that all peoples equally express themselves and participate in the system. 
All the respondents stated that it was impossible to think otherwise. “Kurdistan is not 
only the homeland of Kurds, but of all Kurdistani peoples” was a common statement 
made by many of the interviewees. The answers included severe criticism of the 
Turkish State, accusing it of being extremely exclusive and hegemonic. Several have 
also stated that the ten percent threshold in Turkey to enter the parliament is a major 
constraint to democracy, since it prevents many groups, especially Kurds with a large 
population, from representation. For them, this leads to the domination of the titular 
nation over the other groups, which is totally against the principles presented by 
Democratic Autonomy. One respondent has argued that one of the worst practices of the 
parliamentarian system is experienced in Turkey claiming that no other country in the 
world has a ten percent threshold. It was also stated by the same respondent that there 
would be no election threshold in the Kurdistani parliament (Diyarbakır, 12 September 
2014).  
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One interviewee, however, has boldly acknowledged that there could be a risk to 
create a Kurdish hegemony in the region. When asked how to guarantee the protection 
of all minorities, the same respondent answered: “This would be ensured by taking it 
from the individuals’ intentions and handing it over to the organized society” (Ankara, 
14 June 2014).45  
Several respondents contended that all groups would participate in the system 
easily, since they would have their own councils in their own neighborhoods. For 
example, the Turkish district would form its own district council, while an Assyrian 
neighborhood or an Arabic village would form their own communes. This way, all 
groups could be represented in their own local councils and make free decisions while 
they could also have the chance to reach the upper level council. One interviewee has 
explained this as follows: “The Assyrians will be autonomous anyway, as they will 
establish their own council in their own neighborhood” (Diyarbakır, 14 September 
2014).46 However, this approach is built upon the assumption that all identity groups are 
homogeneously separated in different villages, neighborhoods, districts and cities. 
However, not all settlements could be divided accordingly. Moreover, even if the local 
councils are constructed by certain local minority groups, this does not make them 
immune from the laws across the region. For this, the groups need to join the DTK, 
where decisions regarding the whole region will be taken. Representation in village 
communes or district councils would not guarantee representation at the regional level. 
These concerns, however, were not addressed by any of the interviewees.    
Another major issue regarding local power sharing is the role and rights of 
minority groups in decision making processes. In highly heterogeneous societies, it is 
crucial to set up a system in which minorities are not vulnerable to the decisions of the 
majority. It is also important for the groups to be able to pass decisions regarding their 
own concerns. According to the interviews, the “principle” of Democratic Autonomy is 
to make sure all the needs and demands of the minorities are fulfilled. One of the 
interviewees has said “There are many different identities here. All are Kurdistani 
peoples. Their needs and demands are to be met, and this is a principle,” (Mardin, 15 
                                                          
45 “Bunun garantisi kişilerin niyetinden alıp örgütlü topluma devretmekle olur.” 
46  “Zaten Süryaniler kendi mahallelerinde kendi meclislerini kuracakları için orada özerk olacaklar.” 
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September 2014)47 while another has put: “For instance, Assyrian people’s religious 
practices, language and culture cannot be left to the approval and voting of another 
group. This is out of question” (Hakkari, 11 September 2014).48 
As claimed, basic rights such as language, culture, and religion should not be a 
concern since Democratic Autonomy would automatically hand them over to the 
groups. One has also added that positive discrimination is a main principle and said:  
   For example, our Armenian fellows are being represented by 10 delegates 
and have demanded something from us. We, 500 delegates [of the DTK], 
are not going to vote this in the parliament. Their reasonable demands will 
be sought to be met. Basic rights cannot be voted. They are simply 
recognized (Diyarbakır, 14 September 2014).49 
Similarly, in several other interviews, the principle of positive discrimination has been 
brought up as a mechanism to entrench the rights of minority groups. The most 
dominant argument is that the basic rights of peoples will automatically be given 
without even discussing them; yet, how this would be arranged remains unclear.  
6.4 Central Level Power Sharing 
Regarding the significance of the Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey for 
the whole country, the relationship between the regional and central governments stands 
out as a crucial matter. Nonetheless, neither the writings of Öcalan nor the DTK 
documents provide adequate information about how the regional governments would be 
involved in national legislative and executive powers. For that reason, personally 
conducted interviews have been used as point of reference to manifest the design of 
Democratic Autonomy as far as the given issue is concerned. 
                                                          
47  “Burada çok farklı kimlikler var. Hepsi Kürdistani halklardır. İhtiyaç ve talepleri karşılanır ve bu bir 
ilkedir.” 
48  “Örneğin süryani halkımızın ibadet imkanı, dili, kültürü başka bir farklılığın onayına, oylamasına 
sunulmaz. Bu söz konusu bile olamaz.” 
49 “Pozitif ayrımcılık ilkesini benimsiyoruz. Mesela Ermeni arkadaşlar 10 delegeyle temsil ediliyorlar ve bir 
talepte bulundular. Biz 500 delege mecliste bunu oya sürmeyeceğiz. Onların her makul isteği karşılanmaya 
çalışılacak. Temel haklar oylamaya sunulmaz. Bunlar tanınır.” 
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The interviewees were asked about how the regional assembly would be 
represented at the central level national parliament. To this, various answers were 
received. One respondent said that every single region would contribute to the national 
parliament to the extent of its population (Hakkari, 11 September 2014). Another 
respondent mentioned a similar system carried out in the organization of the peoples’ 
councils. To fulfill that, it was claimed that each regional assembly would send 
delegates to the national parliament depending on the size and population of the region 
and that all the regions would have a certain quota and be accordingly represented at the 
center (Ankara, 13 June 2014). The same interviewee also stated that all the regional 
parliaments across Turkey would be connected to each other. However, the question of 
how and through which means the regional parliaments would be linked to one another 
was left unanswered.  
Contrary to these received answers, two other respondents firmly put forward 
another form of design. One interviewee asserted that the Kurdish parties would join the 
national elections to participate in the national parliament, while they would also 
participate in the local elections to be part of the local assembly. However, the election 
threshold at the national level needed to be decreased, while there would be no 
threshold in the autonomous entity, the respondent claimed (Diyarbakır, 12 September 
2014).  
 Another interviewee manifested the same model as the one stated above. It was 
claimed that the system could be similar to the one currently applied in Iraq. The 
explanation was that there would be two elections in Turkey, general and local. The 
general elections would naturally determine the central parliament and the local parties 
would be allowed to participate in the general elections as well. The local elections, on 
the other hand, would only determine the local assemblies in the autonomous regions. 
As the interviewee explained:  
   Even if an autonomous region is established, the AKP will still be there. 
We will compete with it. The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) will also be 
there. We demand that the Constitution allow for regional parties to be 
formed as well. Democratic Regions Party was established with this 
intention. Turkey’s Kurdistan Democratic Party was also founded. These 
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will be regional parties. But the HDP is the party of the whole country 
(Diyarbakır, 12 September 2014).50 
It can be inferred from this that there would be political parties functioning only at the 
local level, while some others would be functioning all over the country. The same 
respondent has added: “Some parties will remain local only, while some across the 
nation. We want to be able to set up regional parties within the Democratic Autonomy 
model. For example, a Laz party could be established in the Northern Black Sea 
Region”  (Diyarbakır, 12 September 2014).51 
All in all, two different answers have been received about center-level power 
sharing arrangements of Democratic Autonomy: sending delegates from regional 
assemblies to the national parliaments, and implementing local and general elections. 
All the other respondents left the question unanswered by giving irrelevant answers 
about the issue. Moreover, the question of whether there would be any guarantee 
mechanisms to make sure that regions would join the executive power at the center was 
left totally unanswered.   
Even though the data is somehow inadequate to manifest the legal design of 
Democratic Autonomy on center-level power sharing arrangements, it still shows that 
the Kurdish movement aims to develop two types of political parties, one functioning at 
the national level and one at the local. Accordingly, the DBP is to function as a local 
pro-Kurdish party in the region. This, in fact, is already the case since the party holds 
the power of the municipalities and develops local politics and governance at the 
ground. The HDP, on the other hand, acts as a party across Turkey seeking to get into 
the national parliament. For this reason, the HDP, since its establishment, has 
introduced itself with the identity of belonging to the Republic of Turkey instead of 
being a mere pro-Kurdish party.  
                                                          
50 “Özerk bölge kurulursa da AKP olacak. Biz onunla yarışa gireceğiz. MHP de olacak. Bizim modelimizde 
tek parti anlayışı yok. Biz istiyoruz ki anayasada bölge partileri de kurulabilsin. Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi 
bu amaçla kuruldu. Türkiye Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi kuruldu. Devlet gelip tabelayı indirmedi. Bunlar 
bölge partisi olacak. Ama HDP ülke partisi.” 
51  “Bazı partiler sadece yerelde örgütlü kalır, bazıları da ulusal çapta. Demokraitk Özerklik modelinde 
bölgesel partiler kurabilmek istiyoruz. Mesela Doğu Karadeniz'de bir Laz partisi kurulabilir.” 
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The roles both the DBP and the HDP undertake are totally coherent with the ideas 
and recommendations of Abdullah Öcalan to the Kurdish movement. As İdris Baluken 
conveys, Öcalan is in favor of the concept that the DBP is a party functioning merely at 
the local level to build local democracy (Kurdistan 24). He recommends that the DBP 
seek to develop practices of autonomy, educate society and train new staff to spread the 
principles of autonomy. Öcalan, at the same time, believes that it is significant the HDP 
work very hard to embrace all the peoples in Turkey, who are somehow marginalized 
within the system. He underlines the absence of and the urgent need for a political party 
in Turkey that can embrace all kinds of groups and emphasizes that the HDP should 
have the duty of bridging this gap. In brief, Öcalan supports division of duty between 
the political parties that function merely at the local level and throughout the country.   
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to analyze the context of the Kurdish conflict and the 
legal design of Democratic Autonomy respectively. The analyses have manifested 
several significant outcomes that would allow the writer to evaluate the model as a 
resolution tool to bring peace to Turkey. In the light of these outcomes, Democratic 
Autonomy stands as a new alternative governance model hosting valuable arrangements 
such as the peoples’ councils system. Nevertheless, it also becomes evident that the 
model has some serious drawbacks to present a well-arranged institutional design which 
could yield a real solution to the conflict in question.  
To begin with, the vital issue of how the regional units would be arranged remains 
as an obscure matter. The main argument posed by Kurdish actors is that Democratic 
Autonomy is not based on and limited to any territorial boundaries. This argument, 
however, stands more of a strong discourse than a substantive legal arrangement. 
Moreover, the claim to establish over twenty regional units across Turkey lacks strong 
justification. It is much less likely that all parts of Turkey will call for full-fledged 
autonomous arrangements with strong legislative, executive and also judiciary powers. 
Today, at least, there appears no explicit demand for regional governments from other 
parts of Turkey. Thus, it would be unnecessary for the whole country to undergo such a 
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radical structural change. The literature on territorial self-governance similarly suggests 
that a federal arrangement not be necessary in countries where only particular groups 
concentrated in specific regions demand self-rule. The reconstruction of the whole 
country, thus would be redundant in such cases (Ghai 2000, Benedikter 2009a). The 
legal design of Democratic Autonomy suggests a federal structure for Turkey but 
cannot put forward a solid argument why such a federal arrangement is necessary and 
how could it be actualized. The only assertion put forth by the Kurdish movement is the 
“democratization of Turkey” argument, meaning that regional autonomies are necessary 
for Turkey to overthrow the heavy tutelage of the center over locals, and thus become 
more democratic. About how to construct it, Kurdish actors vaguely state that all parts 
of Turkey would demand such a system when its advantages are to become visible in 
Kurdistan.  
In addition, Kurdish actors on one hand emphasize the vitality to construct federal 
structure across Turkey, while on the other, they underline that the priority to establish 
self-governance is to be given to the Kurdistan region. This inevitably creates some 
confusion whether Democratic Autonomy is mainly designed as a federal arrangement 
or as an autonomous one solely for the Eastern and Southeastern regions. Moreover, 
even though Democratic Autonomy makes a claim over the Kurdistan region, there is 
no guarantee that the cities in question are prepared to be involved in such an 
arrangement. Although the Kurdish political movement has a strong basis in many of 
the cities in the region and Kurds have mainly been concentrated there, nearly half of 
the population are made up of non-Kurds. There is no clear evidence that these people 
would also acknowledge an autonomous arrangement, by means of which there might 
be a risk of a Kurdish hegemony afterwards. Moreover, Kurds within themselves are 
also highly diverse. Especially political and ideological rivalries within Kurdish society 
could even lead to a severe conflict over the issue.  
As a matter of fact, the territorial demarcations of Democratic Autonomy in the 
Kurdistan region are not clear either. It is currently not precise which cities the project 
will be constructed upon. There is no actual consensus among Kurdish actors about this 
vital issue. In the personally conducted interviews, much emphasis has been put on the 
historical boundaries of Kurdistan, while no clarifications have been made about its 
precise boundaries. At the same time, it has been strongly claimed that the so-called 
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Kurdistan region within itself would be divided into smaller autonomous regions for 
better governance. However, only one of the interviewees has specified how this 
division would be arranged. The same respondent gave specific names of five sub-
regions the region would be divided into; Amed, Botan, Serhat, Fırat and Dersim. 
However, these names have not been confirmed by any other source, neither by the 
interviewees nor by the other available data. All these different and even contradictory 
arguments obtained by the interviewees not only convey the limitations of Democratic 
Autonomy as an effective territorial solution, but also the deficiency of informational 
coordination among Kurdish actors themselves.  
Indeed, lack of informational coordination is a visible outcome of the analyses. In 
the personally conducted interviews, many incoherent answers to the same questions 
have been received. The most striking example of this is when a former BDP -current 
HDP deputy- claimed that the BDP had officially proposed Democratic Autonomy in 
the draft of the Constitution already delivered to the Parliament, while a former deputy 
said the model had never been proposed officially except for being “expressed 
politically.”  
In addition to these inadequacies, the organizational structure of the DTK appears 
as another issue left with an unclear design. Regarding this issue, the data suggest two 
different organization models. In the personally conducted interviews, the respondents 
have firmly stated that the DTK would receive public delegates from the city councils. 
In the DTK Contract, which is regarded as its Constitution, it is stated that the DTK 
would be organized upon five regional councils of five separate regions. This 
uncertainty about whether city or regional councils would send delegates to the upper-
parliament is directly related to the uncertainty about whether or not the Kurdistan 
region would be divided into five sub-regions. 
Even though the organizational design of the DTK is unclear, what is clear is that 
the institution is in charge of the duty of being the upper-parliament of the whole 
region. Naturally, the position and role that the DTK undertake also raises an important 
question: if there were separate autonomous regions within Kurdistan, why would there 
be one upper-parliament that claims legislative and executive powers over all the 
autonomous regions? Why would five regions unite under one parliament? Is the goal to 
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establish separate governance units or construct a whole Kurdish unit? Although the 
matter is crucial, it is not possible to answer these questions with the current data at 
hand. Undoubtedly, these ambiguities limit the merits of Democratic Autonomy to 
manifest a clear institutional design. Moreover, they also arouse suspicion about the 
project’s sincerity. The Kurdish movement strongly claims that the project is beyond 
any ethnic affiliation and Kurdishness. It also claims that it is not merely restricted to 
the Kurdish region but covers the whole country. Nonetheless, at the same time, it 
attempts to create a region based on Kurdishness. In this sense, it seems that the 
“beyond ethnic identity” argument is not well supported by a concrete legal design.  
Another outcome that the analyses has put forward is about the system of peoples’ 
councils. This bottom to top council system appears to be the most advanced and 
beneficial arrangement of Democratic Autonomy. It offers major advantages to the local 
people as strong local power sharing tools. Firstly, it provides a strong participatory 
system where people can easily have access to decision making mechanisms. It presents 
a pluralist and comprehensive ground for discussion, decision-making and 
implementation. Secondly, thanks to its delegate system, it provides a significant sphere 
where members of civil society organizations, political parties, youth and women 
organizations as well as grassroot can meet. High communication and interaction 
between different institutions could be very effective to reduce the risk of new conflicts 
emerging. Moreover, at times of disputes, people can carry their thoughts and concerns 
to the councils for discussion. By means of this, councils would also function as dispute 
resolution units. Lastly, again thanks to its delegate system, peoples’ councils could 
provide participation of delegates from the sub-councils in the upper ones. This would 
lead to communication between, for example, a member of a village commune and a 
delegate from a city council. A strong coordination among different local levels would 
be effective to reduce the risk of conflict or at least provide a common basis for its 
resolution. 
When taking all these outcomes into consideration, people’s councils provide a 
strong basis for society to get involved in governance and politics. However, despite all 
of its benefits, the council system does not suggest any effective mechanisms to 
guarantee the participation of diverse identity groups in the legislative and executive 
power structures. It is a highly participatory arrangement but lacks efficient tools to 
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ensure the incorporation of different ethnic and religious groups. This emerges as a 
serious inadequacy when the region is highly heterogeneous and it may be a risk to 
create new minority grievances. It is not quite possible to speak of effective local power 
sharing mechanisms when there is no arrangement to ensure the participation of, for 
example, an Armenian family in the district council, where the majority consist of 
Kurds.    
All the data, including the writings of Öcalan and the DTK, clearly emphasize that 
all groups living in the region would freely be joining in governance mechanisms. 
Similarly, all the respondents in the interviews have stated that all groups would be 
incorporated into the system, and their basic rights would naturally be granted. 
However, words and statements, in this case, are not sufficient means to entrench the 
role of the identity groups in governance. In brief, local power sharing tools of the 
project fall short to fully address the heterogeneous characteristic of the local region. 
The Kurdish movement carries out a very strong discourse about respecting all minority 
groups; however, the legal design of Democratic Autonomy does not fulfill this 
discourse.  
The analyses of the central-level power sharing tools of Democratic Autonomy 
similarly show that the model is insufficient to address the needs of its conflict context. 
The Kurdish populated region is significant to the overall country, and thus needs 
powerful tools to be effectively involved at the national level. It needs to ensure its role 
in the national parliament and even in the government to be able to have a say in matters 
affecting the whole country. Nevertheless, the design cannot put forward a coherent 
model regarding the issue. Incoherent and insufficient answers about the matter indicate 
that the institutional design of the project is not well-arranged.  
Another outcome of the analyses is that the EU stands as an important factor of 
reference for the Kurdish movement regarding local governance. The decentralized 
structure of most of the EU countries and the EU’s support for decentralization policies 
are regarded as significant matters that could affect Turkey positively. Moreover, the 
EU is often given as an inspiring model for its free movement policy among its member 
countries. The Kurdish movement, which aims to establish strong links between Kurds 
in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria through Democratic Autonomy and Democratic 
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Confederalism, suggests a similar model where the borders of the particular sovereign 
countries are protected while they become flexible and permeable. However, the fact 
that the Kurdish movement refers to the EU models as effective local governance 
models does not necessarily indicate that the EU should be seen as an instrument of 
conflict resolution or an agent in achieving a convenient conflict settlement. Although 
the EU is a significant reference point for Kurdish actors, it is not attributed an 
excessive meaning. In fact, in many interviews and writings of Abdullah Öcalan, the 
necessity to go beyond European models has been was mentioned. The movement is 
inspired by the European modeling in some aspects and aims to realize a more advanced 
model in the Middle East. In addition, there is also a consensus among Kurdish actors 
that the European Charter of Local Self-Government is a necessary but inadequate step 
towards the realization of Democratic Autonomy.   
Overall, in the light of the analyses at hand, Democratic Autonomy appears to be 
based more on a strong discourse than on a concrete institutional design. Despite the 
fact that it has been more than ten years that the Kurdish movement has been working 
on the project and demanding its realization, no conclusive work has been carried out 
yet. Moreover, there is lack of coordination among Kurdish actors regarding the content 
and design of the model. Accepting these as the outcome of the analyses, this study 
shows that Democratic Autonomy, with its current design, is not able to offer a strong 
contribution to the resolution of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. It requires serious 
adjustments and technical improvements to make sure that all the vague matters are 
replaced by concrete designs that would fully address the context of the conflict.   
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CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter, firstly, will engage in a brief discussion on Democratic Autonomy 
by raising a couple of thought provoking remarks on its theoretical and philosophical 
basis. These remarks will not profoundly be dealt with here since each issue is a distinct 
debate topic on its own and is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, the major 
points touched upon here are considered to be important to fully grasp and evaluate 
Democratic Autonomy and crucial to elaborate upon in a future study. Secondly, the 
chapter will  give the conclusion of the thesis by giving the outcome of the analysis on 
the institutional design of Democratic Autonomy.   
 
7.1 Discussion 
Democratic Autonomy is the expression of a “living together demand” set forth 
by the Kurdish movement. It is the substantive expression of a political agenda that 
constructs the future of Kurds in Turkey. In this sense, it is a valuable project and 
deserves considerable thought. However, this does not mean that there should be no 
room for criticism. In fact, it is just the opposite. By means of evaluating humble and 
constructive criticisms, the Kurdish movement can develop the project and carry it to 
the negotiation table as a strong issue. In the previous chapter, the institutional 
limitations and inadequacies of the project were given due to the outcomes of the 
analyses. Now, a few thought provoking points will be made on its theoretical basis.  
Democratic Autonomy may raise several questions in the minds of the people 
involved in the subject. For example, the question of whether Democratic Autonomy is 
a project of “equal citizenship” or a project that grants “privileges” to a certain group is 
one of them. The Kurdish movement, on one hand, manifests the project as one seeking 
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equality for all peoples. On the other hand, it strongly emphasizes that this project is 
needed to hand over the rights of Kurds derived from being a nation. This dualness 
naturally leads to the question of whether Democratic Autonomy is based upon “politics 
of universalism” seeking equality among all citizens, or “politics of difference” that 
promotes the expression of uniqueness of identity groups (Özkırımlı 2014). 
Another question which is even harder to answer is, how Democratic Autonomy 
could claim to be “beyond any ethnicity” when it instrumentalizes Kurdishness as the 
strongest motive for its realization. The Kurdish movement pursues identity politics to 
advocate, develop and implement the project. It introduces it as a project that would free 
Kurds, recognize their identities and grant status to them. In brief, Democratic 
Autonomy is constructed upon the elements of Kurdishness. How would then this 
strong Kurdish identity be abandoned if Democratic Autonomy is to be implemented in 
the region? As Casier and Jongerden ask: “Can identity truly be used thus, appropriated 
as a strong mobilizing force that functions politically as a weapon, while at the same 
time pursuing its abolishment? How is this to be done, being done?” (2012, 6).  
Last but not least, is Democratic Autonomy, a project seeking a strong 
interpretation of democracy, truly democratic itself? To what extent has Abdullah 
Öcalan, the founder of the project, consulted the Kurdish society before proposing such 
a project for them? To what extent has the society been integrated in the process in 
which the PKK and the political wings have accepted the project as their political 
agendas? As already known, the PKK itself is a highly hierarchical organization mainly 
bound to its “leadership”. The leadership frequently speaks on behalf of the whole 
Kurdish society, creates strong typologies of Kurdishness and claims demands on their 
behalf. Accordingly, whether Democratic Autonomy is a product of a top-down 
decision of the leadership or that of a democratic process, emerges as a question worth 
being considered. Yet, it is important to note that political movements essentially need a 
strong leader to take the initiative. In other words, collective aspirations and demands 
can hardly be substantiated without leadership. The support of Kurdish people, in the 
long-run, is to determine the success of the political project.  
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7.2 Conclusion 
Ethnic, religious, lingual and other differences within a country are perceived by 
many states as a problem that needs to be handled. These states have mostly resorted to 
policies of uniformity and centralization with the conviction that they could eliminate 
the differences, and thus guarantee the state unity. Nevertheless, what has been 
overlooked is that attempts of uniformity and centralization do not necessarily bring 
about unity and, on the contrary, may even challenge it majorly (Oran 2003; Hannum 
1996). This makes up the case where identity groups have opposed to integrate into 
these policies and asked for their collective rights and rights to self-determination.  
The Kurdish conflict in Turkey serves as a good example in this context. As the 
Turkish State was determined to pursue policies of unification and centralization, the 
Kurdish movement was equally firm to challenge them. Today, the movement has 
reached a point of challenging the state’s centralist tradition with its current self-
determination demand. The Turkish State, since its establishment, has been a strongly 
centralized state in which the center not only collects most of the power in its hands, but 
also imposes its authority on the local governments. This strong centralized governance, 
with strict control over the country, has been considered to be mandatory during the 
creation of the Republic in order to establish order and unity (TESEV 2012). Today, it 
has become obvious that this heavy tutelage of the center stands as a barrier to Turkey’s 
democratization, and hence to the resolution of the Kurdish conflict.   
As a matter of fact, the resolution of one of the biggest problems the country is 
faced with, the Kurdish conflict, sits on a territorial solution, referred to as Democratic 
Autonomy by the mainstream Kurdish organizations in Turkey. This radical project 
appears to be valuable by itself as there is an explicit and strong demand towards its 
realization. It is also significant in that it involves a great potential to cure the long-
existing conflict. However, it is important to note that this solution necessitates 
restructuring the ongoing centralist tradition of the state. It suggests a totally new 
governance system for Turkey, which would require a drastic shift from its 
centralization.  
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As the Kurdish movement firmly demands the actualization of the model, it is 
necessary to examine what it indeed proposes for Turkey. This study, hence 
acknowledges Democratic Autonomy as a valuable proposal for the resolution of the 
Kurdish conflict and intends to manifest its content and evaluate to what extent it could 
contribute to the resolution of the conflict at issue. This way the study not only provides 
a factual ground for discussing the model technically but also bridges the gap existing in 
the literature. Although the Kurdish conflict and its resolution are issues extensively 
dealt with in the literature, a relatively small number of studies directly address the issue 
of Democratic Autonomy. Even the studies doing so try to make sense of the model 
rather briefly, not examining its internal design in a technical manner. This study, 
aiming to fill the gap in the literature, and more importantly to shed light on a topic 
which is crucial both for the present and the future of Turkey, manifests the design and 
technical content of Democratic Autonomy, reveals its merits and limitations, and thus 
evaluates its possible contributions to the resolution.  
The thesis argues that the design of Democratic Autonomy hosts serious 
inadequacies and ambiguities. First, it is not clear whether Democratic Autonomy is a 
design for Turkey as a whole or for its eastern regions only. Although Kurdish actors 
emphasize that the model aims to construct regional governments across Turkey, they 
strongly underline their desire that Kurdistan region is to be given priority. This, from 
the start, creates confusion about the scope of the model and terminology to use. The 
model seems to be suggesting both a federal and autonomous structure at the same time, 
thus creating a complexity about of its content and categorization. 
Second, the issue of the scale of regional governments remains obscure. The 
formation of regional units is one of the principal matters regarding a self-governance 
arrangement. Nevertheless, Democratic Autonomy is unable to manifest a clear design 
about how the regional government units would be arranged both throughout Turkey 
and in the Kurdistan region. Why, how and on what basis would Turkey be divided into 
more than twenty regional units? And how would it be possible to realize this project 
since there are no explicit demands for full fledge autonomous arrangements from the 
rest of the country? The data in hand are not able to provide strong statements to answer 
these questions. The arrangement of the Kurdistan region appears similarly vague. The 
data underline that the territorial demarcations of the region would be based on its 
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historical boundaries, also claiming that there would be distinct regions within 
Kurdistan. What are the concrete historical demarcations and how the region within 
itself could be divided, yet are not effectively substantiated. Third, the organizational 
structure of the DTK yet is another issue that is indefinite. If Kurdistan were divided 
into distinct regions, why would there be a single upper-parliament claiming power on 
all the regions?  
As for the power sharing arrangements, there are serious inadequacies as well. In 
fact, the local power sharing tools, which are the people’s councils, are substantial 
mechanisms aiming to incorporate the grassroot into the decision making and 
implementation processes. From street and village communes to the regional assembly 
they propose a wide chain of people’s councils. This system aims to free people from 
the heavy tutelage of the central decision making structures and have them be part of 
autonomous councils that take autonomous decisions. Moreover, the councils involve 
delegates from different levels of governance and civil society organizations. This is 
important to create an effective communication and interaction among different levels 
of structures. The people’s councils system proposed by Democratic Autonomy thus 
seems to be a promising new way of governance for Turkey and it is valuable for 
granting major power to people. Nonetheless, the council system does not put forward 
any suggestions about how to incorporate all the diverse groups within the system. As 
the region is highly heterogeneous, there should be guarantee mechanisms to make sure 
that all groups find representation in the decision making and implementation processes. 
The data, about this matter, suggest that it be a principle of Democratic Autonomy to 
guarantee the inclusion of all diverse groups within the system. Nevertheless, this 
principal needs to be accompanied by concrete mechanisms to create an effective 
internal design.  
Another drawback is that the participation of the Kurdistan region in the national 
decision making and implementation processes are also vital as the region is significant 
for the country. Yet, there is definitely no clear design about how the local would be 
incorporated in to the national level. In fact, regarding this issue, the data put forth 
contradictory statements. This not only indicates the ambiguity about the design of 
central power sharing mechanisms but also the lack of informational coordination 
among Kurdish actors and organizations. Indeed, in many issues regarding the design of 
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Democratic Autonomy, the data manifest incoherent points. This creates a major 
difficulty to introduce a well-arranged internal design. 
All in all, the thesis argues that Democratic Autonomy has serious inadequacies 
to make a genuine contribution to the resolution of the Kurdish conflict. Nevertheless, 
provided that essential adjustments and technical improvements are made, it can surely 
be applicable in the future. Accordingly, future work on the topic can focus on 
discussing and developing a strong institutional design for a self-governance model for 
Turkey framed around the resolution of the Kurdish conflict. Making use of the 
decentralization and self-governance models of the European Union countries may 
serve useful to develop an alternative local governance structure, other than the model 
of Democratic Autonomy. Examining the institutional designs of effective self-
governance models, especially those which are embodied in an ethnic conflict context, 
may also help to develop a decentralization model for the country. These works, 
however, need to go beyond studies merely framed around decentralization and 
democratization of Turkey and seek a design which should be able directly target the 
Kurdish conflict.  
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APPENDIX 
SAMPLE QUESTIONS FROM THE INTERVIEWS 
İsmim Melisa Mendoza Vasquez. İstanbul Sabancı Üniversitesi’nde Uyuşmazlık 
Analizi ve Çözümü yüksek lisans öğrencisiyim. Tez çalışmamı Demokratik Özerklik 
üzerinde yapacağım. Uzun zamandır Demokraik Özerklik ile ilgili yazılanları, Abdullah 
Öcalan’ın kaleme aldıklarını ve sizlerin görüşlerini okuyorum, takip ediyorum. 
Özerklik’in temelindeki fikre ve felsefeye aşinayım. Tezimde ise Demokratik 
Özerklik’in somut ve kurumsal tasarımı üzerinde duracağım. Yönelteceğim sorular da 
bu doğrultuda olacak. Görüşmeye vakit ayırdığınız için teşekkür ederim. Ses kaydı 
yapabilir miyim?52 
Defining Democratic Autonomy 
Türkiye çapında 20-25 bölgeden bahsediliyor. “Kimlik-üstü” bir proje olma iddiasında 
olduğunu biliyorum, fakat yine de somut bir sınırlar ve belirlemeler olması kaçınılmaz 
bir gereklilik. Bahsettiğiniz bölgelerin sınırları neye göre tespit edilecek?53 
Kürt hareketinin özellikle vurguladığı Demokratik Özerk Özgür Kürdistan’ın alanı ve 
sınırları neye göre tespit edilecek? Her şehir referandum ile kendi mi karar verecek 
                                                          
52 My name is Melisa Mendoza Vasquez. I am a post-graduate student in İstanbul at Sabancı University in 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution Program. I am going to study Democratic Autonomy in my master’s thesis. 
I have been following the writings about Democratic Autonomy, Abdullah Öcalan’s writing and your 
comments for a long time. I am familiar with the idea and philosophy underlying Democratic Autonomy. In 
my thesis, I will focus on the concrete institutional design of Democratic Autonomy. The questions I will 
raise will be in accordance with this. Thank you for devoting your time to the interview. Can I record? 
53 20 to 25 regions across Turkey are being mentioned. I am aware that this claims to be a “beyond identity” 
project, however, concrete borders and demarcations are an inevitable fact. How are the borders of these 
regions to be arranged?  
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Kürdistan bölgesine katılmaya? Veya başka ne tür bir uygulama olacak bu bölgenin 
belirlenmesinde?54 
Kürtlerin uzun yıllardır talep ettikleri “statü” Demokratik Özerklik midir? Başka bir 
statü çözüm için yeterli olamaz mı?55 
Avrupa Yerel Yönetimler Özerklik Şartnamesi yerel büyük oradan güç devrediyor. 
Şartname üzerinde çekinceler kaldırılsa ve tam anlamıyla uygulamaya konulsa bu 
çözüm için yeterli olmaz mı?56 
Merkez hükümet ile özerk bölge arasındaki yetki dağılımı önemli konular arasında. 
Kürdistan özerk bölgesi yasama, yürütme ve yargı erklerinin üçünde de yetki sahibi 
olmak istiyor mu? Hangi konularda ve alanlarda yetki sahibi olmak istiyor? Hangi 
konular yalnızca merkez hükümetin sorumluluğunda olacak?57 
Kürdistan bölgesinin resmi dilleri hangileri olacak? Bölgede kullanılan diğer dillerin 
status ne olacak?58 
Kürdistan’ın sınır ötesi ilişkileri nasıl olacak? Özellikle diğer komşu bölgedeki Kürt 
nüfuslu bölgelerle iş birliği ve koordinasyon olacak mı, nasıl olacak?59 
                                                          
54 How are the territory and boundaries of Democratic Autonomous Free Kurdistan, particularly emphasized 
by the Kurdish movement, to be arranged? Is each city going to decide whether or not to join the Kurdistan 
region by referandum? What other arrangements would play a role in determining the region?  
55 Is the “satus” which Kurds have long demanded Democratic Autonomy? Would another status not be 
adequate for a solution? 
56 European Charter of Local Self-governance gives great power to the local. If the reservations about the 
Charter were lifted and if it were totally put into practice, would this not be sufficient for the solution? 
57 The distribution of powers between central and autonomous region is among significant issues. Does 
Kurdistan Autonomous Region want to hold power over the legislation, execution and judiciary? On which 
matter and areas does it it want to have authority? Which issues will be under the responsibility of only 
central government? 
58  Which languages will be the official languages of the Kurdistan region? What will the status of the other 
languages used in the region be? 
59 How will the cross border relationships of Kurdistan be? Will there be cooperation and coordination 
between Kurdish populated regions in the neighboring area?   
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Demokratik Özerklik Anayasal güvence altına alınmazsa bu Kürt siyasi hareketini 
tatmin eder mi?60 
Power Sharing Mechanisms 
Kürdistan çok heterojen bir bölge. Bölgede yaşayan azınlıkların hem yasama hem de 
yürütme organlarına katılımı nasıl sağlanacak? Farklı grupların karar alma ve yürütme 
süreçlerine katılımını garanti altına alacak mekanizmalar mecvut mu?61 
Kürdistan bölge meclisinde karar alma süreçlerinde azınlıkların veto hakkı olabilecek 
mi? Nasıl bir oylama sistemi tasarlanıyor?62 
Kürdistan yönetimi Ankara merkez meclisinde ve yürütmesinde yer alacak mı, ne 
oranda yer alacak ve nasıl bir sistemle yer alacak?63 
                                                          
60If Democratic Autonomy is not entrenched by the Constitution, would this satisfy the Kurdish political 
movement? 
61Kurdistan is a heterogenous region.  How will the participation of the minorities living in the region in 
legislation and execution be fulfilled? Are there any mechanisms that would guarantee the participation of 
different groups in the decision making and execution processes?  
62Will the minorities have the right to veto in the process of decision making? What kind of voting system is 
being designed?  
63 Will the Kurdistan administration take place in the central parliament of Ankara, and if so to what extend 
and through what kind of system? 
